Water Industry Reform
 - Question

Lord Haskel: To ask Her Majesty’s Government what steps they are taking to reform the United Kingdom’s water industry.

Lord Benyon: My Lords, this Government have made improving water quality a priority and have introduced reforms to enable that. The Environment Act has modernised water resource planning, introduced new duties to reduce storm overflow discharges, and made drainage planning statutory. The draft strategic policy statement to Ofwat has set a new course so that the industry can deliver more for the environment, customers and the climate. If we do not see improvements, we will take further action.

Lord Haskel: My Lords, the Minister mentioned the Environment Act. This Act is ineffective because it has no set timetable or targets to clean up our water. There has been a stream of reports calling for action, all of which call for infrastructure investment by the water companies and for more action and less complacency from the regulator. But, after increasing dividends and company debt, most water companies are in no position to carry out the necessary investment. Indeed, one industry executive said that the water companies were spending more on maintaining their assets, which are deteriorating, rather than replacing them. Does the Minister agree that this situation is a danger to public health and risks creating our very own homegrown pandemic?

Lord Benyon: Water companies have invested £160 billion in a modernised infrastructure. I disagree with the noble Lord about the Environment Act; it sets out a very clear direction of travel for water companies and others to clean up our waterways. But I refer him to the strategic policy statement to Ofwat. It has been released in draft and will be laid before the House in the next few weeks, and it will add to it targets for improvement.

Lord Flight: My Lords, our basement flat in Westminster has twice been flooded seriously with sewage-contaminated water as a result of the water companies opening their sluice gates at times of heavy rainfall. The cost of renovating the flat and its contents has been expensive. Going forward, surely property owners need to have renovation costs financed by the relevant water companies.

Lord Benyon: I am sorry to hear about the noble Lord’s problems. The overflows into the Thames are activated by relatively small amounts of rainfall. That is why £1.4 billion is being spent on a new super-sewer, which will deal with those sewage overflows and, I hope, limit the problems to Thames Water bill payers.

Lord Wigley: My Lords—

Earl Howe: I apologise to the noble Lord. The noble Lord, Lord Jones of Cheltenham, has indicated his wish to speak virtually, and I think this might be a convenient time.

Lord Jones of Cheltenham: My Lords, Seven Trent and Wessex Water told Gloucestershire county councillors that they had no plans to ever stop dumping sewage, while Thames Water said it intended to stop only by 2050. None of the companies believes that the Government’s Environment Act will change their behaviour. Is this another example of how arrogance, indolence and ignorance freeze the government machine, while our rivers are polluted with raw sewage and water companies rake in the profits? Should we not freeze water bills and directors’ pay and ban dividends until the problem is stopped once and for all?

Lord Benyon: I believe the noble Lord will find that, if these water companies think that the provisions of the Environment Act and in the statutory policy statement by Ofwat mean that they will be able to carry on releasing sewage at the current level, they have a very serious other think coming.

Lord Wigley: My Lords, the Minister will be aware that the Question relates to the United Kingdom dimension. He will also be aware that water is largely devolved as far as Wales is concerned. In fact, the main provider in Wales is a not-for-profit company. In these circumstances, will he ensure that any new policy initiatives he might be contemplating will be undertaken only after full discussion with the Welsh Government to ensure that there is co-ordination, particularly along an open border, where there is responsibility on both sides by both authorities?

Lord Benyon: The noble Lord makes a very good point. Many water issues cross the border, not least the polluting of rivers on either side of the border. They require a very joined-up approach, not just between Governments but between water companies and farming interests.

Lord Watts: My Lords, is it not the case that our rivers are an absolute disgrace and the worst in Europe? Do we not need to sack the regulator and his group, introduce new legislation and have a Government who back the regulator?

Lord Benyon: This Government and the regulator are absolutely determined to see an improvement to the situation of sewage being released into rivers. Part of that problem is releases of sewage from water companies, part of it is from farming and part of it is from point-source pollution. It requires a holistic  approach. I refer the noble Lord to the statutory policy statement, which has been released in draft and will be laid before Parliament in the next few weeks. It will give him the assurance I think he requires.

Baroness Hayman of Ullock: My Lords, there also needs to be proper enforcement regarding water quality. The Environment Agency has seen its funding cut by 60% in recent years, reducing its capacity to carry out monitoring and enforcement activity. Prosecutions for environmental crime in England plummeted by 86% between 2000 and 2019 and the number of charges also fell by 84%. Does the Minister recognise that, if the Government truly are serious about tackling pollution in our rivers, they must fund the Environment Agency properly so that it can do the job it was set up to do?

Lord Benyon: Defra and its agencies received an extra £4.3 billion in the latest spending review in October 2021. We have made extra budget available to the Environment Agency for 50 extra inspectors to be recruited in this financial year to visit farms and other sources of water pollution to ensure that action is taken.

Lord Trefgarne: My Lords, what has come of the proposal for a national water grid, which seems to have been pending for a very long time?

Lord Benyon: The noble Lord raises an important point. Under the way we economically value water, it is extremely expensive to move it around the country, from areas that have a lot of rain to those that do not. That economic modelling will change very quickly if we continue to have serious droughts, and we have to remain open to moving water between water company areas in a much more joined-up way.

Baroness McIntosh of Pickering: My Lords, will my noble friend pay tribute to Yorkshire Water, which has invested in such a grid for the region? Will he also ensure that, where appropriate, water companies and drainage authorities will be part of the catchment management system?

Lord Benyon: There is a sort of grid, which allows you to move water from Yorkshire as far down as Ipswich, using a variety of different means. Following the disastrous situation in the early 2000s, Yorkshire Water created a much more balanced infrastructure, which has worked for it and needs to be copied by others.

Lord Mackenzie of Framwellgate: My Lords, this Government seem to be suffering from inaction in many departments at the moment, for various reasons. This subject has cropped up on numerous occasions in your Lordships’ House. Are the Government really serious about doing something about it, or are they simply going through the motions?

Lord Benyon: I have heard that one before. This is a very important matter for my department. I can assure the noble Lord that I and my fellow Ministers  talk to each other about this on a weekly basis. A whole range of measures is being brought forward, and together these measures will continue to make a difference. What we need most of all is continued investment in the infrastructure, some of which goes back to Edwardian times and does not reflect the fact that large numbers of new houses and businesses now exist and require that infrastructure to service them.

Lord Carrington: My Lords, I declare my interests as a farmer, as set out in the register. Can the Minister please confirm that any measures to reform the UK water industry are taken after full consultation with all the interested parties in that industry? The Environment Agency’s interpretation of the 2018 farming rules for water did not do that, and as a result farming companies, water companies and microbiologists all witnessed damage to the environment, their businesses and so on. Please can there be consultation?

Lord Benyon: I entirely understand the point the noble Lord makes; that measure was brought in in a less than perfect way. But we have a problem; we have rivers that need to be cleaned up. Government tries to sit between, on the one hand, requiring business to do something and, on the other, supporting the regulator. We hope we get it right, but we do not always.

Rape Trials
 - Question

Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede: To ask Her Majesty’s Government what steps they are taking to increase the proportion of rape allegations that go to trial.

Lord Stewart of Dirleton: My Lords, the rape review action plan has committed to transforming the criminal justice system to tackle systemic failures on rape. In that, we demonstrate our commitment to transparency and public accountability throughout. Our aims are to improve victims’ experience of the criminal justice system, to increase the numbers of victims who stay engaged in the process and to build better and stronger cases so that more people are charged and, ultimately, more rapists go to prison.

Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede: My Lords, I thank the Minister for that Answer. I will just remind the House how appalling the statistics are: only 1.6% of reported rape allegations result in a court case. As the Minister said, the Government’s response has been to put in place the rape review action plan. On 22 January the CPS published its latest statistics regarding the handling of rape. Five categories of data were published; they showed either a flatlining of the data or a modest improvement. Is the Minister happy with that improvement, or does he think he should put in place some targets?

Lord Stewart of Dirleton: My Lords, I acknowledge the data that the noble Lord has placed before the House. I suggest that it is not so much a matter of imposing targets as one of following through on the Government’s approach, which will see an increase in spending over the lifetime of this Parliament and involve more special training for police officers and prosecutors in this area. Finally, although, as I have said, I acknowledge the statistics that the noble Lord has placed before your Lordships, it is important to recognise that the data is necessarily retrospective and relates to times before the Government’s actions, as set out in the action plan, commenced.

Lord Carlile of Berriew: My Lords, will the Minister assure the House that, in the Attorney-General’s regular meetings with the Director of Public Prosecutions, she will hold the director to account for the chilling effect of recent changes in CPS charging guidance in relation to rape? Surely it is in the hands of the DPP that the awful statistics can be improved and victims given a proper hearing.

Lord Stewart of Dirleton: My Lords, I can give the noble Lord that assurance. I remind the House that, of course, as the noble Lord is well aware, we are dealing not simply with the role of government but with necessarily independent bodies, upon which our constitution relies—it relies on the independence of the judiciary and of prosecutors—but I can give the noble Lord the assurance that he seeks.

Baroness Hussein-Ece: My Lords, the End Violence Against Women Coalition reported that, as a result of funding cuts in recent years, two-fifths of police forces in England and Wales no longer have a specialist rape and serious sexual offences unit, thereby losing vital expertise in investigating and prosecuting sexual violence. At a time when rape prosecutions remain at their lowest level on record and rape survivors face some of the longest delays to their cases reaching trial of any victims of crime, are the Government serious about prioritising tackling sexual violence against women and girls?

Lord Stewart of Dirleton: My Lords, this Government are indeed serious about addressing the matters that the noble Baroness has placed before the House. I am able to give the noble Baroness some assurances in relation to figures. We are on track to recruit a further 20,000 police officers by the end of this Parliament. Over 100 prosecutors have undertaken induction training on rape and serious sexual offences—RASSO as it is known—while 674 prosecutors have been trained in a suspect-centred approach; that means focusing the investigation on the suspect and shifting away from the idea that it is the function of the police somehow to challenge the complainer’s account of events. Furthermore, by the end of this financial year, 176 prosecutors will have been trained and skilled in the assessment of the impact of trauma on memory. All these measures will enhance the ability of the system to address these extremely serious crimes.

Baroness Chakrabarti: My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for acknowledging the issue of resources in relation to sexual offences, in particular, and for the  other commitments that he has made, but does he agree that the culture of misogyny in our police service is leading women not to have the confidence they need to come forward? I refer noble Lords to reporting overnight of the case of the Nottingham academic who was strip-searched in police custody in circumstances that can be described only as a sexual assault.

Lord Stewart of Dirleton: My Lords, the expression “misogyny”, and the extent, meaning and parameters of that expression, are currently under consideration. Beyond that I do not intend to provide any further answer.

Lord Hogan-Howe: My Lords, what are the chances of investigating and prosecuting serious sexual offences when 70% of victims are regarded at the time of the attack as vulnerable, sometimes due to alcohol and sometimes to age or mental illness? This means that the prosecution decisions can be quite difficult when the account of the victim is regarded as inconsistent. We never know how juries accept their evidence, and we never have any research into how juries reach their verdicts. I wonder whether this area is something on which the Government would consider instigating proper research to find out what it is that influences a jury. It is not always the things that we believe make a difference.

Lord Stewart of Dirleton: I can tell the House that there is work currently under way by the Law Commission to address misconceptions in this field. The expression often used is “rape myths”, although I am not sure that I am especially fond of that. I think “misconceptions” better addresses and refers to the topic raised by the noble Lord.

Lord Mackenzie of Framwellgate: My Lords, does the Minister accept that modern technology has, ironically, made rape a more difficult crime to investigate because it depends on victims having confidence in the process? Many young women are not prepared to allow their cell phones to be seized and trawled through for months on end by the police. What are the Government doing to address this dilemma without compromising justice?

Lord Stewart of Dirleton: My Lords, the noble Lord makes an extremely important point. In relation to the end-to-end review and action plan, which the Government have published, we have set up a means by which people coming forward with complaints of rape can be confident that they will receive mobile telephones, so they will not be deprived of their use or their contacts and data. At the same time, we will be doing our best to strengthen the investigation of crimes so that complainers do not feel that their personal lives are being unduly pried into or that their rights to privacy are disturbed.

Baroness Blower: My Lords, would the Minister like to have another go at answering the question put to him by my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti, leaving aside the question of misogyny but answering the question about culture?

Lord Stewart of Dirleton: The culture of the police is an extremely broad topic. I regret if I seemed to have ducked the point raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, but these are extremely wide issues, which lie beyond the remit of my ability to answer today.

Wet Wipes: Disposal
 - Question

Baroness Quin: To ask Her Majesty’s Government what plans they have to regulate the disposal of wet wipes.

Lord Benyon: We have launched a call for evidence exploring options to tackle the issues caused by wet wipes. We are seeking views on mandatory flushability standards, mandatory labelling to indicate how wipes should be disposed of, an extended producer responsibility scheme, and a ban on wet wipes containing plastic, with exemptions for medical purposes. Responses to the call for evidence will inform our next steps.

Baroness Quin: My Lords, I recognise that wet wipes are part of the consultation mentioned by the Minister, but given the enormous amount of damage that they do, both to the environment and in causing sewer blockages, and given too that there is cross-party support for a ban in both Houses of Parliament, will the Government bring forward measures very soon, either by secondary legislation under the Environment Act or by giving government time and support to the recent Bill presented in the House of Commons by Fleur Anderson MP?

Lord Benyon: The Government wish to reflect the cross-party support for action on this, and will be moving quickly, following this call for evidence and the analysis of it. We are, in spirit, behind the Bill that the noble Baroness talked about, but we think there are more complications that we want to iron out before we bring forward legislation. If she can be patient with the response to the call for evidence, I think we will all find ourselves on the same page.

Duke of Wellington: My Lords, anyone who saw the BBC “Panorama” programme last April about river pollution will remember how much of the riverbed of the Thames was covered in a layer of plastic wet wipes and other domestic products. Have the Government made any assessment of the effect on the health of our rivers from this very unpleasant layer of domestic plastic waste that covers so much of our riverbeds?

Lord Benyon: Like every Member of this House, I was repulsed by the fatberg found under the streets of London a few months ago, which was largely created out of wet wipes. The Marine Conservation Society says that wet wipes were the third most common type of litter found on beaches in Great Britain in 2020 and that 93% of the material that causes sewer blockages comes from wet wipes, so there is an urgency  in dealing with this issue. We really want to get rid of the plastic that exists within wet wipes and to make sure that parent groups’ fears are alleviated, but we also do not want to cause other environmental problems by replacing plastic with other materials that would then be damaging to the environment in how they were harvested. There are complications that we need to deal with, but I share the noble Duke’s concerns.

Baroness Jones of Whitchurch: My Lords, the Minister has just said that this matter is urgent but he has also asked us to be patient. We know that, in addition to what the noble Duke has said about blockages in sewers piling up on our riverbanks and foreshores, it is costing water companies about £100 million a year to clean up these blockages and the pollution, and those costs are being passed on to the consumer. It is not a question of being patient; this is a very particular issue. We know that there are sustainable non-plastic alternatives so I cannot understand why it is taking the Government quite so long to process this when there are alternatives and the issue needs urgent action now. Can he reassure us that there is urgency in the actions that he is taking?

Lord Benyon: I hope I can. This issue is an absolute priority for us and fits in very well with a string of measures that the Government have taken in recent years to tackle plastics and the pollution effects that they have caused. In some cases the plastics in wet wipes are polyester, in some cases they are viscous—that is, they bind the fabric together—and sometimes they are spun into it.
Concerns have been raised by health organisations that wish to continue to use wet wipes because they see them as fundamental to hygiene in hospitals and other places. I hope that this year we will find a solution that reflects the results of our call for evidence, that we will move forward and that everyone supporting the Bill in the other place and here, and everyone who shares my concerns about this pollution problem, will find a solution that we can all be happy with.

Baroness Altmann: My Lords, with 11 billion wet wipes being used every year in this country and 90% of them containing plastic, the public are understandably in need of better and clearer information. Indeed, the flushable standards are voluntary. Can the Minister reassure the House that the flushable standards and the lack of use of plastic will be an urgent priority? Can he give us any timeline for when that might happen?

Lord Benyon: Currently, Water UK defines plastic as
“synthetic organic material (e.g. petro chemical derived plastic fibres)”.
Water UK has said that that Fine to Flush, the standard that it is applying, contains the flexibility to change within the evolving definition of plastics and that the standard is awarded only for a two-year to three-year period to enable it to be up to date. The Government are working with the industry to find solutions, but ultimately it is for the Government to regulate and we will do so.

Baroness McIntosh of Hudnall: My Lords, does the Minister agree that “biodegradable” has become a bit of a weasel word as time has gone on and that it is now a very powerful bit of marketing language that does not always properly describe what you have to look at the small print to find out, which is that things that are biodegradable sometimes also contain plastic? Can he assure the House that the language used in marketing products will not be misleading in that way?

Lord Benyon: There are many products that we were all told years ago were biodegradable but have now discovered are not, or which may be biodegradable to the eye but break down into microplastics. That is the problem with wet wipes: very often the material may disappear but the plastic is the problem and continues to cause problems in our environment. The noble Baroness is absolutely right.

Lord Addington: My Lords, can the Minister assure the House that the principle that the polluter will pay is actually passed down to the producers of these items and they will ultimately be picking up the bill? Would the Minister like to speculate on just how that would improve the development of acceptable replacements?

Lord Benyon: It is a very similar philosophical point to that raised by disposable nappies. These are created by manufacturers but used by all of us who have children. We need to find a way of giving a clear direction to the industry that one particular type of product will no longer be allowed. Then the industry will innovate and find affordable solutions that the consumer can use. That is the perfect sweet spot to hit when you are trying to regulate against these measures. The precautionary principle is also vital. When talking about biodegradable waste, if there is uncertainty in what we are doing, sometimes we just have to take the precautionary approach.

Baroness Ritchie of Downpatrick: My Lords, plastics and wet wipes have an impact on our fishing industry and marine environment—on both the catching and the processing sectors. In view of the impact on our hospitality industry and wider society, can the Minister provide us with a timetable that will indicate the implementation of the regulations and an acceptance of the Bill going through the other place that will diminish and eradicate the impact of plastics on our land and marine environments?

Lord Benyon: We will be working with the proposer of this Bill, Fleur Anderson, to make sure that she understands what we are trying to do alongside her Bill. There are no state secrets here. We will be sharing all the data we get as a result of this call for evidence. We can inform your Lordships about when we are bringing forward measures within the provisions of the Environment Act or other forms of legislation as quickly as possible, recognising the urgency that everybody feels.

Ukraine:  Military and Non-military Support
 - Question

Lord Walney: To ask Her Majesty’s Government what further (1) military, and (2) non-military, support they will offer to the government of Ukraine to deter the threat of an invasion by Russian forces.

Baroness Goldie: My Lords, we unequivocally support Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and that is why the United Kingdom has provided considerable military support to the Government of Ukraine through Operation Orbital and the assistance announced by the Defence Secretary on 17 January, as well as a range of economic assistance measures and diplomatic engagement.

Lord Walney: I thank the Minister for that Answer. The Prime Minister has rightly signalled today that UK forces will be part of NATO’s defence of its borders, but surely the focus must continue to be on increasing support for Ukraine itself to deter this heinous act of aggression. In addition to punishing economic sanctions, will the Government make clear that lethal military support for our partner will be increased and ongoing in the event of further incursion?

Baroness Goldie: The noble Lord will be aware that under Operation Orbital we have offered a range of military support since 2015. That is continuing. The recently announced ongoing package is a part of that. Another part of it is a maritime training initiative. We have a range of support measures and will continue to do everything we can to support Ukraine to defend itself if that becomes necessary.

Lord Lancaster of Kimbolton: My Lords, having been involved in many a deal with foreign nations over the donation of military equipment, all too often we supply that which we have in surplus as opposed to what the nation needs. Can my noble friend assure me that that will not be a limiting factor in this case and that any donations of further military kit will be done in co-ordination with our NATO allies?

Baroness Goldie: Yes, I reassure my noble friend that any donations are made within the limitations of ensuring that we have residual supplies for our normal operational needs. These donations—he is quite correct to emphasise that that is what they are— are specific: to aid self-defence if that need should arise.

Lord West of Spithead: My Lords, the UN charter authorises the Security Council and General Assembly to take action against any nation that jeopardises world peace. What discussions have we had with our men at the UN to see if any action is going to take place? While understanding that the Security Council  would be vetoed by Russia, there are other actions that might help and would show the opprobrium in which the world holds Putin’s actions.

Baroness Goldie: The noble Lord will understand that there has been a range of diplomatic and military engagement by the United Kingdom Government, not least by my right honourable friends the Secretary of State for Defence and the Foreign Secretary. As to whether that extends to speaking to the men—or, may I say, women—in the United Nations, I do not have specific information, but I can assure him that the widest possible diplomatic activity has been embarked upon.

Baroness Smith of Newnham: The noble Lord, Lord Walney, suggested that we should be thinking about direct support for Ukraine, but what support are we also giving to our allies in NATO, particularly in the Baltic states? We obviously have a presence in Estonia—are we increasing our support there? What conversations have Her Majesty’s Government had with Bulgaria and Romania, whose position in NATO has been challenged by Russia?

Baroness Goldie: Obviously, the noble Baroness will realise that the focus of attention at the moment is on the aggressive and unacceptable behaviour of President Putin in relation to a particular state: Ukraine. We continue as members of NATO to make our full contribution to the forward presence in the Baltic. That has been a very well received initiative which we continue to support.

Lord Howell of Guildford: In gathering together a robust alliance against Russian threats and bullying, will my noble friend assure us that we will include the rising and great powers of Asia and the Middle East, because they are the ones whose voices Russia will listen to most closely?

Baroness Goldie: There has been a wide programme of engagement, not least by my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Defence, with colleagues across the globe, but also by the Foreign Secretary. There has been a desire to ensure that we canvass as wide a position of views as possible. Everyone understands that the proposals and activity of President Putin are completely unacceptable. There is a concerted voice asking him please to de-escalate.

Lord Coaker: My Lords, it is important for Russia to know that Her Majesty’s Opposition stand fully with the UK Government in the actions they are taking with respect to Ukraine and the defence of its sovereignty, including the continuing military assistance, such as the defensive anti-tank weapons sent last week. These are worrying times for security in Europe, so can the Minister say more about the international diplomatic efforts to de-escalate? Can she also say something about the forthcoming visit by the Defence Secretary to Moscow and what he will be saying? Russia needs to know that we support a diplomatic solution, but we will be resolute in our defence of Ukraine and the security of our NATO allies.

Baroness Goldie: I thank the noble Lord not just for his remarks but for their tenor, which is extremely helpful. The Secretary of State is going to meet with his Russian counterpart; that invitation has been accepted. Discussions are ongoing about timing and location. I am unable to say more about that at the moment, but concerted endeavour continues, as the noble Lord will be aware from the Prime Minister’s Statement in the other place earlier today. A very full range of activity was outlined, including engagement with major state leaders across the globe.

Lord Singh of Wimbledon: My Lords, Russia should be completely aware of the serious consequences of military intervention. Too much “Just you dare” talk can elicit the opposite reaction. Nations, like children, do not take kindly to being pushed into that position; they do not like to lose face, so we have to be very careful in the way we talk.

Baroness Goldie: I would actually agree with the noble Lord, and observe that every effort has been made to invite Russia and President Putin to continue to engage. Whether that is through the NATO-Russia Council or direct communication from other global states, that initiative is there. But the problem arises because President Putin has amassed over 100,000 military on the borders of Ukraine. He has taken that decision, and that is what is causing the anxiety.

Lord Campbell of Pittenweem: My Lords, if the Government decide to send further defensive weapons to Ukraine, will they seek access for RAF aircraft to German airspace? If not, why not?

Baroness Goldie: The noble Lord will be aware that we do not comment on operational matters in detail, and he will understand that that has been a respected tradition for successive Governments, so I cannot comment on that specific detail. However, I can answer a question he asked me last week, to which I omitted to respond, on the allegation that Germany denied access to its airspace. Germany did not deny access, because the UK did not submit a request. There has been no dispute between the UK and Germany on the issue; in fact, the Defence Secretary has plans to visit Germany shortly to meet the Defence Minister.

Baroness Meyer: I declare my interest as trade envoy to Ukraine. Has not the United Kingdom given more support to Ukraine than any other European country, and should not some of our neighbours pull their socks up and do a little bit more to support Ukraine against Russia’s aggression?

Baroness Goldie: As my right honourable friend the Prime Minister outlined earlier today in the other place, in fact, significant support has been forthcoming from other nations. As a prominent member of NATO—it being the umbrella under which the UK has been channelling a lot of its activity, along with the United States—there has been a recognition by member states that they need to flex their muscles and make their contribution. The evidence is that they are doing that, and we are very grateful to them.

Lord Alton of Liverpool: My Lords, will the noble Baroness return to the question from the noble Lord, Lord Campbell, about the position of Germany in regard to Estonia, which has been trying to send munitions to Ukraine for its self-defence? When one NATO country stops another NATO country upholding freedom, liberty and democracy, what does that say about our position as an alliance? Also, what does it say when Germany offers instead to provide a field hospital to Ukraine?

Baroness Goldie: I do not have any information on that precise point, but I undertake to investigate and respond to the noble Lord if I can.

Lord Browne of Ladyton: My Lords, innocent civilians will pay the cost of political failure if the current tensions over Ukraine continue to escalate. The most important non-military support we can give Ukraine is to continue intense, robust dialogue. The Secretary of State for Defence explained this in the Statement he made last week, and I commend him for his willingness to meet with General Shoygu in Moscow. Does the noble Baroness not agree that if we are going to find a sustainable solution to this problem without further unnecessary deaths, we need to concentrate on diplomacy?

Baroness Goldie: The noble Lord speaks with authority and makes a very important point. He will be aware that the NATO approach over recent years has in fact been deterrence, dialogue and defence, and that is a sustainable way forward. It is certainly an approach this Government endorse, and it is the approach we are endeavouring to prosecute at the moment. We just hope that President Putin is hearing the entreaties being uttered and understands that there are very, very grave consequences to follow if he decides to pursue his proposals to invade Ukraine.

Coronavirus Grants: Fraud
 - Private Notice Question

Baroness Smith of Basildon: Asked by Baroness Smith of Basildon
To ask Her Majesty’s Government what is the expected cost of fraudulent claims made under the Coronavirus Grant Schemes.

Baroness Smith of Basildon: My Lords, this Question might seem familiar because it is the third time that we have asked it. I thank the noble Viscount, Lord Younger, for coming to the House to answer this today.

Viscount Younger of Leckie: Perhaps I should start by thanking my noble friend Lord Agnew for allowing me the opportunity to stand here today—

Noble Lords: Oh!

Viscount Younger of Leckie: I promise that I shall stay the course. Throughout this dreadful crisis that we have had to endure over the past two years, the Government’s number one priority has been to protect jobs and livelihoods while also supporting businesses and public services across the UK. We had to work particularly quickly to produce some generous packages to give the necessary support back in lockdown 1.

Baroness Smith of Basildon: I hesitated because I was not sure if the noble Viscount had finished—because, again, he did not answer the Question. Whistleblowing is vital in exposing undesirable or unlawful conduct. The Government rightly expect others to operate to high standards but do not seem to be able to meet those standards themselves.
Yesterday, the serious frustrations of the noble Lord, Lord Agnew, finally bubbled over, leading him to blow the whistle on his own colleagues as he departed. His lengthy statement yesterday exposed chaos and mismanagement across government, but it did not answer the question posed by my noble friend Lord Tunnicliffe. The Chancellor has gone AWOL, and, in his absence, although the noble Viscount did not give the figure today, other junior Ministers have insisted that putting the coronavirus fraud at £4.3 billion is too simplistic.
Taxpayers are footing the bill; your Lordships’ House and they deserve answers. If it is not £4.3 billion-worth of fraud, how much is it? If he has not got the answer today—I think noble Lords will understand why—can we at least be told when we will know and exactly how much of that the Treasury intends to write off?

Viscount Younger of Leckie: It is a slightly complicated picture, but the Government continue to work actively with the British Business Bank, lenders and fraud authorities to identify and address fraud risks and recover loans obtained fraudulently. On the noble Baroness’s question, the £4.3 billion figure is not recognised by HMRC; it is an inference made in the report by the Times, which I am sure the noble Baroness has read. The figure that was taken out of that was £5.8 billion, which was in the report and accounts of HMRC. Some £500 million, which was returned, should be deducted from that, so we think that there is £800 million to £1 billion to recover.

Lord Young of Cookham: My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend. Was not the object of the loan scheme to enable existing companies to continue trading through the pandemic? If, as we heard from my noble friend Lord Agnew yesterday, banks paid out money to companies incorporated post Covid, and did so negligently, are we not entitled to revoke the 100% taxpayer guarantee?

Viscount Younger of Leckie: Again, we should remember that, in lockdown 1—roughly from March to April 2020—there was a clear need for urgent action to encourage a greater take-up of different support measures. That is why we intervened to change the design of the bounce-back scheme to make it 100% backed, which led to £46 billion being sent to 1.5 million businesses. To take up my noble friend’s point, I am sure that lessons can be learned, but, at the time, it was imperative that the Government acted quickly.

Lord Stoneham of Droxford: My Lords, when Covid struck, HMRC stopped answering its fraud-reporting phone line—the phones just rang and rang. The alternative way of reporting fraud online required entering intrusive personal details that most people were afraid to provide. How much fraud does the Minister estimate has been unreported due to the Government’s attitude towards whistleblowers?

Viscount Younger of Leckie: The noble Lord’s question is focused on HMRC, but I can say that the expected losses to error and fraud in 2021 were £5.8 billion, and expected losses for 2021-22 will be published in due course. But a lot of work is going on in terms of recovery, and the expected recovery by HMRC is estimated to be between £1.3 billion and £1.5 billion.

Lord Carlile of Berriew: My Lords, did the Government anticipate the potential use of existing ready-made off-the-shelf companies as instruments of fraud? Is it yes or no?

Viscount Younger of Leckie: I think the answer has to be no. We had to move particularly quickly in very difficult circumstances. Of course, there is always a risk of fraud—all fraud is unacceptable, but there was a risk because we had to move quickly. As I say, there is a lot of work and, particularly from HMRC’s point of view, in the months and years ahead there is big scope to recover.

Lord Browne of Ladyton: My Lords, fraud in government is rampant and is estimated at just under £30 billion—so writes the noble Lord in the Financial Times today. Why, in those circumstances, did the Government agree to drop the long-awaited economic crime Bill from next year’s legislatory list for Parliament to consider?

Viscount Younger of Leckie: I do not have an answer to that; I will have to get an answer to the noble Lord. I say again that the schemes brought forward during those very difficult times were designed in response to a pronounced market failure, particularly with the UK’s smallest businesses struggling to access the finance that they needed to survive at the start of the pandemic. Voices from across the spectrum, including from the party opposite, were shouting at us to be sure that we acted quickly. We were already doing so, but we continued to do so.

Lord Cormack: My Lords, I express sympathy for my noble friend: yesterday he took the letter and today he has drawn the short straw. Does he accept that this matter really is important now? This was an Answer to an Urgent Question in the other place, and it is important that we have a definitive Statement from the Government giving as many figures as possible. While I acknowledge that fraud is more difficult to detect than to denounce, we need to have these facts.

Viscount Younger of Leckie: My noble friend makes a very good point. As I alluded to earlier, HMRC and BEIS are working very hard in conjunction with the lenders to recover as much as we possibly can. I reiterate that the figures, as noble Lords will tell me,  are big. We have paid out altogether more than £400 billion to support the economy. It is fair to say that to that extent it has been a great success, because the economy is in very good shape.

Lord Patel: My Lords—

Lord Sikka: My Lords—

Earl Howe: My Lords, it is the turn of the Cross Benches.

Lord Patel: My Lords, I listened to the debate yesterday, in which the noble Lord, Lord Agnew, indicated that some lenders were failing on fraud. Can the Minister say which lenders are failing on fraud?

Viscount Younger of Leckie: I do not accept the premise that lenders are failing on fraud, and, of course, the noble Lord, Lord Patel, will know that I am not in a position to name individual lenders. However, lenders continue to work closely with the Government on counterfraud, including recovering £1.2 million on facilities identified as fraudulent so far. It is important that lenders are held accountable for taxpayers’ money, and all lenders continue to be subject to a robust audit process by the British Business Bank.

Lord Sikka: My Lords, two 30-second checks would have saved the Government billions of pounds. First, no one can open an ISA account without providing a national insurance number, but the Government did not require that information from anyone seeking furlough support. Secondly, all applicants for Covid loans should have been required to provide an HMRC reference number. That would have killed off all dormant companies and offshore tax haven companies. Will the Minister please explain why these two 30-second checks were not applied?

Viscount Younger of Leckie: That is a very fair question and of course the sort of detailed question that I cannot answer. In terms of the fraud that we are looking to identify as part of the loan book, as of 17 December 2021 some £67 million worth of claims had been settled for the loan scheme. Of those, £13 million for 337 facilities had been flagged by lenders as suspected fraud. That is the sort of detail that we want to get into.

Baroness Altmann: My Lords, I too have sympathy with my noble friend the Minister, but will he reassure the House that the Government are looking seriously at the remarks and observations made by our noble friend Lord Agnew yesterday, particularly at any recommendations that he has for improving the situation and lessons learned at both BEIS and the British Business Bank, as well as at HMRC?

Viscount Younger of Leckie: I am aware that my noble friend has much experience in this area, linked to her work on pensions and in respect of HMRC. She is absolutely right: preventing fraud is incredibly important. We designed the schemes to prevent as much fraud as possible before any payments were made, while still quickly supporting those who needed  them in unprecedented circumstances. For example, the first furlough payments went out within six days of being announced. We had to move quickly but, clearly, as she said, lessons will be learned.

Lord Sandhurst: My Lords, yesterday, my noble friend Lord Agnew of Oulton told the House that he was at odds with what he said was the Treasury relying on after-the-event audits, saying that this was “too reactive” and too late. Why have the Government relied on auditing lenders after the event instead of taking preventive steps beforehand?

Viscount Younger of Leckie: That is a good point. It is certainly something that I shall need to look into and I shall need to write to my noble friend about it. There is no question but that the auditing side is particularly important.

Lord Vaux of Harrowden: My Lords, the sorts of fraud that we heard so vividly described yesterday would have been a lot more difficult if directors’ identities had to be verified. The Government announced some 18 months ago that they would do that. When will they start insisting that Companies House verify identities of directors?

Viscount Younger of Leckie: That is certainly one of the lessons learned; I know that it is on the agenda to be looked at.

Lord Harris of Haringey: My Lords, what is the point of designating a Minister as Minister for Fraud Prevention and then not listening to his advice? If you were the Chancellor of the Exchequer, surely you would want to listen to that advice and take some account of it.

Viscount Younger of Leckie: The House will have heard the question from the noble Lord, and I shall take it back.

Lord Harlech: My Lords, is it true that BEIS had only two officials working on counterfraud at the start of the scheme and they have so far refused to engage with the Cabinet Office?

Viscount Younger of Leckie: My understanding is that BEIS has invested significantly in the expansion of its counterfraud function, in terms both of increased resource and, critically, of capabilities. A key role of its counterfraud function will be to embed a governed and risk-assessed approach throughout BEIS and the arm’s-length bodies.

Lord Watts: Yesterday, the noble Lord, Lord Agnew, was accountable and did the right thing, but is not the Chancellor of the Exchequer ultimately responsible for this mess and should he not resign?

Viscount Younger of Leckie: No, he should not resign. I go back to the most fundamental point, which is that we had to act particularly quickly back in lockdown 1 to support businesses. As a result, we put in the £400 billion package of economic support that I  referred to earlier. That protected more than 14.5 million jobs and thousands of businesses. It is a great credit to the Chancellor that he took those bold steps.

Lord Judge: Has a police investigation into these frauds started? Has the Serious Fraud Office been involved?

Viscount Younger of Leckie: Not that I am aware of.

Baroness Wheatcroft: My Lords, as we seek to claw back money misspent over Covid, can the Minister tell us whether those who benefited from fast-track VIP PPE contracts and delivered unfit goods will be paying back the money?

Viscount Younger of Leckie: On PPE, we acknowledge the severity of these claims, and the DHSC takes its responsibilities around due diligence extremely seriously. Of course, this goes back a bit further. As the DHSC has recently set out, all offers that come to the mailbox are triaged by an official from the high-priority appraisals team to be processed and responded to.

Leasehold Reform (Ground Rent) Bill [HL]
 - Returned from the Commons

The Bill was returned from the Commons. It was ordered that the Commons amendments be printed.

Health Protection (Coronavirus, Restrictions) (Entry to Venues and Events) (England) (Amendment) Regulations 2021
 - Motion to Approve

Lord Kamall: Moved by Lord Kamall
That the Regulations laid before the House on 15 December 2021 be approved.
Relevant documents: 21st Report from the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments (special attention drawn to the instrument). 25th Report from the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee. Considered in Grand Committee on 19 January.
Motion agreed.

Motor Vehicles (Driving Licences) (Amendment) Regulations 2022
 - Motion to Approve

Baroness Vere of Norbiton: Moved by Baroness Vere of Norbiton
That the draft Regulations laid before the House on 29 November 2021 be approved. Considered in Grand Committee on 19 January.
Motion agreed.

Data Protection Act 2018 (Amendment of Schedule 2 Exemptions) Regulations 2022
 - Motion to Approve

Baroness Williams of Trafford: Moved by Baroness Williams of Trafford
That the draft Regulations laid before the House on 10 December 2021 be approved. Considered in Grand Committee on 19 January.
Relevant document: 25th Report from the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee
Motion agreed.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill
 - Third Reading

Lord Ashton of Hyde: My Lords, it may be helpful for me to say a few words about Third Reading amendments. In line with the procedure agreed by the House, yesterday evening the Public Bill Office advised the usual channels that Amendment 1 on the Marshalled List for Third Reading today falls outside the guidance in the Companion on Third Reading amendments. The Clerk of Legislation advised as follows:
“In my view, this amendment falls clearly outside the guidance. The issue was fully debated and decided on a vote at Report. The Minister was asked to reconsider and come back at Third Reading; he clearly and repeatedly declined (see cols 1947-50). In my view, the amendment is not addressing an uncertainty; it would reopen the issue and significantly change what the House decided.”
On the basis of that advice, the usual channels and the Convener of the Cross-Bench Peers are recommending to the House that Amendment 1, in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, should not be moved. I therefore invite the noble and learned Lord, when the time comes, not to move his amendment.

Baroness Williams of Trafford: My Lords, before we move on to the amendments, I want to put on record a few remarks about the position of the Bill in relation to devolution. The great majority of the provisions in the Bill apply to England and Wales; a number also apply to Scotland and/or Northern Ireland. Throughout the preparation and passage of the Bill we have been working closely with each of the devolved Administrations and I pay tribute to officials and Ministers in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland for their constructive engagement and support.
There are provisions in the Bill which engage the legislative consent process in the Scottish Parliament, Senedd Cymru and the Northern Ireland Assembly. I am pleased that the Scottish Parliament has issued legislative consent on the advice of the Scottish Government in respect of those provisions which relate to devolved matters in Scotland. Just last week, Senedd Cymru considered two legislative consent Motions and, on the recommendation of the Welsh Government, agreed to legislative consent to one of these Motions but rejected the other Motion. I am pleased to say that the LCM agreed by the Senedd gave legislative consent  to all the measures in the Bill which, in the view of the UK Government, engaged the LCM process in the Senedd itself. In addition, the LCM passed by the Senedd also covered the measures in the Bill relating to the increase in the maximum penalty for assaulting an emergency worker and the extraction of information from electronic devices. In the view of the UK Government, these measures related strictly to reserved matters and therefore did not engage the LCM process or, indeed, require legislative consent.
Turning to the second Motion put forward by the Welsh Government, the Senedd declined to give its legislative consent to certain provisions in the Bill relating to criminal damage to memorials, public order and unauthorised encampments. I therefore want to put on record that, in the view of the UK Government, these measures again relate to reserved matters and therefore did not engage the LCM process, or indeed require legislative consent.
The Northern Ireland Assembly has already agreed to a legislative consent Motion in respect of certain measures in the Bill that engage the LCM process. That Motion did not, however, cover the Bill’s provisions relating to the extraction of information from electronic devices, which, in part, also engage the LCM process. I understand that the Northern Ireland Executive have now agreed to bring forward a supplementary LCM in respect of these measures, and that is due to be considered by the Assembly shortly.

  
Clause 3: Required life sentence for manslaughter of emergency worker

Amendment 1

Lord Falconer of Thoroton: Moved by Lord Falconer of Thoroton
1: Clause 3, page 4, line 39, at end insert—“(c) manslaughter in circumstances where—(i) the death was not caused by dangerous driving or driving when under the influence of drink or drugs, and(ii) but for causing death or serious injury to the emergency worker, the unlawful act would have attracted a maximum sentence of less than five years imprisonment.”

Lord Falconer of Thoroton: My Lords, on 24 November 2021, the Government announced in a press release that they were introducing into the Bill a provision that imposed a mandatory life sentence where a key emergency worker dies as a result of manslaughter. The introduction of that provision into the Bill was not the product of any debate in this House or the other place.
On 1 December 2021, the relevant amendment giving effect to the provision that there was a mandatory life sentence for manslaughter was tabled with the Table Office. On 8 December 2021, the matter was debated in this House. A large number of Peers spoke in the debate, including the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, the noble Baronesses, Lady Fox, Lady Hamwee and Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, the noble Lords, Lord Beith, Lord Pannick, Lord Carlile and Lord Marks, and the  noble Earl, Lord Attlee. They gave a variety of reasons why the provision had particular defects; there was a range of detailed complaints about it. The noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede, spoke on behalf of the Labour Front Bench and indicated that Labour accepted the amendment in principle but that there were problems with the detail.
Before there was a vote on the amendment itself, the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, suggested an adjournment to discuss the detail. There was a vote on that and it was rejected. There was then a vote on the amendment. Anybody fairly reading that debate would conclude that the principle of the amendment was agreed to—that this House agreed to the principle of a mandatory life sentence where an emergency worker dies as a result of manslaughter. However, nobody reading that debate could possibly conclude that the detail was treated as being resolved in relation to that.
One detail that affected many noble Lords was the consequence of having a mandatory life sentence for manslaughter if, for example, in a demonstration about, say, HS2, a demonstrator pushed over a police officer acting in the execution of his or her duty, who bumped their head—which would be common assault at worst—and died. That demonstrator would end up with a mandatory life sentence. They would not be saved from the mandatory life sentence by the exceptional circumstances defence.
This caused many people in the House considerable concern. I completely accept that the principle of the mandatory life sentence is no longer up for debate; that has been resolved. However, in conjunction with my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti—to whom I pay tribute for her work on this issue—I have crafted an amendment that does not touch the detail of the provision, in the sense that it leaves in place the principle agreed but says that, where the offence you would otherwise be charged with does not attract a sentence of more than five years, you will not be susceptible to it. This is to deal with the one-knock manslaughter case. It leads to justice and reflects where the House is coming from. I strongly commend the amendment to the House and very much hope that the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, will address the detail.
I should deal with the point that the Chief Whip made to start with. He has left, sadly, but there you are. On amendments at Third Reading, the rules say:
“The practice of the House is normally to resolve major points of difference by the end of report stage, and to use third reading for tidying up the bill … The principal purposes of amendments on third reading are … to clarify any remaining uncertainties … to improve the drafting; and … to enable the Government to fulfil undertakings given at earlier stages of the bill.”
I accept that this amendment does not come within any of those three identified bullet points, but it is under the chapeau of this phrase:
“The practice of the House is normally to resolve major points of difference by the end of report stage”.
How can we do that when the first we heard of this amendment was on Report? Read the Report debate. Noble Lords will see that it was a Second Reading-type debate, as they would understand it. Of course that rule does not apply; it is not normal.
This is the second point made in the rules:
“Where the Legislation Office considers that amendments fall clearly outside the guidance, including, for example, amendments which are identical, or very similar, to ones tabled and withdrawn at Committee and Report … or amendments raising completely new major issues, it will advise the Lords Member concerned.”
The guidance deals with the normal circumstance whereby, if you have not resolved the major issues by the time you get to Report, it is too late to raise them at Third Reading. That is not the case here. I completely respect the Public Bill Office for giving me the advice it did because I am not acting within one of the three bullet points, but I strongly urge this House to recognise that, where a major change is introduced this late, the guidance does not prevent an amendment of this sort going through at Third Reading.
We exist to be an effective scrutinising House. After this, we will come to an IPP amendment. We went so badly wrong on that after full scrutiny. This is such an important measure. It is about a mandatory life sentence. Therefore, although I have thought earnestly about the advice I have been given, I have not thought it appropriate to withdraw my amendment. In those circumstances, I beg to move.

Baroness Chakrabarti: My Lords, I rise in support of my noble and learned friend Lord Falconer of Thoroton, who is, as your Lordships will appreciate, a former Lord Chancellor and law officer.
I reiterate that the Government came here on 8 December to commend Harper’s law to your Lordships’ House. However, in the course of that debate, to which I listened with great care, concerns were raised by every single group in your Lordships’ House about the potential unintended consequences that went beyond the Harper’s law case—a case of severe criminality that included dangerous driving that led to manslaughter. In particular, one-punch manslaughter was raised by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, and many other noble Lords; as my noble and learned friend said, there was huge concern.
The reason why my noble and learned friend Lord Falconer is right to ventilate this today goes beyond what we believe about Harper’s law, mandatory sentences, or even judicial discretion. All of these should be of particular concern to this second, revising Chamber. The reason he is right to ventilate this issue is that where significant, potentially controversial and rights-impacting measures are to be introduced, it seems to me—and I believe to other Members of your Lordships’ House—that there should at least be two bites at the cherry. The measures should at least be looked at twice.
Without the aid of my noble and learned friend, what will happen is this: it is presented and debated once in the second Chamber—not even in the first Chamber and then the second Chamber. The vote is on the same day and that is it—because, let us be honest, this is not going to have detailed consideration when your Lordships’ amendments go back to the other place. Whatever my noble and learned friend decides—and with the greatest of respect, I totally agree with the clerk about the irregularity of his amendment in terms of procedure at Third Reading—we are forced into a gentlemen’s agreement that is not  reciprocated in the other direction. There must be adequate time, and it seems to me that, going forward, any significant and controversial measure must at least be looked at twice, so that there can be an opportunity to ventilate, study it, and correct any potential glaring, unintended consequences.

Lord Grocott: My Lords, I came cold to this debate, as it were, to hear what was to be said. I am certainly not an expert on the law, but I have had quite a bit to do with the Companion over the years, and I remember vividly a time when it was quite routine, on Third Reading, to present amendments that clearly should have been debated earlier. The authorities of the House at the time—and I may have been part of that—decided that we needed to tighten up the circumstances in which amendments could be laid at Third Reading. But—and this is a huge “but”, which my noble and learned friend Lord Falconer has already dealt with—it was always assumed that there would be flexibility in the decision about the admissibility of amendments at Third Reading.
There were occasions—I would have come armed with them if I had anticipated this debate—when the usual channels would get together, during or after Report, and say, “Look we really can’t resolve this now, we need to put down an amendment at Third Reading”. Had it been challenged by either Front Bench or by anyone among the usual channels, that would have been resolved at that point. But nearly always, there was such a common-sense argument about, “Well, we’ll let this one go at Third Reading, the air needs to be cleared with this at Third Reading”, that it was agreed among the usual channels; it was never seen as completely Stalinist rule. Indeed, as my noble and learned friend has said, there is flexibility actually written into it. But I can say with confidence that this issue has been addressed in the past. It seems to me overwhelmingly the case, in the way my noble and learned friend described it, that quite clearly it should come within the auspices of the Companion, with the agreement of the usual channels, to be able to debate this hugely important issue at Third Reading.

Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood: My Lords, I deeply regret the deformity to our law which results from the Harper amendment, made, as your Lordships know, for Third Reading. A mandatory life sentence for murder is one thing—indeed, one must recognise that, although entirely understandable, even that is questionable—but a mandatory life sentence for the manslaughter cases now spotlighted by the Harper amendment is really quite another.
I will content myself today by saying that not only may it cause a great injustice but it may be that, if one were a defence counsel in one of these cases, one would positively welcome Harper’s law and emphasise to the jury the awesome consequences of a conviction—consequences from which juries might well shrink. If this matter now goes back unamended to the House of Commons, I suggest that the other place may wish to reflect on those consequences. To pass as potentially unjust a law as this may prove to be counterproductive and a disaster for long-term justice.

Baroness Kennedy of The Shaws: My Lords, I came into the debate late on the day we voted. I was really quite shocked to find what was being debated, and I listened very carefully to the contributions. Because I had not heard the Minister speak from the Dispatch Box, I did not take part in the debate; I felt that I would be criticised for coming in without having heard the full discussion. But I have practised in the criminal courts for 50 years—I was called to the Bar 50 years ago—so I can tell noble Lords that I was very alarmed at the content, and I echo what has just been said by one of our distinguished judges.
I really was concerned at the absence of discretion here. You could have such a range with this kind of manslaughter charge, and it is a shocking idea that a mandatory life sentence might be passed on someone very youthful in circumstances such as were described—you can never completely cover every possibility—by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, where the consequence of a tragedy could also lead to the double tragedy of somebody spending their life in prison because the sentence is mandatory. So I really do think we have to think twice here. Of course, we have to protect our public servants, but it is vital that we keep true to the idea that different cases require different responses, and that there have to be some exceptions.

Baroness Fox of Buckley: My Lords, relatively new as I am to this House, I try to follow procedure and often fail to do so, and I am rightly reprimanded by fellow Peers when that happens and when mistakes are made. I am also very conscious of the democratic deficit of this House as unelected legislators. But, in relation to this issue, I was shocked by what I saw as an abuse of procedure by the introduction of this very important Harper’s law at such a late stage. I felt that that was bending the stick, to say the least, in terms of taking this House and its procedures seriously.
So, from my point of view, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, has explained very well that this is a modest amendment that does not try to overturn the spirit of what was passed earlier on but is trying to deal with what I think are unintended consequences that the Government themselves do not want to see—that is not their intention. But Harper’s law is not a minor matter. Since that bit of a mess by which it was passed last time, I have had some sleepless nights imagining that I might in any way be responsible for the unintended consequences that I really do not think the Minister wants to happen, but which could happen unless the Bill is unamended—which is why I support this amendment in these unusual circumstances.

Lord Mackay of Clashfern: My Lords, as I understand the position, the amendment, without qualification, was pressed to and supported in a Division. The normal situation to deal with the kind of question that the noble and learned Lord mentioned would be to modify that amendment by another, but that, for reasons that may be quite understandable, did not happen. Therefore, the amendment that was passed was unqualified and accordingly, strictly speaking, the rule would be as the clerk has said.
However, this House has discretion in these matters. The rules that are laid down are the best we can think of for every circumstance, but not even we can think of all the possible circumstances. Therefore, the clerk is perfectly right in this case, but justice suggests that it would be wise for the House to realise that, in this particular situation, a modification of the original amendment was certainly raised in the debate, although it was not put formally into the procedure. Therefore, to do justice in this sort of case, it would be right for the House as a whole to agree, in this very special circumstance, that this matter should be dealt with.

Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb: I want to throw my considerable Green weight behind the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer. The Members opposite must realise in their hearts that this is unfair. I came into politics to make things fairer and this is not fair. It is unjust, as we have heard. Please let us debate it properly. I would vote for it—anyone can move it to a vote—and I hope it would pass.

Lord Cormack: My Lords, I support my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay of Clashfern. He put this with beautiful simplicity and total clarity. He underlined the fact that, at the end of the day, we are answerable for what we decide. I deplore bringing in important things at the late stage of a Bill, which is why I withheld my vote when we were voting and not debating last week, because it made a mockery of Parliament. This is not making a mockery of Parliament; it is underlining the humanity of Parliament. I believe we should follow the sage advice of my noble and learned friend.

Lord Clarke of Nottingham: My Lords, I apologise and feel rather guilty about the fact that I have neglected this Bill during its passage through the House because I was simply unable to attend and I decided not to participate. I came to listen to this debate to find out what was being put on the statute book, having followed it a little from a distance. This issue therefore took me completely by surprise. I have listened to the exchanges, but I thought I should add the voice of a third former Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice to the very eloquent case that has been made on both sides by the two others who share that position.
Personally, I do not approve very much of mandatory sentences, which have spread on to the statute book far too frequently in recent years in response to dramatic and publicised cases. I do accept the mandatory life sentence for murder; that is a very long-standing practice. We should deal with considerable care when we add new mandatory sentences in response to understandably emotional and dramatic cases that appear in the media but, unfortunately, responding to the media has become a feature of criminal justice Bills rather too frequently.
I rose simply to do what my noble friend Lord Cormack did: to add my voice, in so far as it helps at all, to those that have been put forward. This House would be letting itself down if it just let this go through by overstrict adherence to the normal procedures, which of course we should normally follow.

Lord Wolfson of Tredegar: My Lords, this amendment has been tabled—in haste, it appears, as I will explain in a moment—at a very late stage in proceedings. It is not clear in its intention and appears to relate to an important category of people who I do not think any of the speakers in support of the amendment referred to. I will come back to that point.
I listened carefully to the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, who said that he came cold to this matter. Far from being cold, I have had a number of warm meetings with Members from all sides of this House on all matters relating to Ministry of Justice provisions in the Bill. I regret to say that until this amendment dropped without warning, half way through my dinner last night, none of its proposers had found the time to engage with me or approach me in any way on this matter since it was debated in your Lordships’ House. That is a matter of regret, because in my relatively short time here I have found that discussions before matters are raised in the Chamber can be very useful. Had the matter been raised with me, I would have had the opportunity—and I would have availed myself of it—of pointing out some of the confusion behind the amendment and asking the noble and learned Lord whether the amendment he has tabled is in fact the amendment he wanted to table. I will come back to that point.
Having heard the words of my noble and learned friends Lord Mackay of Clashfern and Lord Clarke and my noble friend Lord Cormack, I will not get into the propriety or otherwise but will deal with the substance of the point. Harper’s law, which is the focus of the amendment, requires the imposition of a life sentence in cases where an emergency worker is the victim of unlawful act manslaughter. The intention of the amendment appears to be to restrict this to cases that involve an underlying unlawful act that is of a certain level of seriousness. My understanding is that it seeks to do so by excluding from the scope of Harper’s law those cases in which the unlawful act that underpins the unlawful act manslaughter of the emergency worker is one that, had the offender been convicted of that as a stand-alone offence, would have carried
“a maximum sentence of less than five years imprisonment.”
There is, I am afraid, real confusion as to what the amendment seeks to do. Noble Lords who enjoy it really ought to turn to page 4, line 39 of the Bill and remind themselves that this seeks to include an exception into Harper’s law. That is very important when one sees that in proposed new paragraph (c)(i) of the amendment there is a “not”, so it ends up with a double negative.
It seems to me that there are two interpretations of this paragraph and, from what the noble and learned Lord said, I am really not sure which interpretation he seeks to put forward. The first is—bear with me here—that it appears to except from that five-year maximum category, and therefore include within Harper’s law, cases in which the death was
“caused by dangerous driving or driving when under the influence of drink or drugs,”
even if the maximum penalty for the unlawful act offence was less than five years. If that is the case, it is not clear why that should be if the main thrust of the  noble and learned Lord’s argument is that Harper’s law should not apply if the underlying offence carried a sentence of less than five years.
I also point out, as I am sure the noble and learned Lord knows all too well, that dangerous driving and the other driving offences here do not and cannot themselves form a basis for unlawful act manslaughter in any case, because that is the result of the decision in Andrews v DPP.
The alternative explanation of this form of words put forward by the noble and learned Lord is that the amendment appears to intend that where the unlawful act underlying the unlawful act manslaughter is one that in and of itself would attract a maximum penalty of less than five years’ imprisonment, that will be outside Harper’s law unless that act is accompanied by
“dangerous driving or driving when under the influence”,
which in the context of unlawful act manslaughter would be the circumstances that render the unlawful act dangerous.
I apologise to the House for subjecting it to a disquisition on unlawful act manslaughter but this is precisely the sort of point I would have discussed with the noble and learned Lord, had it been brought to my attention before I was halfway through my main course last night. More to the point, this would be an insertion at page 4, line 39 of the Bill; it would therefore go into proposed new Section 258A, which applies where
“(a) a person aged under 18 is convicted of a relevant offence, (b) the offence was committed … when the person was aged 16 or over”.
So, this amendment to Harper’s law, which is put forward on the basis of general principle, applies only to 16 and 17 year-olds. I did not understand from any of the speeches in favour of the amendment that the principle underlying those speeches was limited to 16 and 17 year-olds. The point was put on the basis that it ought to be of general application.
Why, I ask rhetorically, since the point has not been made, is this limited to 16 and 17 year-olds? Of course, the answer is obvious: it is not intended to be limited to 16 and 17 year-olds. Again, had this amendment been shown to me before halfway through my main course last night, I would have pointed this out, with respect, to the noble and learned Lord. What we have, therefore, is a late amendment, brought without any discussion with me or my colleagues, which fundamentally seeks to uproot the position taken by this House in Committee and on Report. It also suffers from fundamental uncertainty as to what it actually does, and the fundamental problem that it seems to apply only to 16 and 17 year-olds.
Quite apart from all of that, I simply do not see any merit in restricting Harper’s law in this way. We have already taken care to ensure that the provisions inserted by Clause 3 will apply only in cases of unlawful act manslaughter of an emergency worker who is acting in exercise of their functions as such a worker. Unlawful act manslaughter, as noble Lords certainly know by now, captures those cases where an unlawful act has been intentionally performed in circumstances rendering it dangerous, and that has caused death. It is the   Government’s position that the unlawful act manslaughter of an emergency worker merits a mandatory life sentence. The seriousness of such conduct and the harm it causes both to the emergency worker—obviously—and to our wider society are evident. I respectfully see no reason to limit the sentence in the way this amendment appears to intend.
I come to the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy of The Shaws—I respectfully congratulate her on 50 years in the criminal justice system—about discretion. There is, of course, a judicial discretion built in here; we have had this debate on several occasions during consideration of the Bill. Where the court considers that there are exceptional circumstances relating either to the offence or the offender that justify the imposition of a sentence other than life imprisonment, this could be done. I accept that some people want the exception to be broader, while some people may not want an exception at all, but that has been the Government’s consistent position throughout the Bill. I find it a little surprising that, at Third Reading, such a fundamental point is apparently up for discussion again.
Before I sit down—and I apologise to the House for delaying it—I come to the “one knock” case that the noble and learned Lord has put. If a person at a protest or demonstration were to hit a police officer who was then, for example, to fall over, hit their head and, God forbid, die, that could be captured under Harper’s law if it amounted to unlawful act manslaughter. Why is that? The reason is that what has happened here is not a simple case of battery. Under the offences made out here, the offence for which the offender would be sentenced is unlawful act manslaughter, and the Government believe that that crime, when done against an emergency worker acting as such, merits a mandatory life sentence other than where there are exceptional circumstances.
For those reasons—and, frankly, with renewed regret that I am having to deal with this on the floor of the House when I could have had conversations about it in good time previously—I respectfully beg the noble and learned Lord to withdraw the amendment.

Lord Falconer of Thoroton: I am incredibly grateful for the support from all around the House. I am particularly grateful to my noble and learned predecessor and my noble and learned successor for supporting me in this matter.
The response from the Minister was incredibly disappointing. It was bombastic and technical and failed to address the essential issue, which is: what about the “one knock” manslaughter case? The answer that came in the end appeared to be, “Actually, we intend to cover that.”
The Minister made one good point on the drafting. He is absolutely right that my draft covers only 17 year-olds because it refers only to page 4. I would have had to submit the same draft in relation to pages 5 and 6 as well, which, if I had got page 4 in, I am sure would not have made much difference.
This is such an important issue that I would have been tempted to obtain the opinion of the House. All around the House there has been support for it, but the only encouragement I get is the technical point the Minister made. It may be that when this comes to the House of Commons, the Government will consider that they could improve my drafting and get to the same result. In those circumstances, with regret, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment 1 withdrawn.

  
Clause 80: Key national infrastructure

Amendment 2

Lord Rosser: Moved by Lord Rosser
Amendment 2: leave out Clause 80Member’s explanatory statementThis clause is consequential on a clause which was not added to the bill, as it was defeated by a vote of the House. This clause therefore provides background detail for a power and a clause that do not exist. This amendment would remove this non-operational clause from the bill.

Lord Rosser: My Lords, my amendment would leave out Clause 80. The clause is consequential on a new clause from the Government that this House declined by a Division last week to add to the Bill. That new clause introduced the offence of “interference with use or operation of key national infrastructure”. What is now Clause 80 should surely not have been moved following that vote; it provides background detail for a power and a clause that do not exist. It starts off, for example, by saying:
“This section has effect for the purposes of section (Interference with use or operation of key national infrastructure)”,
and goes on to define types of national infrastructure for the purpose of the Government’s new clause to which this House disagreed. My amendment would thus remove that non-operational clause from the Bill. I understand that the Government will not be opposing this necessary tidying-up amendment, and I thank the noble Baroness the Minister for that. I beg to move.

Lord Harris of Haringey: My Lords, I want to make the very simple point that even if the Government were not going to accept the amendment, the clause would be pretty nonsensical due to the very strange way in which it defines “national infrastructure”. It has a unique set of definitions that includes some things that would not normally be regarded as infrastructure and excludes other things that are critical to the nation and the way it operates.

Baroness Williams of Trafford: My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, who has explained that the amendment would remove Clause 80 from the Bill. It defines “key national infrastructure” for the purposes of the Government’s proposed offence of interfering with the operation or use of key national infrastructure. Of course, I was extremely disappointed that the House voted not to add this new offence to the Bill on Report. The proposed offence would help  protect the British public from the misery that certain individuals targeting our key national infrastructure have been able to cause.
The Government fully defend the right to peaceful protest, but we stand behind the British public in protecting them from the serious disruption caused by some who think their right to protest trumps the rights of the public to go about their daily lives. That said, the fact remains that as your Lordships did not support the introduction of the new offence, we are not going to play games: what is now Clause 80 of the Bill is redundant, and, consequently, the Government will not oppose this amendment.

Lord Rosser: I had moved the amendment and wanted to put it to the vote, and I hoped that the House would be prepared to accept it. I thank the Minister for what she has said.
Amendment 2 agreed.

Amendment 3

Lord Wolfson of Tredegar: Moved by Lord Wolfson of Tredegar
3: After Clause 136, insert the following new Clause—“Imprisonment for public protection etc: duty to refer person released on licence to Parole Board(1) Section 31A of the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997 (imprisonment or detention for public protection: termination of licences) is amended in accordance with subsections (2) to (6).(2) In subsection (2)(a), after “Chapter” insert “(whether or not the prisoner has subsequently been recalled to prison under section 32)”.(3) For subsection (3) substitute—“(3) Where—(a) the prisoner has been released on licence under this Chapter (whether or not the prisoner has subsequently been recalled to prison under section 32);(b) the qualifying period has expired; and(c) if the Secretary of State has made a previous reference of the prisoner’s case under this subsection, the period of twelve months beginning with the day of the disposal of that reference has expired,the Secretary of State must refer the prisoner’s case to the Parole Board under this subsection.”(4) In subsection (4)—(a) in the words before paragraph (a), for “an application” substitute “a reference”, and(b) in paragraph (b), for “application” substitute “reference”.(5) After subsection (4) insert—“(4A) A reference under subsection (3) must be made, and a reference under that subsection must be determined by the Parole Board under subsection (4), even if at the time of the reference or determination the prisoner is in prison having been recalled under section 32.(4B) If at the time of the determination the prisoner is in prison having been recalled under section 32—(a) subsection (2) does not apply, and(b) subsection (4)(a) has effect as if it required the Parole Board—(i) to determine whether it is satisfied that it is not necessary for the protection of the public for the prisoner, when released, to be released on licence in respect of the preventative sentence or sentences, and  (ii) if it is so satisfied, to direct the Secretary of State accordingly.(4C) Where the Parole Board gives a direction under subsection (4B)(b)(ii)—(a) if at any time the Board directs the prisoner’s release under section 28, that section has effect in relation to the prisoner as if, in subsection (5), for “to release him on licence” there were substituted “to release the prisoner unconditionally”, and(b) if at any time the Board directs the prisoner’s release under section 32, that section has effect in relation to the prisoner as if, in subsection (5), for “immediate release on licence” there were substituted “immediate unconditional release”.”(6) In subsection (5), in the definition of “the qualifying period”, after “on licence” insert “(whether or not the prisoner has subsequently been recalled to prison under section 32)”.(7) Subsection (8) applies to an application made by a person under section 31A(3) of the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997 before this section comes into force.(8) If the application has not been determined when this section comes into force, subsections (4) to (4C) of section 31A of the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997 apply in relation to it as if it were a reference of the person’s case by the Secretary of State to the Parole Board under subsection (3) of that section.(9) Subsection (10) applies if a person remains on licence under Chapter 2 of Part 2 of the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997, or remains subject to release on licence under that Chapter, following—(a) the disposal before this section comes into force of the person’s application to the Parole Board under section 31A(3) of that Act, or(b) the disposal under subsection (4) of section 31A of that Act, as it has effect by virtue of subsection (8) of this section, of the person’s application to the Parole Board under subsection (3) of that section.(10) Subsection (3) of section 31A of the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997 applies in relation to the person as if the application had been a reference of the person’s case by the Secretary of State to the Parole Board under that subsection.”Member’s explanatory statementThis amendment and the amendments in the name of Lord Wolfson of Tredegar at page 133, line 13, page 135, line 13 and page 233, line 33 give effect to an undertaking given by Lord Wolfson on 15th December 2021 (Hansard col. 359). This amendment imposes a duty on the Secretary of State to refer the case of a person who is serving a sentence of imprisonment for public protection (or the equivalent youth sentence), and has been released on licence, to the Parole Board after ten years and annually after that.

Lord Wolfson of Tredegar: My Lords, following my commitment and undertaking to the House on Report, I am pleased to be able to bring this package of amendments relating to imprisonment for public protection—IPP—before the House this afternoon. I thank sincerely the noble Lord, Lord Blunkett—and I understand why he is unable to be in his place today—the noble and learned Lords, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood and Lord Judge, and my noble friend Lord Moylan for their commitment to this cause and continued engagement with me on this matter. We have had a series of meetings and calls, which have been invaluable. They offered me their considerable wisdom and experience both of this subject and of this House in order to get this amendment—if I may put it this way—across the table and over the line.
It was made very clear at all stages in this House that there was enormous strength of feeling that some beneficial change for IPP offenders was both right and necessary. I am pleased that we have cross-party support for this sensible, proportionate and effective change that will provide such benefit but at no risk to public protection.
I committed on Report to bringing forward an amendment which puts the Secretary of State’s policy of automatic referral of applications to terminate the IPP licence on to a statutory footing. This would enable all eligible IPP offenders to be referred to the Parole Board for consideration for licence termination at the appropriate time. The new clause that I have tabled delivers on this commitment.
The position is that Section 31A of the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997 sets out how IPP offenders are currently able to apply for licence termination. Once the qualifying period of 10 years has elapsed—that is, 10 years from the offender’s first release by the Parole Board—this section provides that offenders can apply to the Parole Board to be considered for licence termination. In practice, the Secretary of State has made it policy to do this on the offender’s behalf, but first had to obtain consent from the offender.
The principal change in the first of the amendments in my name is in new subsection (2), which amends the wording of Section 31A so that the Secretary of State will be legally required to automatically refer the offender where the 10-year qualifying period has expired. Where the offender has previously been referred to the Parole Board for licence termination, they will automatically be referred if 12 months have elapsed since the previous reference. That removes the need for the offender to give permission for the Secretary of State to make applications on their behalf, and will enable the IPP licence to be brought to a definitive end for more offenders.
The clause also adds a new subsection to Section 31A which deals with offenders who are in custody following recall under the IPP licence. When an offender is recalled to prison, their licence is automatically revoked, so they cannot have their licence terminated while they are in prison following recall because they are no longer on licence. But, in these cases, the Secretary of State will still be required to refer the offenders to the Parole Board on the point of eligibility and every 12 months thereafter. The Parole Board will then determine whether the licence should remain in force following any subsequent release decision. It will be up to the Parole Board whether to terminate the licence of an IPP offender in custody—but these provisions are specifically intended to ensure that all eligible IPP offenders, who are either on licence or have been recalled and had their licence revoked, have the opportunity to have their licence terminated.
The remaining subsections are technical, transitional and clarificatory to ensure that the clause works correctly. But I make it absolutely clear from the Dispatch Box that time spent in custody on recall does not affect the running of the 10-year qualifying period. There are two further amendments in my name, both of which are consequential. I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, for joining me in them. The second amendment ensures that this clause operates  correctly with other subsections that might prevent a referral, and the third sets the commencement date at two months following Royal Assent.
Taken as a package, these amendments appropriately balance the need to protect the public with ensuring that IPP offenders who are assessed by the Parole Board as no longer posing a risk to the public are given every opportunity to have their IPP licence, and the IPP sentence as a whole, terminated. So, with renewed thanks to those noble and learned Lords who joined me, particularly in supporting the first amendment, for their sustained engagement, I beg to move Amendment 3.

Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood: My Lords, my noble and learned friend Lord Judge has asked that I go next. I have indeed added my name to the first substantive government amendment, but I indicated that I would—and I do—make it plain that I do so without any great enthusiasm. Rather, it is on the basis that one must be grateful for small mercies—here, alas, I put the emphasis on the “small”.
I am grateful to the Minister for doing what he could for us, and, so far as it goes, I welcome the small change brought about by the amendment. But, in my respectful view, it does not go remotely far enough. It is difficult to overemphasise how small a concession this is in relation to the overall problem of the remaining IPP prisoners. Even in respect of the recall prisoners, we had hoped that the maximum term for which a licence should remain in force would be reduced from 10 years to five.
Beyond that, I fervently hoped to do something for the 1,700-odd cohort of IPP prisoners who have never been released and who remain incarcerated 10 years after this whole sentencing regime was abolished by LASPO in 2012. Many of the 1,700 are substantially more than 10 years beyond their tariff term—but there it is. We now have to—and we do—put our faith in the House of Commons Justice Committee, which has taken evidence and listened to many, including me, and is shortly to report on the whole question of this remaining regime. One hopes that it will do something to meet this grave, continuing and, indeed, growing injustice. In the meantime, I make it plain that I support this most modest of amendments.

Lord Moylan: My Lords, with the agreement of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, I rise to thank my noble friend the Minister. I know from conversations with him that the noble Lord, Lord Blunkett, who cannot be in his place today would join me in expressing our appreciation to my noble friend the Minister for the integrity, openness and engagement—and consequently the trust—he has engendered since Report. This is an example of government and the House working constructively to improve the operation of the criminal justice system and those affected by it.
The amendment moved by my noble friend addresses one limb of the amendment in my name in Committee and again on Report. It puts into effect the Government’s own previously announced policy of making the termination of licences automatic. I welcome that, but I still hope that soon the Government will also adopt  the second limb of that amendment to reduce the qualifying period from 10 years to five. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, said, the Justice Select Committee in the other place is considering this whole case.
I hope that when my noble friend replies he will be able to say that, if that committee recommends a reduction in the qualifying period from 10 years to five, the Government will be quick to adopt that amendment and put it into effect. Both measures—the automaticity of the referral and the potential reduction of the qualifying period from 10 years to five—are primarily aimed at IPP prisoners out on licence, not those in prison, though I appreciate that my noble friend has pointed out that those on recall may gain some benefit from this.
This is the first crack in the wall of this regime made in the last 10 years. It would be very easy for noble Lords to think that now is a moment when we could perhaps relax; the Government, having made a concession and implicitly recognised an injustice, will move, quietly perhaps, to resolve the whole matter quickly. But that is not what the Ministry of Justice is expecting to see happen.
In a Written Answer given in the other place by my right honourable friend Kit Malthouse on 3 December last year, the Ministry of Justice set out in round numbers how many IPP prisoners it expected to see released on licence in each of the next five years. It came to 800. But when asked how many of those out on licence it expected to see recalled to prison over the same period, the total came to a staggering 3,400. The Ministry of Justice expects 2,600 more IPP prisoners, net, to be in jail over the next five years than there are today. That is nearly a doubling of the number of IPP prisoners in prison today. This problem is not resolved; we have not even begun to resolve it. This problem is going to get worse and the Government are obliged to take it seriously.
My noble friend referred on Report to the existence of an action plan. He said that the ministry had an action plan for dealing with the problem. Requests to see the action plan have been met with a response from my noble friend to the effect that it will be available shortly, or it is not currently available, but we may look forward to it. I do look forward to it; we might all look forward to it, but we would like to see it soon. We would like to see it address this problem and put this scandal properly behind us as soon as possible.

Lord Judge: My Lords, I thank the Minister, who has found himself wallowing in a misery of injustice and has done a great deal at least for the issue to be recorded in statute. For me, that is the only advantage of this amendment, but I respect very much the efforts he has made to produce an amendment at all.
Beyond that, I entirely agree with the observations from my noble and learned friend Lord Brown and the noble Lord, Lord Moylan. We have not got to the end of the beginning of this, but the end of the beginning has possibly come into sight. For me, after the shambles of this dreadful piece of statutory—I could get carried away and then I would be speaking unparliamentary  language, but noble Lords all know what I mean; I shall just stick to shambles—we can begin to make up for what has gone on over too many years.

Baroness Burt of Solihull: My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for the amendment. He has followed through on a commitment he made on Report, which is greatly appreciated. However, like all the other noble Lords who have spoken, I wish the Government had gone further. Indeed, our little cross-party team put several other amendments forward, a number of which have been alluded to by the noble Lord, Lord Moylan.
This is one small improvement to a system that needs to be abolished for this group of prisoners caught on the wrong side of history. It is, however, a movement in the right direction. When the Minister spoke to me on the day that he made the commitment to bring the amendment forward, he quoted Newton’s second law. For noble Lords who, like me, do not have a clue what Newton’s second law is, it says that it is easier to move an object already in motion than one at rest. Well, the object is in motion and we—and, I believe, he—will try to push it along as far and as fast as we can whenever the opportunity arises. The ball is rolling and we will keep on pushing for justice and fairness for those whom the law has left behind.

Lord Garnier: My Lords, I appreciate that Third Reading is not the time for long and ponderous speeches, but I wanted to place on record—as someone who tabled amendments on Report and in Committee to deal with IPPs and the injustice that remains—that I wholeheartedly support the remarks of the noble and learned Lords, Lord Brown and Lord Judge, my noble friend Lord Moylan, and the noble Baroness, Lady Burt.
This is just the beginning and must be seen as something that will continue to be looked at, both by the Select Committee in the other place and the Ministry of Justice. I also place on record my personal thanks to my noble friend the Minister, who has dealt with this question with sensitivity and within the bounds of possibility that being a Minister in this House places on him. I thank him for what he has done and look forward to hearing more that will undo the injustice that the IPP regime is still visiting on a number of people.

Lord Clarke of Nottingham: My Lords, I feel very guilty that I was unable to arrange my diary to take any part in the Bill as it went through because this is the part of the Bill in which I would otherwise have taken an active part. I have already apologised to the noble Lord, Lord Blunkett, outside this House for the fact that in the end I was not able to offer him any assistance.
I add only, as my noble and learned friend just has, my support and simply record that I was the Lord Chancellor who abolished indeterminate sentences in 2011 with the wholehearted support of the noble Lord, Lord Blunkett, who was then in the House of Commons with me and defused any attempts to preserve this stain on the statute book, which he had accidentally introduced without any expectation that it would be used as it was and resolve into a problem.
If you had told me when we abolished this sentence that there would be thousands of people in the position that they are now, 11 years after abolition, because they were left over to be dealt with, I would not have believed it. What I proposed was simply a change to the burden of proof that the Parole Board had to apply when deciding whether it was safe to release somebody, but that was never implemented. The fact that all these years later we face these problems is something of a disgrace. I thank the Minister for making this modest move, but I certainly agree with what everybody has said about the modesty of it. It needs urgently to be addressed by the Select Committee in the other place.

Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede: My Lords, I too would like to echo the thanks for the Minister. He has, in a sense, been a lobbyist within the Ministry of Justice to get this modest amendment over the line. The noble Lord, Lord Moylan, summed up the position very well when he described it as the first crack in the wall. I was alarmed by the figures he quoted from his Written Question, where he seemed to indicate that there would be more prisoners in jail because of recalls, so the problem is likely to get worse and not better.
The noble Baroness, Lady Burt, referred to the Minister’s reference to Newton’s second law—that it is easier to move an object that is already in motion. My first degree was in physics, and I would phrase that slightly differently, in a way that is relevant to the politics: the rate of change of movement is proportional to the impressed force. We on this side are certainly interested in increasing the impressed force on this object which is currently under way.

Lord Wolfson of Tredegar: My Lords, I am grateful for the kind words a number of noble Lords have said. This may be a modest start, but it is a start, and I am sure that the conversation will continue. In particular, as I said when we discussed this matter substantively, I am well aware that the Justice Select Committee is looking at this matter. It will be reporting soon and, while I cannot go quite as far as my noble friend Lord Moylan would want me to by saying that, if the committee recommends, for example, changing the qualifying period from 10 years to five years, the Government will adopt it, I can say—which I hope would be obvious anyway—that we will take anything that comes out of the Justice Select Committee extremely seriously and look at it with very great care.
The action plan has been provided to the Justice Select Committee. We will review it again following the publication of its report to take account of our consideration following its recommendations. I hope the House will forgive me if I do not respond to everybody who contributed. I am conscious that we are at Third Reading and there is other business before the House. But I thank everybody who has contributed to this short debate. In particular, I respectfully thank the noble Baroness, Lady Burt of Solihull, for our conversations and the correspondence we have had, which she knows I have been dealing with.
I am conscious that Newton has now been invoked on a number of occasions. I am not altogether sure whether Newtonian physics applies to government  action, but I will proceed on the basis that it does. I will try to push things as far as I can, but for present purposes, the only things I will immediately seek to move are these amendments.
Amendment 3 agreed.

  
Clause 142: Calculation of period before release or Parole Board referral where multiple sentences being served

Amendments 4 and 5

Lord Wolfson of Tredegar: Moved by Lord Wolfson of Tredegar
4: Clause 142, page 133, line 13, at end insert—“(3A) Subsection (3) does not apply to a reference by the Secretary of State under section 31A(3).”Member’s explanatory statementThis amendment is consequential on the new Clause in the name of Lord Wolfson of Tredegar to be inserted after Clause 136. It disapplies section 33A(3) of the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997 (inserted by Clause 142) in relation to a reference by the Secretary of State under section 31A(3) of that Act.
5: Clause 142, page 135, line 13, at end insert—“(3A) The reference in subsection (3)(a) to a requirement of the Secretary of State to refer a prisoner’s case to the Board does not include a requirement to do so under section 31A(3) of the 1997 Act.”Member’s explanatory statementThis amendment is consequential on the new Clause in the name of Lord Wolfson of Tredegar to be inserted after Clause 136. It disapplies section 267C(3) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (inserted by Clause 142) in relation to a reference by the Secretary of State under section 31A(3) of the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997.
Amendments 4 and 5 agreed.

  
Clause 209: Commencement

Amendment 6

Lord Wolfson of Tredegar: Moved by Lord Wolfson of Tredegar
6: Clause 209, page 233, line 33, at end insert—“(ma) section (Imprisonment for public protection etc: duty to refer person released on licence to Parole Board);”Member’s explanatory statementThis amendment is consequential on the new Clause in the name of Lord Wolfson of Tredegar to be inserted after Clause 136. It provides for that Clause to come into force two months after Royal Assent.
Amendment 6 agreed.

Baroness Williams of Trafford: My Lords, perhaps I may just detain the House a little longer to mark the end of this Bill’s passage through your Lordships’ House. It has been a big Bill, with much scrutiny across no fewer than 11 days of Committee; and six days on Report has added to its size. During this time, we have added some important new measures to the Bill, including to further tackle violence against women and girls. Noble Lords have also made a few changes to the Bill, against the advice of the Government. It will now be for the House of Commons to consider those amendments, and we will no doubt be debating them again soon.
I reiterate the Government’s disappointment at the removal of some very important measures, the aim of which was to prevent a repeat of the scenes we saw last year, with people blocking roads, preventing those going about their daily lives from doing so and—yes—preventing essential services such as ambulances getting through to hospitals. The public demanded that the Government act to stop this serious disruption. We did so, but noble Lords on the Benches opposite decided to block these measures. That will not go unnoticed by the public.
Notwithstanding that, I want to take this opportunity to recognise the contributions of those who have supported me in steering this Bill through the House. I pay particular tribute to my noble and learned friend Lord Stewart of Dirleton and my noble friends Lord Wolfson of Tredegar, Lord Sharpe of Epsom and Lady Scott of Bybrook for sharing the load on the Front Bench. We have been ably supported by the joint Bill team in the Home Office and the Ministry of Justice, and by numerous officials and lawyers not only in those two departments but in the Department for Transport, the Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities, the Department for Education and Defra. On behalf of myself and my ministerial colleagues, I extend our thanks and appreciation to all of them for their professionalism and understanding over these past months.
I single out for particular thanks Charles Goldie, who is well known in the Home Office parish; I have almost lost count of the number of Bills that he has supported me on to date. I also thank Katie Dougal, Alice Harrison, Becky Martin and, of course, our private officers, who sit day and night while we debate these matters.
I also thank the Front Bench opposite for their engagement on the Bill, accepting that there have been some areas of disagreement between us. The noble Lords, Lord Rosser, Lord Coaker, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede and Lord Kennedy of Southwark—and, in the early stages, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, together with the noble Baroness, Lady Chapman of Darlington—have at times, including today, made points and have been open to helpful discussions to resolve issues where we can.
I single out the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, for praise for being able to articulate in a sentence some very complex points.
Similarly, I thank the noble Lords, Lord Paddick and Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, who have been very active during the course of the many weeks we have been engaged on this Bill. Again, I recognise that there have been, and continue to be, some areas of disagreement between us.
Given its wide scope, many other noble Lords have also contributed to the many hours of debate on this Bill. There are too many to mention now but, again, I extend my thanks to all noble Lords for their scrutiny of this important Bill. There should be no doubt about the merits of this Bill’s ultimate objective, namely keeping the public and our communities safe. On that note, I beg to move that the pill—pill? I think maybe I need a pill at this stage—the Bill do now pass.

Lord Rosser: I say to my noble friends behind me that I will resist the temptation to make political comments on the Bill. After all the days we have had in Committee and on Report, I am sure they will understand why I do not wish to go down that road.
I thank the Minister, the noble Baroness, Lady Williams of Trafford, and the noble Lords, Lord Wolfson of Tredegar and Lord Sharpe of Epsom, for all the work that they have so obviously done on this Bill. I also thank them for the meetings we have held and the changes that have been secured through government amendments or government support for amendments.
I also thank my noble friends Lord Coaker, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede and Lady Chapman of Darlington. As the Minister reminded us, my noble friend Lord Kennedy of Southwark has also been involved, as has been my noble and learned friend Lord Falconer of Thoroton. We seem to have had a fairly large Front Bench on this side of the House, and I am extremely grateful to all of them for the work that they have done.
I too thank the Bill team. Everything that the Minister said about them we would certainly endorse and wish to be associated with. They have been extremely helpful, and we have appreciated that. I also thank the many outside organisations with an interest in the terms of this Bill for the briefings that they have given us, both written and verbal. That has been extremely helpful too.
Talking of help, I would like to thank for the vital and invaluable work they do colleagues in our office here in the Lords, particularly Grace Wright, who has been a key figure and has certainly kept me on the straight and narrow. I am quite sure that any mistakes I have made have been nothing to do with her; she has prevented me making an awful lot as it is.
The Bill has been improved by amendments that this House has made and, in some cases, by resisting amendments to which this House has not agreed. As the Minister said, it now goes back to the Commons. Like her, I too wait to see what the Commons will now make of this Bill as amended by your Lordships.
I again thank everybody whom I have mentioned, and I am quite sure that there are others whom I should have mentioned but have not done so. For that, I apologise.

Lord Paddick: My Lords, I remember looking at this 307-page Bill—or at least it was 307 pages to begin with—in August and wondering how on earth to tackle it. I was reminded that the way to eat an elephant is one piece at a time, which is the approach we took. This was about five Bills stapled together, except the PPO could not staple them together because it was too big. The Bill returns to the other place considerably improved, although you cannot make a silk purse out a sow’s ear—these are separate metaphors; I am not mixing them—or should I say a boar’s ear in these days?
I shall not resist what the Minister has said about the Bill. As far as we on these Benches are concerned, the existing legislation to control protest was adequate, and the measures that we have removed from the Bill were not necessary in the first place. The majority of  the police consider that a lack of police officers is the limiting factor when it comes to policing of protests rather than a lack of legislation.
I would normally thank the Minister and the Bill team for their engagement, but, certainly, I am not alone on these Benches, at least as far as the home affairs side of things is concerned, in feeling that the Government have not reached out to us as much as they could or should have done. None the less, we have all been in this together over a considerable period, and I am grateful for the time that the Government have given in allowing us to debate these issues.
I thank the Official Opposition, both the leadership and Back-Benchers, the Cross- Benchers, non-affiliated Peers and the Greens for their support and co-operation. In particular, I thank Elizabeth Plummer and Grace Wright for their invaluable help on the Bill, as well as all the outside organisations which helpfully provided us with briefings. We would not have done any of this without that help, and we hope that the Government will see the improvements that we have made to the Bill as improvements when it is considered by the other place.

Lord Cashman: My Lords, as other noble Lords have said, the Bill has been much improved. I pay particular thanks to the noble Baroness, Lady Williams of Trafford, for working over six years with me and my friend, the noble Lord, Lord Lexden, in widening the pardons and the disregards for historical homosexual offences, including in the Armed Forces. It is truly historic when a state apologises for what it has done and reaches back over 500 years. It is the end of a six-year campaign that the noble Baroness, Lady Williams, has been an active part of. I cannot thank her and the Bill team enough, and indeed colleagues and the team in the Armed Forces. I also put on record our thanks to Professor Paul Johnson, the country’s leading expert on this. Finally, it might have been a six-year campaign, but some of us have campaigned for more than 33 years, not for ourselves but so that injustices can at last be put right.

Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames: My Lords, I will try not to repeat too much of what my noble friend Lord Paddick said. He pointed out—it is not a new point—that this has been a long and difficult Bill. I am bound to say that we must all hope that such a mammoth Bill, with such a wide range of diverse topics shoehorned into a single piece of legislation, will never be put before Parliament again. It has taken too many days, with too little time for the content involved and too much pressure, not just on MPs and Peers but on parliamentary staff, officials and those many organisations that seek to brief us about legislation. For us here, there have been too many early starts and too many late nights. It has been a very difficult experience.
None the less, I completely agree that the House has done its job well. We are very grateful to the ministerial team and their officials. On justice issues, I am, of course, particularly grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, for the care, courtesy, approachability and engagement, not to say humour, that he has shown in our discussions. We have had some significant  successes, from our point of view, on breastfeeding voyeurism and common assault in the context of domestic abuse. We have had some limited progress—my goodness, it is limited—on IPPs. That is clearly not the end of the story.
On Home Office issues, we are grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Williams, for her care and the comprehensively courteous way she has dealt with the House, although I am bound to say that I share my noble friend Lord Paddick’s view that we have felt that she has not been able, on behalf of the Government, to make the concessions she perhaps might have liked to have made in some areas.
These Ministers illustrate the pressure there has been on all of us. In this context, I mention the tireless and efficient work of my noble friend Lord Paddick, who has borne the brunt of days and weeks of debate over many hours and days of sitting, and there have been many more days of preparation.
Before the Bill finally passes, we on these Benches regard it as largely profoundly regressive. On human rights issues, the House must expect Liberal Democrats and others in the Opposition to continue robustly to defend individual liberty in a way that we do not believe the Bill does. On justice, we will keep the pressure up for a humane sentencing system dedicated to rehabilitation and reform, combined with increasing use of community sentences. We will continue to work on women’s justice, where it seems that we are accepting very slow progress when we should be looking for dramatic improvement.

Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb: I realise that I ought to be gracious, but I have hated almost every minute we spent on this Bill over the days, weeks and months. I deeply regret that it will pass. I wish it had not been presented in the first place and I wish we had not been forced to let it through, but it has been historic. One of the things that has been historic is the united opposition to some of its worst parts. That is something the House can be proud of. I look forward to many more days, weeks and months of arguing with the noble Baroness and the noble Lord on the Benches opposite.
Bill passed and returned to the Commons with amendments.

Downing Street Parties: Police Investigation
 - Commons Urgent Question

Lord True: My Lords, with the leave of the House, I shall now repeat in the form of a Statement the Answer given by my honourable friend the Paymaster-General to an Urgent Question in another place on the investigation into Downing Street parties following the statement from the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police. The Statement is as follows:
“As the House will be aware, earlier today the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police confirmed that the Metropolitan Police Service will be investigating  alleged breaches of Covid-19 regulations within the Government. This is a matter for the police, and the House will understand that I am not in a position to comment on the nature or content of the police investigation. I previously made it clear from this Dispatch Box that the Government recognise, and I recognise, the public anxiety and indignation that it appears as though the people who have been setting the rules may not have been following the rules, and I would like to repeat that sentiment today. This is why the Prime Minister asked for a Cabinet Office investigation to take place.
The terms of reference for that investigation, led by the Second Permanent Secretary at the Cabinet Office and the Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities, Sue Gray, have been published and laid in the Library of the House. Those terms made it clear that, as with all internal investigations, if, during the course of the work, any evidence emerges of behaviour that is potentially a criminal offence, the matter will be referred to the police and the Cabinet Office’s work may be paused.
As the House would expect, there is ongoing contact between the Cabinet Office investigation and the Metropolitan Police Service. However, the Cabinet Office investigation will continue its work. I would urge the House to wait for the findings of that investigation and for the police to conclude their work. That is important to allow the work to take place unimpeded and to protect the rights of all those involved. I must emphasise that matters relating to adherence to the law are properly a matter for the police to investigate, and the Cabinet Office will liaise with them as appropriate.
Finally, I can confirm that the findings of the investigation will be provided to this honourable House and made public. The House will understand that there is a limit to what I can say, given that this is an ongoing investigation. I also cannot comment on what is now an ongoing police investigation, and therefore I ask that Members of the House let the investigation run its course and do not pre-empt its conclusions.”

Baroness Smith of Basildon: My Lords, I know the Minister to be an honourable and decent man. I just have to wonder how many more times he will be comfortable coming to the Dispatch Box to defend the indefensible to your Lordships’ House. So I thank him for being prepared to answer questions today.
I have to say that defending this Prime Minister is a tough gig, particularly now it is the Metropolitan Police asking the questions. First, if I may press the Minister on a point of clarity, this morning we were told that the Sue Gray report was not able to be published, but parts of it—I think he used the word “findings”—would be published. We are now told that the Metropolitan Police is happy for all of it to be published. There has been some confusion over the course of the day as to what will be available, when it will be published and what will happen. Can the Minister please say whether the Government will commit to the publication of the report—not just the findings—and not in any way block it from being made available to the public in its entirety?
Secondly, and I appreciate that this may be a difficult one for the Minister, can he confirm reports today that after the Prime Minister was personally informed about the police investigation, he then chaired a Cabinet meeting and chose not to inform his own Cabinet of the police investigation? The Minister will know how deeply shocking that would be and what an enormous concern that would give, if that was the case. I would be grateful if he would comment on those two points.

Lord True: My Lords, on the second point, obviously, I am not a member of the Cabinet and not informed on that matter. It is not custom, as the noble Baroness knows, to comment on Cabinet discussions. On the first point, I must repeat what I said in the Statement. As the terms of reference set out, the findings will be made public. Obviously, there is an interrelation between the Cabinet Office inquiry and the police investigation, and any intimation must be left to those conducting the inquiries. As far as the Government are concerned, I repeat: the findings and the investigation will be made public.

Lord Newby: My Lords, it is not disputed that the Prime Minister attended his own birthday party at a time when such gatherings were illegal. So he is now simply awaiting the executioner’s blow, either from the Gray report or the police investigation. In the meantime, his authority has disappeared completely. Will the Minister pass on to the Prime Minister the view of the country, and I suspect of this House, that the only positive act that he could now perform would be to resign today?

Lord True: No, my Lord.

Lord Butler of Brockwell: My Lords, could the Minister give us a little more precise guidance about the effect of these developments today on the timing of Sue Gray’s report? Can that report still be expected within the next few days?

Lord True: Most noble Lords will understand why I am not going to speculate on the timing of the progress of either investigation. I have told the House that aspects of the Cabinet Office investigation will continue. Obviously, there is an independent police investigation. I am sure the noble Lord, with his great experience and great service to the country, will understand that those two inquiries must be allowed to run their course.

Lord Robathan: My Lords, I am not, contrary to what people might think, a cheerleader for the Prime Minister. Indeed, when I had the opportunity, I did not vote for him, for a number of reasons. However, I think we should get things in perspective. It seems to me that the great British public are not terribly concerned about—

Noble Lords: Oh!

Lord Robathan: I am not talking about Members of the House of Lords sitting opposite, I am talking about the British public. I do not think they are very  concerned. I care very much whether the Prime Minister lies, as it happens, because I think Prime Ministers should have integrity. However, the instability at the top that has been caused by this furore is deeply worrying when we have geopolitical events in Ukraine. Frankly, I think most people would like to see the Government getting on with it. Perhaps the Prime Minister will eventually have to resign, but I think that what is now happening in Ukraine and elsewhere is more important.

Lord True: I will not agree with every aspect of my noble friend’s remarks, but he does make a point: the business of government must continue. We all know there are very grave matters before the Government, both domestic and international. My right honourable friend the Prime Minister is fully and actively engaged in those and made a Statement on events in Ukraine in the House of Commons earlier. I believe it is important that that factor is recognised.

Lord Scriven: My Lords, Kate Josephs, who was director-general of the Covid task force and is now chief executive of Sheffield City Council, has admitted going to a drinks party for her leaving do on 17 December 2020. Subsequently, she tried to mislead the local press by denying that she had been to drinks parties. She apologised only 19 minutes before the story went public. Does the Minister believe that this is the leadership behaviour expected of a chief executive in local government?

Lord True: My Lords, I am not going to comment on any particular individual at the Dispatch Box. I am sure the noble Lord is a greater expert on Sheffield than I.

Lord Cormack: My Lords, there is great concern around the country. The graphic photograph of the Queen alone at her husband’s funeral, juxtaposed with other pictures, did cause a great deal of disquiet. Will my noble friend the Minister do his best to guarantee that both reports—that of Sue Gray and if there is a report from the police—are published on a day when both Houses of Parliament are sitting?

Lord True: My Lords, I can only say to my noble friend that the reports of findings will be published in due course. There are investigations under way; those investigations, with great respect, should be allowed to continue and be completed. At that point, obviously, the matter of publication becomes condign.

Baroness Fox of Buckley: My Lords, we have just done the Third Reading of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill, and I wondered whether the Minister would comment on the number of people who have been fined extortionate amounts of money for breaking rules and have been accused of breaking the law. Will they receive an amnesty, as a consequence of realising there was wide-scale rule-breaking?
Secondly, the Minister said the business of government will carry on—needs to carry on—but is there a danger that the Government will be distracted by this police  inquiry, and hugely important matters of rebuilding society after lockdown are going to be neglected because of this preoccupation with No. 10 and parties? That is what the country is worried about.

Lord True: I agree with what the noble Baroness has said, and I can certainly give her the assurance that the work of governing is continuing. I do note that people on the Benches opposite are extremely distracted by their perusal of social media. But on the first point, she will understand that I cannot comment on the judgments that are being made in the courts or any individual cases, but obviously, I hear what she is saying.

Baroness Meyer: My Lords, the Prime Minister has apologised several times and has shown that he understands the public’s indignation. Does my noble friend not agree that, until the investigations are conducted, we should better concentrate on more important issues such as Ukraine and the NIP, and instead of destabilising the Government we should all work together and move forward?

Noble Lords: Oh!

Lord True: My Lords, we hear the voice of those who do not want to work together or move forward. I agree with what my noble friend said. I do believe, also, that there is a great principle, in public life and private life, that no one is guilty by accusation. We should let the reports be concluded.

Lord Browne of Ladyton: My Lords, I infer from the noble Lord’s statement that we can expect publication of only the findings of Sue Gray’s report and not the whole report. Am I right?
Secondly, does this sequence of events not raise serious questions about the nature of policing these lockdown regulations? It is almost impossible not to conclude that the police went from saying, “We are not investigating anything because we have no evidence”, to Sue Gray interviewing police officers and finding that they had evidence all along, and the Metropolitan Police Commissioner, having seen them, saying, “I either discipline the police officers or I investigate the crimes”?

Lord True: No, my Lords, nothing may be inferred of that kind. I refer the House to the very clear statements made by the Metropolitan Police Commissioner this morning, in her own words, where she set out the position. I do not think it is for me, as a Minister of the Crown, to add to or substitute the words of the Metropolitan Police Commissioner.

BBC Funding
 - Statement

The following Statement was made in the House of Commons on Monday 17 January.
“Mr Speaker, under article 43 of the BBC’s royal charter, I am required to determine a funding settlement for the level of the licence fee for a period of at least five years from 1 April 2022. I am legally required to  make my determination as far in advance as possible. I also highlight that, this year, the licence fee settlement has featured S4C prominently for the first time. In line with the recommendation from the independent review of S4C completed in 2018, the licence fee will be the sole source of public funding for S4C.
Negotiations began back in November 2020, and both I and my predecessor met the BBC on several occasions during this period to discuss this settlement. As part of those negotiations, the charter requires that I assess both the BBC’s commercial income and activities and the level of funding required so that the BBC can effectively fulfil its mission and public purposes. In addition, this Government set out our own relevant factors to consider during the charter review in 2015-16: evasion, commercial income, household growth and industry costs.
As the Prime Minister has said, the BBC is a great institution. It has a unique place in our cultural heritage. Beyond our shores, the BBC broadcasts our values and identities all over the world, reaching hundreds of millions every day. Likewise, the Welsh broadcaster S4C plays a unique and critical role in promoting the Welsh language, and in supporting our wider public service broadcasting landscape.
However, in reaching this settlement, I had to be realistic about the economic situation facing households up and down the country. The global cost of living is rising, and this Government are committed to supporting families as much as possible during these difficult times. Given that climate, we had to think very carefully about imposing any potential increase in the TV licence fee, particularly when any increase would expose families to the threat of bailiffs knocking on their door or criminal prosecution. When it comes to monthly bills, this is one of the few direct levers we have in our control as a Government. In the end, we simply could not justify putting extra pressure on the wallets of hard-working households.
Every organisation around the world is facing the challenge of inflation. I simply do not believe that those responsible for setting household bills should instinctively reach into the pockets of families across the country for just a little more every year to cover those costs. Today, I am announcing that the licence fee will be frozen for the next two years, and will rise in line with inflation for the following four years.
The BBC wanted the fee to rise to over £180 by the end of the settlement. Instead, it will remain fixed at £159 until April 2024. That is more money in the pockets of pensioners and of families who are struggling to make ends meet. We are supporting households when they need that support the most. This settlement sends an important message about keeping costs down while also giving the BBC what it needs to deliver on its remit. The approach to funding will be the same for the BBC and for S4C. However, I can announce that S4C will receive an additional £7.5 million funding per annum from 2022, to support the development of its digital offering. That is a 9% increase, following five years of frozen funding.
We believe this is a fair settlement for the BBC, it is a fair settlement for S4C and, most importantly, it is a fair settlement for licence fee payers all across the  United Kingdom. Let us not forget that the BBC will continue to receive billions in annual public funding, allowing it to deliver its mission and public purposes and to continue doing what it does best.
To support the BBC even further in what is a fast-changing broadcasting landscape, the Government will more than double the borrowing limit of the BBC’s commercial arm to £750 million. That will enable the BBC to access private finance as it pursues an ambitious commercial growth strategy, boosting investment in the creative economy across the UK. But, as Tim Davie said in his first speech as director-general of the corporation, the BBC must be a ‘simpler, leaner organisation’ that offers ‘better value’ to licence fee payers. We agree with that. Ultimately, this settlement strikes the right balance between protecting households and allowing broadcasters to deliver their vital public responsibilities, while encouraging them to make further savings and efficiencies.
The licence fee settlement is only one step in our road map for reform of the BBC. In the last few months, I have made it clear that the BBC needs to address issues around impartiality and groupthink. Those problems were highlighted definitively by the recent Serota review. The BBC’s own leadership rightly recognised those findings in full and committed to deliver all the review’s recommendations in its 10-point action plan on impartiality and editorial standards. I have had constructive discussions with the BBC about those issues in recent months. The BBC now needs to put those words into action. It needs to convince the British public that those changes are being made, and to provide regular and transparent accounts of its progress.
We will shortly begin the mid-term review of the BBC’s charter, which will consider the overall governance and regulation of the BBC. A key part of that review will look at whether the BBC’s action plan on impartiality has, in fact, materially contributed to improving the organisation’s internal governance.
It is also time to look further into the future. As any serious commentator will tell you, the broadcasting landscape has changed beyond all recognition over the past decade. We are living in a world of streaming giants, on demand, pay per view and smart TVs. Technology is changing everything. Some 97% of homes already have superfast broadband. A family in Cumbria can stream five different movies in five different rooms in their house at any one time, and our gigabit rollout is transforming those networks even further. More than 65% of UK households now have access to the fastest connection on the planet.
As the tech has changed, so have audience habits, particularly among younger viewers, so it is time to begin asking those really serious questions about the long-term funding model of the BBC and whether a mandatory licence fee with criminal penalties for individual households is still appropriate. As we have said before, we will therefore undertake a review of the overall licence fee model. Those discussions will begin shortly.
The BBC has been entertaining and informing us for 100 years. I want it to continue to thrive and be a global beacon in the UK and in the decades to come,  but this is 2022, not 1922. We need a BBC that is forward-looking and ready to meet the challenges of modern broadcasting; a BBC that can continue to engage the British public and command support from across the breadth of the UK, not just the London bubble; a BBC that can thrive alongside Netflix, Amazon Prime and all its other challengers that attract younger viewers. The licence fee settlement represents a significant step in that journey and in our wider reform of the BBC.
I look forward to continuing to work with the BBC and others across the industry over the coming years to secure the future of these vital British services. I commend this Statement to the House.”

Lord Bassam of Brighton: My Lords, in truth, we know that this Statement was about distraction—a vindictive distraction at that—away from the Prime Minister’s behaviour during lockdown, the Government’s unlawful VIP lane for Covid contracts and their continued refusal to deal with our country’s cost of living crisis.
The Secretary of State pleads that she is interested in the cost of living crisis; if she were, she would be telling the Prime Minister to reverse the cuts to universal credit, put a stop to the national insurance and tax hikes this April, back Labour’s VAT cut on fuel bills and follow the lead of the noble Lord, Lord Agnew, and raise the alarm about the £4 billion-worth of Covid-related fraud. Freezing the licence fee increase pales into insignificance when put alongside those issues.
Given the BBC’s stated desire to become a leaner outfit, and with the new ability of the corporation’s commercial arm to access more private finance, I can see why the Secretary of State believes there is a rationale for a freeze, but we do not necessarily agree, as it will have a significant impact on the BBC’s output. Surely, the Government’s discussions with the BBC should have been concluded before any decision or announcement was made. Secretary of State after Secretary of State has looked at alternatives to the licence fee and not managed to find a feasible solution. If there is one, we are, of course, happy to look at the detail, but why does this Secretary of State believe she will succeed where others have failed?
The Secretary of State has expressed unease that pensioners face punishment if they do not pay the licence fee, so she must be appalled to find out that it was her own Government who stopped subsidising free licences for the over-75s. She cited concerns about impartiality and groupthink, an area in which, in my view, the BBC is very self-aware—perhaps even more so than the Government. Both sides of our political divide often accuse the BBC of bias, which probably means that, on balance, it is getting things about right. During the current government crisis, it has seemed to us that ITV, Sky and Channel 4 have, if anything, been even more questioning of the Government’s credibility.
In general, the BBC is rightly viewed by most as a national treasure and an international icon, so perhaps the Minister can say why the Government are so determined to undermine it. You can almost set your watch by the Government’s constant threats to public  service broadcasting. The knock-on impact of the freeze—a real-terms cut of some £285 million by the end of the settlement period—is likely to have a larger economic cost than what the BBC loses by way of income. As we saw at the height of the pandemic, reduced commissions put enormous strain on the production and creative ecosystem, which has been left far more fragile than it was pre-pandemic.
The fact is that the BBC acts to underpin our creative sector. It the Government start chipping away at its foundations, they will undermine the structure and fabric of our cultural institutions and a big part of what makes the cultural industries so profitable and popular internationally. At present, production costs are spiralling due to inflation and increased competition from other broadcasters. The BBC has already trimmed quite a lot of the fat behind the scenes, so the impact of further cuts is likely to be more obvious to viewers. Will the Minister speculate and tell us today where he thinks the cuts needed for the BBC to balance its books should come from?
To give the Minister credit, in recent debates he has defended the work of the BBC and the way it is funded. I appreciate that decisions on funding statements are taken at a higher pay grade by his superiors, but did the Minister know that they had been taken and that this announcement was due? Perhaps he can share with us today his feelings when he saw the tweet about the future of the BBC’s funding and the threatened end of the licence fee. The Treasury has indicated that it will not chase down the £4 billion fraudulently claimed from its coronavirus support schemes at the height of the pandemic, so why not reverse that—track down the money in order to properly fund the BBC and other services and reduce, or at least offset, the planned tax increases that will hit family budgets far harder than the licence fee ever could?
We need a stable and secure funding base for the BBC, a more co-operative and collegiate approach from the Secretary of State, and a proper plan in place to effectively review the BBC’s charter and address the long-term issues that the Secretary of State raised about the dynamic and fast-changing nature of the digital, media and communications sector, which contributes so much to this country, its national life and our economy. This Statement was about little of the above, and I am afraid that it was much more about the shambles that, hour by hour and day by day, this Government have descended into.

Baroness Bonham-Carter of Yarnbury: My Lords, the BBC is 100 this year—what a birthday present from the Secretary of State this is. What possible reason is there for this attack on an institution that is the backbone of our world-beating creative industries, doubling its money, so far as investment in our creative economy goes?
Does the Minister not agree that the effect of initial BBC spending multiplies as it ripples through the economy, from region to region and sector to sector? Does he agree that it is pivotal in supporting our creative industries through innovation, skills and training, which directly feed into the Government’s levelling-up agenda, making programmes across the country that boost local economies and utilise local skills? BBC  investment over decades has helped to develop significant local creative hubs across the UK, not to mention a network of local radio and TV, ensuring that a spotlight is shone on important regional issues and essential local news.
Does the Minister agree that 43p a day, which is the cost of the licence fee, offers exceptional value to all audiences across the UK, supplying via television, radio and the internet British content that is universally available to everyone across the country? Cuts will affect everyone but especially those with only free-to-air TV and radio, who tend to be less well off and older. Does the Minister not also agree that the BBC has been a lifeline through the pandemic, providing both news that the public trusted and essential support, through Bitesize, for those home-schooling?
Does the Minister agree that the World Service and the programmes that it exports, which showcase this country’s creative talent, are central to promoting the UK around the world, and are the envy of the world? The BBC was described by our Prime Minister, when he was Foreign Secretary, as
“the single greatest and most effective ambassador for our culture and our values”.
The DCMS is not the department for social policy, as the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, has mentioned; there are more direct ways to help those who are trying to deal with the burden of inflation plus increased energy bills. So will the Minister please listen to the words of Richard Sharp, chair of the BBC and a member of his party:
“I believe that the case for a well-funded, modern and efficient national broadcaster has not diminished over the past decade, but grown”?
Have the Government assessed the impact of this funding freeze on the BBC? Given that 95% of BBC spend goes into content and its delivery—despite what the Daily Mail says—what would the Minister be happy to do without? What about an impact assessment of this decision on the UK creative economy as a whole? Finally, does he not agree that these decisions cannot continue to be made behind closed doors—we believe that there is disagreement within the Cabinet about the announcement—and that we need an independent licence fee commission?

Lord Fowler: My Lords, I agree with a great deal of what—

Noble Lords: No.

Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay: My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord and the noble Baroness for their questions. I will deal first with the question of timing and the assertion that this may be to do with other matters. I point out that my right honourable friend the Secretary of State is under an obligation, under Article 43 of the BBC’s royal charter, to determine a funding settlement for the level of the licence fee for a period of “at least five years” from 1 April this year. She is also required to make her determination as far in advance of April as possible—that is what she set out in her Statement to another place on 17 January.
I welcome the focus of the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, on the cost of living. I was not clear from his remarks whether he agrees with the Government’s decision to announce the freeze in the fee so that the licence fee remains at £159 for two years, before rising in line with inflation—or whether he would have supported the alternative, which was for the licence fee to rise to £180 by 2027. But I welcome his recognition that there is a rationale for the decision that the Secretary of State has taken.
As the noble Baroness says, the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport is not a social policy department as some others are, but this is one area in which we are able to help people with the bills they face as the cost of living rises. Again, it was not clear from her Benches whether the decision to help people met with her party’s support.
Across the country, businesses and households face rising bills and are tightening their belts. It is right to expect the BBC to do the same and to support people as they do so. The decision we have taken follows extensive discussions with the BBC—negotiations that began as far back as November 2020—which involved my right honourable friend and her predecessor as Secretary of State and continued until, most recently, 12 January, the Wednesday before she made her Statement in another place. I was aware of those discussions and welcome the decision to help people with the rising bills they face.
On the idea that this attacks or undermines the BBC, which the noble Baroness and the noble Lord said, I simply point out that the settlement provides the BBC with some £3.7 billion in licence fee funding this year and £23 billion over the duration of the settlement period. It also gives the BBC financial certainty for the next six years, to the end of the current charter period, so that it can continue doing its excellent work, which I have been very glad to pay tribute to in your Lordships’ House before; I continue to do so.
I agree with the noble Baroness in her remarks quoting the Prime Minister, who, since he left the Foreign Office and moved to Downing Street, has repeated the comments about the value of the BBC—not just the World Service but at home—and the lifeline it provided to many people during the pandemic. That is why we have given the settlement that we have.
We also gave a generous settlement to S4C, which was set out in the Statement. S4C plays a vital role in supporting the Welsh economy, culture and society, and the Government decided to award it a £7.5 million per year uplift from the licence fee to support its digital development. In total, that will provide S4C with approximately £88.8 million in licence fee funding per annum, which will rise in line with increases to the licence fee from April.
We believe this is a fair settlement for the BBC, S4C and licence fee payers across the United Kingdom. It strikes the right balance between protecting households and allowing the BBC and S4C to deliver their vital public responsibilities. The settlement will encourage the BBC to make further savings and efficiencies as it becomes a leaner organisation that delivers better value to licence fee payers.
The Government will also more than double the borrowing limit of the BBC’s commercial arm to £750 million, which will enable the BBC to access private finance as it pursues an ambitious commercial growth strategy and to boost investment in the creative economy across the UK. The noble Lord and the noble Baroness are right to point to the important part it plays in the wider creative economy.
The BBC is a beacon for news reporting and the arts around the world, and has a unique place in our cultural heritage. We want it to continue to thrive in the decades to come, and to thrive alongside its competitors. That is why, as the Secretary of State also announced, the Government believe that it is the right time to begin asking serious questions about the long-term funding model of the BBC. We need to ask whether a mandatory licence fee is still appropriate, particularly as audience viewing habits have changed, especially among younger viewers.
The context of that debate is important. Over the last three years, the number of licence fees paid has declined by some 700,000. We need to acknowledge that the criminal sanction for non-payment of the licence fee can cause considerable stress and anxiety for people, particularly at a time when the cost of living is rising.
I was staggered to learn that almost one-third of convictions of women in this country are for non-payment of the licence fee. A growing number of women are getting criminal records and some are being imprisoned for non-payment of the fines imposed. These are the questions we should be asking and the debate we should be having as we undertake the review of the overall licence fee model. As the Secretary of State set out in her Statement in another place, this is the start of a discussion. I saw in the papers this weekend that the former Labour Culture Secretary, James Purnell, a senior executive at the BBC until recently, has started to engage in that debate in a very thoughtful way. I look forward to having that debate with noble Lords from across the House, but I hope they will agree that it is an important discussion to have.

Lord Fowler: My Lords, I apologise for being premature, but I wanted to congratulate the noble Baroness on what she said, which my noble friend repeated. I have no objection whatever to re-examining the basis of the licence fee. That is a sensible thing to do, but what concerns me is the accompanying statements made by the Secretary of State for Culture, which seem to suggest that this has been more about a political battle between the Government and the BBC than the future of the corporation. I therefore hope that the noble Lord will dissociate himself from that campaign and say that that is not the policy of Her Majesty’s Government.

Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay: My Lords, this is not part of any political discussion, other than the politics of ensuring, in the short term, that people are assisted with the rising cost of living and, in the long term, ensuring that the BBC has a sustainable model to continue to produce the excellent output that it does, both at home and around the world. My right  honourable friend the Secretary of State paid tribute to it in her Statement and we all continue to do so. It is because we want to see it thrive that we want to make sure that it has the best sustainable model for the long term.

Baroness Blackstone: My Lords, is the Minister aware of just how much the BBC licence fee payer gets for his or her relatively low outlay on the licence fee? Let me just list the services: 10 TV services; 10 national radio services; 40 local radio stations; BBC iPlayer; BBC education programmes; the World Service; the BBC website and much more. Why are the Government jeopardising the quality of these many, varied services by their mean-spirited decision to freeze the licence fee for two years, thereby leading to a real-terms cut in BBC revenue? The explanation given in the Statement and implied by what the Minister said earlier—that the Government want to put more money into hard-pressed households’ pockets—just does not make sense, given the trivial amount entailed per household. If that is really what the Government want to do, I am sure the Minister will agree that abandoning their increase in national insurance payments, which really would make a difference, would be a better approach.

Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay: I do not think a settlement of more than £23 billion can be called mean-spirited. The noble Baroness is right to point to the wide range of things that the BBC does, but it is right, as we decide what the cost to the licence fee payer should be, that we look at those services in the context of the changing landscape and the other ways that people are consuming their news content and their entertainment provision and make sure that the BBC continues to be funded in a way that maintains its excellence and is fair to the people who pay for it.

Lord Carlile of Berriew: My Lords, notwithstanding the success of S4C, does the Minister agree that BBC Cymru Wales makes an extraordinary, virtuous and unifying contribution to the life of people in Wales? Will he give an undertaking to the House that nothing will occur to undermine the quality of public service broadcasting through the BBC in and for Wales, given the huge contribution that BBC Cymru Wales makes to news, popular culture and sport for the people of the Principality?

Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay: My Lords, as the BBC is operationally and editorially independent, it is up to it to decide how it spends its settlement, but I know it will want to maintain its excellent reputation throughout the United Kingdom in representing and delivering an excellent service to people right across the British Isles, as S4C does in Wales, as the noble Lord says.

Baroness Bottomley of Nettlestone: Will the Minister advise the Secretary of State that it would give greater veracity to her criticisms of the BBC if she refrained from commenting on party-political bias? That is the job of the party chairman. As Secretary of State, she is the sponsor for the broadcasting industry and I suggest she leaves criticisms of party-political bias to a different authority.

Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay: My Lords, as we touched on in our debate on the BBC instigated by the noble Lord, Lord Bragg, before Christmas, it has been the hallmark of many Administrations to speak about the BBC with affection and sometimes criticism, as is the case with a much-cherished 100 year-old institution. The Statement that my right honourable friend the Secretary of State set out is the culmination of negotiations which began in November 2020, focused on helping licence fee payers in the short term and setting out a sustainable model for the BBC over the long term.

Lord McNally: My Lords, I cannot think of a time in the 100-year history of the BBC when an announcement of its future has been so politically motivated and accompanied by such ridiculous statements from the Minister responsible on Twitter. The one thing to grasp from the Statement was the offer of a proper, open, fair study of the problem of how we fund the BBC. If she wants to redeem her reputation, it would be by establishing such an independent, open commission to look at this problem and report, so that the next decision can be made in an informed way. Since we have just heard from one Bottomley, I shall quote another, the Father of the House, Peter Bottomley, my pair when I was in the other place. He said:
“The Conservative approach is to keep what is good, what works—and to improve whenever possible.”
What better terms of reference for such a future study of the funding of the BBC?

Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay: My Lords, Parliament is lucky to have a Bottomley in each House and I have the pleasure of calling them both friends. I will take the noble Lord’s suggestion about how we might have the debate that the Secretary of State has said we want to have about future funding back to the department. I welcome the fact that he is beginning to engage with it and look forward to having that debate with noble Lords across the House.

Lord Grade of Yarmouth: My Lords, I have some difficulty accepting the criticism of intimidation of the BBC from noble Lords opposite. I seem to recall that the most dangerous moment in the whole history of the BBC was when Prime Minister Blair and his untrained attack Doberman, Alastair Campbell, attacked the BBC over the Gilligan broadcast about weapons of mass destruction. It brought the corporation to its knees to the extent that the chairman and the director-general resigned within 24 hours. The Blair Government were so desperate at what they had done to the BBC that they sent for me to go in and try to sort it out—that is how desperate they were.
That said, one would get the notion from listening to some of the comments around this House this evening that the BBC is impoverished by this settlement. Does the Minister agree that £3.7 billion in a very crowded marketplace of public intervention is a surprisingly good settlement? I wish those in the BBC who asked for more money from the Government would watch their own news bulletins and see what is going on, with people having to decide whether to heat or eat, and the increased use of food banks. There is a  complete lack of reality about what is going on in Britain with this regressive tax. I believe in the BBC and I stand with everybody in this House who supports it, but this is not the time for it to be asking for more money. Does the Minister agree that the Secretary of State’s decision to fire the starting pistol for the big debate about what we want from the BBC and how we pay for it is a very good step in the right direction and very timely?

Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay: My noble friend makes two pertinent points on the basis of his considerable experience. As I said, it is not unusual for this much-loved, much-cherished national institution to attract political comment from all quarters from time to time. That is as it should be. We all do it from a position of wanting the best for the corporation and to ensure that it can survive and thrive for its next 100 years. My noble friend is right to reinforce the point that £3.7 billion from licence fee payers this year, at a time when people’s bills and costs of living are rising, is a fair settlement that enables the BBC to continue doing the excellent things that it does, but in a way that shows that it understands how businesses and households across the country are having to tighten their belts—looking at how they can do what they do more efficiently and get more bang for their buck.

Baroness Hoey: My Lords, I welcome the Statement by the Secretary of State, which will have been welcomed outside in the country if not necessarily in your Lordships’ House. Does the Minister not agree that, in this day and age, when someone might buy a television with absolutely no intention of ever watching the BBC—given all the other choices that they will pay for—it is surely time for that proper debate on whether we can continue to fund the BBC in this arbitrary way that makes it impossible for some people to afford it?

Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay: The noble Baroness is right that the way people are consuming their media is changing, and changing rapidly. I have spoken about the 700,000 fewer licence fees that have been bought over the last three years; that change is happening rapidly. It is essential that we have this debate so that we can protect the BBC to make sure that it continues to thrive alongside, and as part of, a changing media landscape. That is the reason why we want to start having this discussion well in advance of the next charter period.

Baroness McIntosh of Hudnall: Listening to this debate, I think it is pretty clear that nobody who has spoken so far has suggested that there should not be any further consideration of how the BBC is funded, or that there should not be regular consideration of whether it is being supported in the right way. The noble Lord, Lord Grade, made a perfectly legitimate point when he referred back to actions during the time of the Blair Government. In doing so, he underlined the point that Governments of all colours and at all times have been periodically extremely irritated by the BBC. I do not refer to any particular accusation, but  accusing the BBC specifically of party political bias is a very different matter from being irritated by how it behaves from time to time.
My questions to the Minister are these: does he think that, as this debate proceeds, it can now be conducted in a tone of generosity and impartiality rather than in the terms set by, shall we say, the Daily Mail? Will he also answer the questions that came from various Members of your Lordships’ House about whether he thinks that, on its current settlement, the BBC can, and indeed should, continue to deliver everything that it currently delivers? And if it cannot, what does he think it should stop doing?

Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay: As I have said, the BBC is operationally as well as editorially independent, so it is up to the BBC to decide how it spends its settlement and how it continues to deliver for licence fee payers. That is a decision that is being repeated by many businesses and in many households across the country as people tighten their belts; it is important that they do so.
We spoke in our previous debate about the dangers of groupthink and the BBC’s own acknowledgment of the work that has to be done to ensure that it fully reflects the country that it serves, with the Serota review and other things. That work is to be welcomed and I think it was welcomed across your Lordships’ House. This is not a matter of party politics but of making sure that the BBC reflects the country that it serves and the people whose hard-earned money pays for its services.

Lord Framlingham: My Lords, does the Minister agree that, if the BBC is to justify its fee, its news programmes must be honest and straightforward? Last weekend, there was a demonstration in London by people who were against compulsory vaccination. The BBC news reported it as being attended by “hundreds of people”. I saw it myself, repeated more than once—“hundreds of people”—when in fact there were thousands and thousands of people at the demonstration who could be clearly seen on another channel at the same time as the BBC was saying that there were only hundreds. What does that do to the BBC’s credibility, and what will all those people who attended that demonstration, or watched the comparison on television, think about the BBC and the licence fee?

Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay: The number of people attending protests is often disputed by the people who take part, the police and the reports that are made of them, so I hope that my noble friend will forgive me if I am not drawn into my assessment of the protest or of the reports. The BBC is editorially independent. It reports the news in an independent way; it grapples with often highly politically charged issues as it does so, and it has a means for people who feel that its bulletins are not fair to make their voices heard and seek redress. That is one of the reasons why it is so cherished.

Lord Clement-Jones: The Minister did not answer the question of my noble friend Lady Bonham-Carter as to the consequences of the licence fee not  being adjusted for inflation over the next two years. What is he suggesting the BBC should cut?

Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay: My Lords, I have said that, as the BBC is operationally independent, it is for the BBC to decide how it spends its settlement of £23 billion over the settlement period, and how it serves the people who are funding it.

Baroness Ritchie of Downpatrick: My Lords, the Minister seems to indicate that freezing the BBC licence fee could be used as a cost-saving measure to help those who have to meet rising costs as part of the cost of living increase. Does the Minister not agree that it would be much better if the Government were to reduce, and not bring forward the increase in, national insurance contributions—as a measure of dealing with the cost of living increases and ensuring that the BBC continues to provide a good level of fair and equal broadcasting right throughout the UK?

Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay: The noble Baroness will, I hope, appreciate that decisions on other departments’ areas and how the Government can help people with the cost of living are not for me. However, I hope I infer from her comments that she welcomes the decision that the Secretary of State has taken to do our bit to help people with the rising costs of what otherwise would have been a licence fee increase to £180 by 2027.

Lord Watson of Invergowrie: My Lords, the remarks of the noble Baroness, Lady Bottomley, and the noble Lord, Lord McNally, about the Secretary of State should perhaps be put in the context of the fact that she has a history of attacking the BBC, and her appointment to her current post was akin to giving a child the keys to the sweet shop.
Almost 80% of school-age children use BBC Bitesize, the UK’s only free-to-use comprehensive education resource portal as a regular part of their learning. During the Covid peaks, BBC lockdown learning attracted an average of four and a half million users to the online resources specially developed to support home schooling at a time when the Government were failing to provide enough laptops or broadband to disadvantaged families. No commercial broadcaster would provide these services gratis. Has any assessment been made of the impact of the licence fee freeze on the BBC’s education output?

Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay: I agree with the noble Lord that the services provided by BBC Bitesize and more widely were a lifeline to people including those who were home schooling during lockdown, as I said to the noble Baroness, Lady Bonham-Carter. However, I point to the comments of my right honourable friend the Secretary of state in another place when she made this Statement. She was very glad to defend the BBC and to say that she wanted it to continue to thrive for another 100 years. That is why we want to have the open discussion that we need to make sure that its funding model can sustain it in a changing landscape; that is important and, as I have said, I look forward to having that debate with noble Lords.

Lord Shipley: My Lords, in her Statement, the Secretary of State said that she
“had to be realistic about the economic situation facing households up and down the country.”—[Official Report, Commons, 17/1/22; col. 39.]
What consideration might the Government give to introducing a rebate scheme for those on lower incomes, as applies with council tax, so that the licence fee might better reflect the ability to pay?

Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay: I will take the noble Lord’s interesting point back to the department and discuss it with my colleagues there.

Dissolution and Calling of Parliament Bill
 - Committee

Relevant documents: 8th Report from the Delegated Powers Committee, 8th Report from the Constitution Committee

  
Clause 1: Repeal of the Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011
  

Debate on whether Clause 1 should stand part of the Bill.

Lord Grocott: My Lords, I very much support Clause 1 being part of the Bill, but I want briefly to record how big a decision this is. Just 11 years after the Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011 was put on to the statute book, with much criticism and objection to it at the time—it was done in the shortest period of time and, as we know from other sources, was decided in a very short period by the coalition partners—we are saying that it should now be repealed. This must be the shortest existence of any major constitutional Act.
I mention that so that we learn, I hope, at least one lesson from it: that major constitutional Bills should not be introduced in anything like the way this one was. At the very least, there should be some attempt to achieve consensus on them if they are to endure. Of course, normally, there should surely be pre-legislative scrutiny. The Act has no friends, as evidenced by the fact that there are no amendments to Clause 1. Clause 1 is terrific; I thought that we should start on a happy note.

Lord Lexden: My Lords, Evelyn Waugh once said that the problem with the Tory party is that it
“never put the clock back by a single second.”
Is it not rather wonderful that it is now putting the clock back by 11 whole years?
Clause 1 agreed.

  
Clause 2: Revival of prerogative powers to dissolve Parliament and to call a new Parliament

Amendment 1

Lord Norton of Louth: Moved by Lord Norton of Louth
1: Clause 2, page 1, line 6, after “Her Majesty’s” insert “personal”

Lord Norton of Louth: My Lords, the Government have a manifesto commitment to get rid of the Fixed-term Parliaments Act. The Opposition also have a manifesto commitment to repeal it. This Bill repeals the Act and seeks, as we have just heard, to restore the status quo ante. Like my later amendments, Amendment 1 is designed to ensure that the Bill does precisely that.
Amendment 1 makes it explicit that the prerogative power to dissolve Parliament and call a new Parliament falls within the personal prerogative of the sovereign. Since the 17th century, the powers that remain with the Crown and have not been displaced by statute have come to be exercised in the name of the Crown or by the monarch, acting on the advice of Ministers. There are three personal, or reserve, prerogative powers remaining—that is, where the monarch does not act on advice—although two are governed by conventions of the constitution. Until the enactment of the Fixed-term Parliaments Act, the power to dissolve Parliament was a prerogative power that was not exercised on advice. A Prime Minister requested Dissolution but the monarch was not bound to accede to the request. Although the practice was to grant the request, there were circumstances in which it could be envisaged that the monarch could refuse it.
As is well known, there was some uncertainty as to what those circumstances may be. In 1950, the King’s private secretary, Alan Lascelles, wrote anonymously to the Times identifying circumstances in which a request for a Dissolution may be refused. Prime Ministers were not able to take it as given that a request would be granted. My understanding is that, in 1993, No. 10 contacted the palace to check that, in the event of the Government being defeated on the Motion on the social protocol of the Maastricht treaty, which the Prime Minister had made a vote of confidence, a request for Dissolution would be granted. As the Joint Committee on the Fixed-term Parliaments Act reported:
“As far as we can tell, since the Second World War, UK Prime Ministers only requested a dissolution once it was very clear the Monarch would grant it.”
There is an argument that the power to dissolve Parliament should not be within the sovereign’s gift. There is an argument that it should be. I believe it important that a Prime Minister does not have the capacity in all circumstances to determine the date of a general election. This, however, is not the occasion for that argument. If the Bill is to restore the status quo ante, it is not a question of whether the power should reside with the sovereign but, rather, a case of ensuring that the Bill puts it beyond doubt that it does so.
This amendment would, therefore, put on the face of the Bill that the prerogative to dissolve Parliament and call a new Parliament is a personal prerogative. The motivation for it stems from the Government’s initial list of Dissolution principles, referring to the sovereign acting on advice. As the Joint Committee recommended:
“If the Government wishes to restore the Monarch’s personal prerogative fully, it needs to revise the language in its dissolution principles, so that it is clear the Prime Minister has no power to advise a dissolution, but only to request one. The Government should replace references to ‘advice’ on dissolution with ‘requests’ for dissolution since the Monarch must accept Prime Ministerial advice.”
The Government took this on board; the Explanatory Notes to this Bill refer to the sovereign granting Dissolution
“on the request of the Prime Minister.”
However, it is worth quoting what the Government said in their response to the Joint Committee’s report:
“In repealing the FTPA, we are returning to a position whereby the power to dissolve Parliament is exercised solely by the Sovereign as a ‘personal prerogative power’. We are grateful to the Committee for its scrutiny of how this is described in the dissolution principles paper, and agree that the better description is that the Prime Minister ‘requests’ a dissolution.”
The wording rings an alarm bell. “Requests” is not a “better description”. It is a correct statement of the constitutional position that pertained prior to the enactment of the Fixed-term Parliaments Act in September 2011. To say that “requests” is a “better description” than “advice” is to convey that it is simply a choice of words to convey the same thing. If the Government accept that the power to dissolve is a “personal prerogative power”, it is not a power exercised on advice. The wording of the Government’s response does not instil confidence in the grasp of Ministers and officials of the principles governing our constitutional arrangements.
Given that, I believe that there is a case for putting it beyond doubt that it is a personal prerogative power. At the very least, this debate provides an opportunity for the Minister to put it on the record at the Dispatch Box that it is a personal prerogative power. However, I see no reason why it should not be in the Bill. The Government are committed to restoring the position as it stood prior to the Fixed-term Parliaments Act taking effect. The amendment does not challenge that; rather, it would ensure that it is achieved. I beg to move.

Lord Beith: My Lords, the House is indebted to the noble Lord for elucidating this issue and tabling the amendment. In the Joint Committee, it was worrying that the Government did not initially seem to understand the distinction between requesting a Dissolution and advising a Dissolution, advice that would be binding on the sovereign. I entirely exempt the ministerial reply today from that criticism—the Minister is indeed a former member of the Constitution Committee, which also considered this—but we certainly considered it necessary to explore a little more fully and to criticise the wording of the Dissolution Principles document, the one-page analysis of the issue that made the specific mistake to which the noble Lord made reference.
The refusal of a Dissolution is the only remaining restraint on the ability of a Prime Minister to foreshorten a Parliament in circumstances that might be either entirely appropriate or, in some cases, at least questionable. Subsequent government writing, such as appears in their response to the Joint Committee, indicates that the Government recognise that there are circumstances in which it might be inappropriate to grant a Dissolution, such as a Prime Minister seeking a rerun of an election that has not quite gone according to plan and has not delivered the overall majority that was sought.
Another possibility is the 1974 situation, which I remember vividly because I was elected first in October 1973 and then in February 1974. Ted Heath was  unable to establish a coalition, because we did not want to form a coalition with him, so Harold Wilson became Prime Minister. Was he advised that it would be premature to go to the palace and seek an immediate Dissolution? I have no idea, but he did not do so. He took the rather shrewder step of spending about nine months trying to demonstrate that you could have a sanitised Labour Government who did not do any of the things that people worry about Labour Governments doing, and was therefore able to go to the country in a slightly stronger position in October that year. Thankfully, I was re-elected but with a majority of only 70-odd, if I remember rightly; I survived to tell the tale another day. There are circumstances like that in which the issue is a questionable one, and that is why it is important to defend the personal prerogative power.
There are ways of addressing this issue but they do not seem likely to find their way into the legislation as it will eventually be passed. We will discuss Motions of the House of Commons later. They would provide some restraint on a Prime Minister but not very much. Considering that this might not find its way into the final legislation, it is even more important that we protect the ability of the sovereign to decline to give a Dissolution in exceptional circumstances.
Of course, a power like that is more important for what happens behind the scenes than for any possibility that it would be fully exercised and the sovereign would actually have to do it. We are talking about a situation in which the Prime Minister would be advised that it would be unhelpful, inappropriate and potentially damaging to the position of the monarchy to raise the issue at this precise point and, if it was going to be raised, it would be much better to raise it later or at a better moment. Those are the kinds of conversations that surround the few personal prerogative powers that still exist.
The system depends on something that is sadly lacking at the moment, which is a great deal of trust. The Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee in the Commons said that
“some mix of statute and convention is the best way for this area to be governed, but this requires the actors involved to act in ways which engender trust.”
That has not been happening very much lately, so we should look at this with some care.
The noble Lord, Lord Norton of Louth, has done the right thing by tabling the amendment. I am not entirely persuaded that it makes a difference because my view is that it is a personal prerogative and, unless Parliament legislates it away, it is still there. However, first, it is highly desirable that it becomes clear that the Government understand the position that it is a request, not advice; and, secondly, if there is a general feeling in the House that it needs to be included in the Bill, we can do so. If not, we simply recognise that this is the position and that it has not been changed if we revert to the status quo ante.

Lord Grocott: My Lords, I agree with much of what the noble Lord, Lord Beith, said and with the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Norton. I am not sure it is hugely important but, because the issue of “advice” as opposed to “request” has reared its head as early as this, I want to make what seems to  me to be a self-evident unarguable point, although I have been unable to persuade everyone that it is. Although the assumption prior to 2011 was that the Prime Minister went to the monarch with a request—in other words, it gave the monarch the decision as to whether or not to accept the request for Dissolution—the overwhelming evidence in my lifetime, and that of others of similar age in this Committee today, is that in practice it is inconceivable that an elected Prime Minister could go to the monarch and say, “I think we should go to the country” and the monarch would say no. Incidentally, that is hardly a disastrous request; the notion sometimes seems to come out in these discussions that asking for a general election is somehow an affront to democracy.
It is inconceivable to me that the monarch would say no, and historically, at least in modern times, it has just never happened. There may have been chats behind the scenes but there is no doubt that it would be a constitutional crisis of enormous magnitude if the Prime Minister of the day went to the monarch and said, “Please can I have a general election?”—or, to put it more accurately, “Please can the people resolve this difficulty that Parliament is in?”—and the hereditary monarch, who we must at all costs keep out of politics, said no. That is about the most politically contentious decision that any monarch could make.
It has always been an assumption of most people in these debates that at all costs we must protect the monarch from making those kinds of decisions. To me, it is a slam-dunk case that the monarch in modern times has had advice from the Prime Minister because in practice it has been inconceivable that the monarch would ever say no.

Lord Mackay of Clashfern: My Lords, we are very much indebted to the noble Lord for his background in this matter. It is important to remember that there are Dissolution principles to be settled before this situation arises. From time to time they have been revised, but I do not think they have been revised for some time now, and obviously it is appropriate that they should be before a further action is required.
It seems there is an academic argument about whether, once the prerogative powers are stopped as they were by the original Act, they can be revived—and this academic discussion occupies quite a lot of pages. So far as I am concerned, if Parliament says, “You go back to where you were before we did this”, that seems perfectly possible and should be followed. I therefore agree with my noble friend Lord Norton of Louth that it is desirable to put that in the Bill. I do not think it is at all likely that anything of the sort that the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, has mentioned is likely to arise, because the Dissolution principles make that very plain. It is in the form of a request because of its importance, but it will be taken in accordance with principles that are well settled. I very much support this proposal and the basis on which it rests.

Lord Desai: My Lords, if I may intervene in this debate, I think it is still important that what used to be the custom and convention be clarified on paper. This is for a very simple reason. While I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, that it is inconceivable  that a monarch could refuse the request of a Prime Minister, there is always a possibility. For example, in India, which has a constitution based very much on British lines, the president is elected by the Parliament, and very often he or she is a partisan person and would be unable to refuse the Prime Minister under any circumstances. We have to reserve the power of the monarch. If what the Prime Minister is saying does not smell good when he or she is asking for a dissolution, the monarch should have the power to say no.

Lord Lexden: My Lords, I agree with all those who have said that my noble friend Lord Norton of Louth has done us a very considerable service. He reminded us of the formidable words of Alan Lascelles, private secretary to George VI in 1950. We should, at all times, keep those Lascelles words in mind:
“It is surely indisputable (and common sense) that a Prime Minister may ask—not demand—that his Sovereign will grant him a dissolution of Parliament; and that the Sovereign, if he”—
or, we should add, she—
“so chooses, may refuse to grant this request.”
It is the existence of this power that has ensured, and will continue to ensure, that no Prime Minister has asked improperly for a dissolution in our history.

Lord Grocott: May I just ask, what would be an improper dissolution?

Lord Lexden: I do not think I could make a list of the possibilities. One can conceive of them, but we trust to the existence of this power and the wisdom of the monarch to ensure that no improper dissolution is likely ever to be brought forward.

Viscount Stansgate: My Lords, I intervene briefly because this is a very interesting debate and I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Norton of Louth, for having tabled his amendment. We are all here because we recognise that the 2011 Act was a mistake. However, I am a little puzzled by the noble Lord’s amendment because he prefers to insert the word “personal” when, up to now, we have simply referred to it as the royal prerogative. Indeed, I am grateful to the Minister, who in a Written Answer to me yesterday defined the royal prerogative; I have it in front of me but do not need to read it out. The Minister refers to the royal prerogative just in those terms and not in any way as “personal”. Therefore, when the noble Lord, Lord Norton, responds to this debate, I would be grateful if he—or indeed the Minister—could tell us whether there is any difference between the phrases “royal prerogative” and “personal prerogative”.
While I am on my feet, I join other noble Lords in saying that, when I listened to the noble Lord, Lord Beith, it brought back to me what happened in 1974. However, I do not think that anyone would expect the monarch to refuse a dissolution, although it is inherent in the nature of this Bill that the monarch might take that fatal step.

Lord Mackay of Clashfern: My Lords, the answer to the question of the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, may be that, if something was clearly in contradiction  to the dissolution principles, it would be wrong. The idea must be that the Prime Minister would exercise his power to request within the framework provided by the dissolution principles.

Baroness Smith of Basildon: My Lords, I rise to speak only briefly. This short debate shows how, although we have five groups of amendments, they are all quite interdependent: they are all involved with the same issue. The noble Lord, Lord Norton of Louth, has done us a service tonight. He has indicated what the Government say they are trying to achieve: to reset the clock to where we were prior to the Fixed-term Parliaments Act. The reason why we have amendments down tonight is the lack of certainty that the legislation as drafted actually achieves that. I do not think there is any difference across the House about where we are trying to get to; rather, the issue is whether the vehicle being used does what it says on the tin, and that is why I am grateful to the noble Lord.
The reason why I am speaking now is that I may not have to speak on other amendments, because they are very much a part of the same issue. The dissolution principles have been identified several times. There is a later amendment, from the noble Lord, Lord Wallace, on the recommendation of the joint committee that these principles be revised and updated. I am sure that the Minister will respond to that later.
On the Lascelles principles, it is clear there that there are three areas where the sovereign could refuse a request—they would not have to, but they could—if those conditions were met. I suspect, as some noble Lords have said, that there would be a discussion prior to that point before any request was formally made.
I hope the Minister will take on board the comments we have made. I know he said that he does not want to see any amendments to the Bill, but as we have heard today, the amendments noble Lords have put forward seek to achieve what the Minister and the Government want to achieve via the Bill. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Norton, for doing that. What we need is clarity, which is what many of the amendments before us today seek to achieve. Where there is a lack of clarity, they seek to ensure that the Bill does what the Government want it to do. I am sure that we will return to this issue, but I hope the Minister will not rule out accepting this amendment or having a discussion with the noble Lord, Lord Norton, to see if it could help the Government to achieve their objectives.

Lord True: My Lords, I thank all those who contributed to what has been an important and interesting debate. I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Norton of Louth for bringing it forward, and I also welcomed the opportunity to talk to him about it. What I am going to say on the record is, I hope, a response to that discussion and to matters raised in this debate. I was struck by the fact that the noble Lord, Lord Beith, in an elegant and thoughtful contribution, envisaged circumstances where the reserve power could apply. The noble Lord, Lord Grocott, said that it was  inconceivable. The reality is, as we will discuss later, that the Government’s belief, and the traditional practice, is that the reserve power has an important constitutional role.
The noble Lord, Lord Grocott, had a little go at another Second Reading speech at the start. I agree, of course, with what he said and with what my noble friend Lord Lexden said. I also agree with what the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, said last time around. It is absolutely true that the 2011 Act was, in her words, clearly designed for a specific purpose at a specific time: to protect the coalition Government from instability. I freely acknowledge the wisdom and accuracy of those words.
There is general support for the Bill, and I welcome that. I cannot encourage the noble Baroness opposite to think that all the amendments are clarifying. I think some of the discussions we have had would involve driving a coach and horses through the Government’s intentions on the Bill, as I hope to persuade the House later.
Turning to the amendment of my noble friend Lord Norton, I repeat that I am grateful to him for tabling it. Clause 2 was carefully drafted to put beyond doubt that the prerogative powers relating to the dissolution and calling of Parliament will be revived. As my noble friend Lord Norton outlined, these are prerogative powers that are personal or reserve prerogative powers, meaning that they belong to the person of the sovereign, acting in the sovereign’s individual capacity. The noble Lord has also sought to place on record and beyond doubt that the dissolution prerogative power is not exercised on the advice of the Prime Minister but is instead a request made to the sovereign. I can assure him that that is the Government’s position.
Turning specifically to Dissolution, the Government have recognised in response to the Joint Committee, for whose work we are extremely grateful, that this personal prerogative is exercised by the sovereign on the request of the Prime Minister, not on their advice. I am pleased to reassure your Lordships that the Government fully accept this accurate characterisation and are grateful for the Joint Committee’s considered conclusions on that point and the submissions made in the debate.
I hope that very clear statement on the record will gratify and ease the concerns of my noble friend Lord Norton and others. I therefore thank him again for tabling the amendment as it has given the Government an opportunity to clarify this point in Parliament, and given this Committee the opportunity to debate this aspect of the constitution. I hope my statement has provided sufficient clarity on the nature of the Dissolution prerogative so that my noble friend may feel able to withdraw his amendment.

Lord Norton of Louth: My Lords, I am extremely grateful to everyone who has spoken. It has given rise to a very valuable debate with some very helpful interventions. I take the point of my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay of Clashfern that there is an extensive academic argument about whether the prerogative can be revived. I am very much in favour of academic debates taking place, since if they did not, I would be out of a job. From my point of view, the  one good thing that came out of the Fixed-term Parliaments Act was the number of articles I managed to publish on the subject.
Today, however, is the occasion for that debate about the prerogative being revived. I accept that the Bill achieves what it is designed to do: to provide that the prerogative comes back and to put it beyond doubt because of that academic debate about whether it could or could not. This establishes that it does. That has to be our starting point because, as the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, said, it is designed to restore the status quo ante. Therefore, the purpose of my amendment is to achieve clarity of that purpose and that it is a personal prerogative, the distinction I drew —in response to the noble Viscount, Lord Stansgate—in opening. It is one of only three prerogative powers that the monarch does not exercise on advice.
I deliberately quoted the report of the Joint Committee, which the noble Lord, Lord Beith, referred to, in relation to the point that the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, raised: the practice is that the monarch has acceded to requests for Dissolution. I was also trying to touch on the fact that No. 10 has contacted the palace in advance to make sure that it will be granted. I always think that is a useful deterrent; it makes the Prime Minister think about it. There is now the convention that Ministers do not act in a way that would embarrass the Crown, so there is some restraint there. There is a useful purpose in its existing in the same way that, formally, the monarch does not appoint the Prime Minister. That, again, is one of the powers not exercised on advice. There are certain elements there that remind Ministers that there is a higher authority to which they are responsible. There is a purpose in it and a useful role, but that is a wider debate. My starting point is that the purpose of the Bill is to restore the status quo ante and my amendment is focused on that. It is working within the purpose of the Bill and what it is designed to achieve.
As I said in opening, I was keen to get the Minister to put on record at the Dispatch Box that it is a personal prerogative power. Therefore, that is a necessary condition. I will need to reflect on whether it is a sufficient one, but for the moment I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment 1 withdrawn.

Amendment 2

Lord Wallace of Saltaire: Moved by Lord Wallace of Saltaire
2: Clause 2, page 1, line 9, at end insert “subject to subsection (1A).(1A) The Prime Minister may not request Her Majesty to exercise Her prerogative to dissolve Parliament if Parliament has been prorogued, unless Parliament is first recalled and the House of Commons agrees that the Prime Minister should request Her Majesty to exercise Her prerogative to dissolve Parliament.”

Lord Wallace of Saltaire: My Lords, quite a lot of what we will discuss this evening is how far we need to put into statute the sort of things the noble Lord, Lord Norton of Louth, has been thinking about, or whether a revised version of the Cabinet Manual would be sufficient to set out the conventions agreed by the parties. We will come back to that later.
Looking through the 2004 report of the Commons Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee, Taming the Prerogative: Strengthening Ministerial Accountability to Parliament, I note that there was a memorandum from the Treasury Solicitor’s Department on the royal prerogative, which listed as one of the prerogatives
“the summoning, prorogation and dissolution of Parliament”
as a single interconnected power.
The Government have said that Prorogation is outside the scope of the Bill and is an entirely separate car. The reasons, going back to why in 2010-11 Prorogation was taken out, seem relatively clear. The Lords Constitution Committee then said that
“the risk of abuse of the power of prorogation is very small”.
The Government said in the debates on the Bill that
“The conventions of this House are sufficiently strong”—[Official Report, Commons, 18/1/11; col. 768.]
to make inclusion of the power of Prorogation on a statutory footing unwise and unnecessary. Opinions would now differ. As the noble Lord, Lord Lexden, pointed out, no Prime Minister has asked improperly for a Dissolution, but the question of whether a Prime Minister has asked improperly for a Prorogation is very much open.
The noble Lord, Lord True, and other Ministers have enjoyed referring to our tried and tested constitutional system. If one looks back at arguments over Prorogation, there were riots throughout the country in 1820 against Prorogation. In 1831, when the Lords were about to debate whether there should be a Motion to prevent Prorogation, William IV jumped into a rather inferior carriage and came down personally to prorogue Parliament. In 1854, an MP proposed an address to the Queen against Prorogation, which Lord Aberdeen as Prime Minister made a matter of confidence in order to prevent. “Tried and tested” is, perhaps, a little strong.
I ask the Minister in general terms for an assurance that a revised edition of the Cabinet Manual, which I hope is now well under way, will clarify that there is now a well-established convention—tried and tested, even—over the last century that Prorogation is now a prerogative power available for use only in marking the short recess period between parliamentary Sessions, and that this should not be used as a prelude to a request for Dissolution that has not been communicated to nor approved by Parliament. Nor should it be used, as it has not been for the past century, as a means of avoiding parliamentary scrutiny, proposals or decisions over any extended period.
Perhaps I may be permitted to say a little about the broader issues behind this debate since my amendment is linked to the broader amendment which follows. The desirability of reaching as wide a consensus as possible has been stated in a range of reports relating to this Bill. The 2004 committee report said that the case for the reform of ministerial executive power is “unanswerable”. Indeed, opposition Conservatives including William Hague gave evidence to that committee in support of further limits on executive power. Perhaps the young Nicholas True wrote some of the evidence which he gave; I do not know.
The Minister’s response to the Constitution Committee last December said, rather more weakly, I thought:
“Political consensus is of course valuable when possible”
without, so far as I am aware, promoting any active cross-party consultations on the constitutional issue. I regret that. This is a major constitutional Bill; therefore there needs to be as much consensus as we can achieve.
The fact is that, week by week, we begin to approach the idea that this Government might not necessarily be in power beyond the next election, which could conceivably produce a Parliament in which no single party has a majority. We are concerned not just with addressing the flaws in the 2011 Act but with future-proofing, as various committees have talked about, so that we are prepared for a situation that we might face with the outcome of the next election.
The Joint Committee says at paragraph 14 that there has been
“a clear direction of travel to bring prerogative powers under greater democratic control, usually through greater Parliamentary scrutiny or approval, or by giving statutory force to rules that previously relied on prerogative powers, executive discretion and constitutional conventions.”
The Faulks administrative law review makes much the same point. Conventions are based on trust and executive restraint. Where trust is weakened, statutory authority has to replace convention. I therefore move my amendment, which links Prorogation to Dissolution, because that is part of making sure that we share an understanding of some of these basic constitutional principles.

Lord Judge: My Lords, the amendment in my name and those of the noble Baroness, Lady Smith of Basildon, and the noble Lords, Lord Newby and Lord Lansley, is about the constitutional location of power today and for the next 80 to 100 years. It is not about where, historically speaking, power in Parliament used to rest. It is about now, at the beginning of this century, after at least half a century in which the powers of the Prime Minister have been accreting at an alarming and chilling rate. I will not go through the endless efforts I have made to draw your Lordships’ attention to that fact, but it is a fact.
I was not able to speak at Second Reading but the issue of troublesome prerogative powers relating to Dissolution and Prorogation formed the basis of my contribution to the debate on the Queen’s Speech. I know that I am not taking the Minister by surprise because he and I have had many rather interesting discussions about the constitutional issues. It is important that I add this too: when I made that speech, the present Prime Minister was riding high in the polls. This is nothing to do with the fact that he has troubles abounding at the moment—Prime Ministers always run into trouble at some time. It is not about the present Prime Minister; it is about the person, whoever that might be, who holds this office not being given further power, as the Bill proposes.
We should not have a fixed-term Parliament. We all agree on that. There should be a maximum period. Five years is what is proposed and it makes perfect sense. What did not make sense last time was the  proposal that a two-thirds majority was needed in the Commons for that term to come to an end. It did not make sense because of something that should have been absolutely obvious to everybody. I am sorry to say that to those who advocate for it. Just about every important piece of legislation enacted in Parliament has required a bare majority. Nobody set about trying to have two-thirds majorities; a bare majority would do. The Great Reform Act had a majority of two. The Habeas Corpus Act, where all our freedoms were determined, passed because the noble Lord acting as a Teller for one side counted a big fat Peer as 10 and so it was carried. That is what our liberties have turned on. My point is that a two-thirds majority is an aberration.
The question is: how do we replace the legislation? We have had the beginning of a fascinating discussion: do the current proposals revive the prerogative power? Fun—the noble Lord, Lord Norton, can get his students to write endless essays, all getting Firsts if they agree with him, on this subject. But this is the point: whatever the theory might be, the reality is that the power of Dissolution will now be based on statute—this statute, which might be changed. Prerogative power does not get elevated out of thin air; it is founded on the statute.
In answer to one or two of the matters raised in the noble Lord’s Amendment 1, whether the theory is that the Prime Minister gives Her Majesty—the monarch, rather—advice or a request, it seems to me, and here I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, absolutely impossible to understand that the monarch of the day would be prepared to enter into tempestuous political controversy, threatening the very existence of the monarchy, if the prime ministerial advice or request was rejected. It seems inconceivable. It might have been possible when the Lascelles letter was written to the Times in 1950. It was never put to the test; it never arose. In my view, it is inconceivable. If my view is right, here in the 21st century, the current legislative proposal in this Bill is that the decision whether Parliament should be dissolved would be vested exclusively in the Prime Minister of the day. Today, in a modern democracy, an uncurbed power to have Parliament dissolved—it is rather astonishing to think about it.
Of course, as was said in an earlier debate, it is perfectly true that the Prime Minister, in making his or her decision, has to be mindful of the possible adverse reaction of the electorate if they choose to think that his or her idea of having an election is a bad one. Of course it is, but whether the public do or not, general elections are about the next five years. The election arrives and a decision is made on the health service, the education system, the Armed Forces. It is not just about this single decision made by the Prime Minister. So I go this far with the argument against me: okay, the Prime Minister would take into account possible adverse reactions from the electorate if the electorate do not want an election. But this is not a principle; it is simply a matter of prime ministerial judgment. It is not constitutional control; it is the Prime Minister making a purely political decision: “Where does the balance of advantage to me and my party lie?”
It will also be suggested—it has been suggested to me and I have read it pretty frequently—that recent events in the Commons in the context of Brexit underline the need for this prime ministerial power. The Brexit  debates were hardly a model of clarity but let us remember what they reflected: a huge parliamentary and, indeed, national divide, splitting parliamentary parties themselves, in the context of the constitutional aberration of a referendum, with the Dissolution process itself governed by the requirement for a two-thirds majority rather than a simple majority, which, as I said a moment ago, altered parliamentary processes and, indeed, strategies. In constitutional terms, the Brexit shambles demonstrated the folly of a two-thirds majority being superimposed on the result of a referendum that was not welcome to a majority in the House of Commons. That is not a sufficient justification for reviving or creating—it does not matter what you call it—this unrestricted power over the length of the life of the Parliament for the Prime Minister of the day.
These arguments overlook something so obvious that it is not merely in danger of being overlooked, it is being overlooked. I am not going to let it be overlooked. The Dissolution of Parliament eradicates the choice made by millions of citizens when they cast their votes at the previous election and chose who would represent them in the House of Commons. That sounds over- dramatic, but I invite your Lordships to think about it, because that is what it means.
To ensure continuing democratic involvement, to ensure that we live in a democracy and to enable us all to reflect on where power should lie, of course there has to be a finite time for each Parliament. That is a necessity in a democracy. But when the Dissolution is not a consequence of the effluxion of time but is simply based on a unilateral prime ministerial decision, the votes at the earlier general election are wiped out. The earlier democratic decision is revoked. One vote trumps millions of votes. To me, in a democracy there is a certain level of absurdity about such a principle. If this Bill passes unamended, the effect of those votes will be revoked by—and I am choosing a word used recently by the Delegated Legislation Committee—diktat. If you do not like “diktat”, call it decree, call it command, call it whim, call it fancy. I do not mind what you call it. but it is one person’s decision—unconstrained and unrestricted—by an assessment of political advantage.
Surely in the 21st century the exercise of power to change and to ditch the democratic vote should at least be subject to a modicum of control. The amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Norton, offered the possible control of the monarch and, for the reasons I have given, I respectfully suggest that that is not sufficient. Surely we should rest some responsibility on the House of Commons of the day—the elected representatives. That is what the Commons is there to do: to control and to keep an eye on the Executive and to keep a particular eye on the accreting power of the Prime Minister.
This is something that we cannot just accept on the basis that a prerogative power is being revived. This is going to be a statute.

Baroness Taylor of Bolton: My Lords, I listened carefully to the noble Lord, Lord True, and he is right that this is an important Bill. I very much welcome the repeal of the Fixed-term Parliaments Act—I was never a fan and I am pleased to see it go.
I hesitate to disagree on any occasion with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, but I am not sure that I follow his logic entirely. Maybe that is because of the political experience that some of us have seen and felt when Prime Ministers have not always got these things right and have not always chosen the right minute to have an election. My noble friends Lord Grocott and Lord Rooker will well remember 1978 when Jim Callaghan did not have an election at a time when people thought it might be advantageous and subsequently lost a few months later. Gordon Brown did not have an election in 2009 and subsequently lost a year later.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, is right that this is about the constitutional location of power, but it is also about the role of the Executive and the legislature. Yes, the legislature is there to hold the Government to account—a very important function. If I was in the House of Commons at the moment, having been given a vote by the Fixed-term Parliaments Act I think I would have wanted to hold on to that vote to say whether an election should take place. I thought that that might have been one of the compromises that was reached during the consideration of this Bill by the Government and when the Joint Committee looked at it. I am surprised that the Commons gave up so easily the power to have a say and to sanction the calling of a general election.
It would not necessarily have been a simple thing to do. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, mentioned the two-thirds majority that was clearly just part of the political fix of the original deal between the Conservatives and the Liberals after the 2010 election, and that is a non-starter. However, I wonder whether he would say that the majority had to be 50% plus one of those voting on the issue or 50% of the whole House plus one. What would the Motion be and what would the role of the Speaker be in terms of a tied vote? We have to consider all those arrangements. I do not think it is a simple issue although, had I been in the Commons when this Bill was going through, I would have been very reluctant to give any say whatever in terms of when an election should take place.
I support the approach from the noble Lord, Lord True, that the main objective should be making this Bill as clear and watertight as possible. That is one of the principles that should underpin all the considerations we have about amendments. The Constitution Committee, which I chaired until very recently, said that constitutional legislation should be able to pass the test of time. Clearly, the Fixed-term Parliaments Act was never going to do that, and I think many of us saw that from the outset. Certainly, when we are looking at this legislation, be it on certain other clauses—Clause 3, for example—or indeed the points that have already been made by the noble Lord, Lord Norton, I think that the purpose of our deliberations from now on should be to make sure that there are no loopholes whatever in this legislation so that it can pass the test of time.

Lord Lansley: My Lords, I am very pleased to contribute to this debate. I signed Amendment 3 together with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, and other noble Lords.
I do not come to this as a constitutional expert—far from it—but I think I bring to it two objectives. One is to think about it from the practical, political point of view. In this House we have encountered, and will continue to encounter, the prerogative power being increasingly clarified by statute. I start with that point, which I think the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, referred to. When we see the prerogative being clarified by statute, my view is that we should try to make it a watertight statute. We should try to make it absolutely clear. In this particular respect, we are looking at something that is clear only in so far as it reasserts that there is the status quo ante. However, the status quo ante itself is not necessarily clear. We have a set of principles which—as we have discovered, and I have discovered, by listening to the debates and reading them in the other place—are themselves debatable about how they would be applied and in what circumstances they would be applied. Even in the first debate this afternoon, we heard the assertion that it would be inconceivable for the monarch to refuse a request for a Dissolution but equally, there may be circumstances in which such a request may be refused, otherwise what is the point of calling it a request?
It is not certain. My view is that when we encounter prerogative whether we were debating the Trade Bill and looking at the prerogative to make treaties—I have a Private Member’s Bill which would clarify in statute the circumstances in which the Government could enter into a prolonged and substantial armed conflict or declare war—or here, I think we should be prepared to be more specific about the circumstances in which this prerogative is to be used.
I come back to the practical and political. First, there is a manifesto commitment. The Conservative manifesto said:
“We will get rid of the Fixed Term Parliaments Act”.
Amendment 3 also enables that to happen. That is not the issue.
Secondly, the Joint Committee put forward the proposition that constitutional change should secure
“as wide a degree of cross-party agreement as possible”.
My personal view is that Amendment 3 would enable that to happen. It is supported by parties in this House. Although it will not commend itself to my noble friends on these Benches, it would be supported by the Scottish nationalists, who are not represented here; they said so in the other place. However, I was rather disappointed that when the Government responded to the Joint Committee, they did not address that point; they did not say that they were looking to secure as wide a degree of cross-party support as possible.
What we have to do, which the Joint Committee asked for, is expose the Bill to the fullest possible scrutiny. Looking at the debate in the other place, I do not think that this issue, which seems central, received that, so I am pleased that we are giving it an opportunity to be thought about very carefully.
I recall that the Fixed-term Parliaments Act and its implementation fell down on the two-thirds majority. We should remember that there were three occasions in 2019 on which a Motion was presented in the other place and secured a simple majority but not a two-thirds majority. That immediately begs the question: was that the extent of the problem? Certainly, a simple  majority enables us to start to think about how crises should be resolved and by whom, but it is that fundamental point about “by whom” that I come back to. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, put it extremely well, but I shall put it in my own terms.
If a Prime Minister were requesting a Dissolution of Parliament and calling an election in circumstances where that would not be supported by a majority in the House of Commons, on what authority would he or she be doing that? If people cannot tell me what that authority is, we should put into the statute now that a Prime Minister should act with such authority. In all normal circumstances, based on our past experience, a Prime Minister will command a majority in the House of Commons and be able to secure a simple majority for such a Motion, and they would be able to have a Dissolution of Parliament at a time of his or her choosing.
However, I do not think that we can turn the clock back to past conventions and assume that they will be readily or easily applied to future circumstances. For example, coalitions have happened and may do so again, and they may be quite complicated. If we were in circumstances where a Prime Minister did not have a majority based on his or her own party and we were in the relatively early stages of a Parliament, by what authority would they circumvent the fact that an alternative Government was available?

Lord Sherbourne of Didsbury: Perhaps I may ask my noble friend about a situation where there was a hung Parliament, where the Prime Minister had no majority—we have had that experience very recently—where a pandemic was taking place and where the Opposition did not co-operate in passing laws. Surely then it would be right for the Prime Minister to seek the consent of the country.

Lord Lansley: There are many circumstances in which crises can emerge. There are arguments that cut both ways. In the midst of a pandemic, does one want an election? In the midst of a war, does one want an election? We could go back to 1940 and say, “Surely, if the Prime Minister then, Neville Chamberlain, had sought a Dissolution, why would he not have been granted it? Would it have not been right for the electorate to say what the outcome should be?” My response to my noble friend would be to ask whether in those circumstances it would not be the responsibility of the House of Commons, and whether it did not have the authority to resolve that crisis. If the answer we come to is, “Oh, but, but, but…”, there are all sorts of circumstances and hypothetical scenarios that we can conjure up which would lead us to the assumption that the Prime Minister can go to Her Majesty or the monarch and request a Dissolution, but the House of Commons would not support it. I come back to the same question: by what authority does the Prime Minister make such a request? I support the amendment and have put my name to it because it brings us back, time and again, to precisely that point.
Professor Robert Hazell put it more elegantly when he gave evidence to the Joint Committee:
“The best way of protecting the monarchy is not to revive the prerogative power but to leave decisions about Dissolution where they belong—in Parliament, in the House of Commons.”
This amendment does that in the simplest and most effective way possible by making it certain that if a Prime Minister requested a Dissolution in future, he or she did so on the basis that a majority of the House of Commons had agreed. If not, by what authority would he or she do it?

Lord Beith: This is an issue which divided the Joint Committee. The view expressed by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, was the view of a minority of the committee of which I was a member, whereas the majority did not want to go into this territory. We had a great deal of discussion about it, but the report records, unusually, that there was a clear difference of view.
I support the idea that there should be a House of Commons vote. Even though I previously supported ensuring that the prerogative power remained a personal prerogative, partly in case this amendment was not carried but also because the two are not inconsistent with each other, it would be even more inconceivable that the monarch should refuse a Dissolution if it had the clear authority of the House of Commons behind it.
A further benefit of having a House of Commons vote on Dissolution is that it makes it quite clear the ouster clause that we will debate later would be unnecessary. The courts would not interfere with a decision taken by Parliament. We can return to that topic later, but we might as well put it on the table now, because it is a powerful argument for having a House of Commons vote. I therefore support what has been said by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, and the noble Lord, Lord Lansley.
There are circumstances in which a Prime Minister might be told that it would be embarrassing for the monarch to have to be asked because a Dissolution might be refused. That would include a re-run of an election that had just taken place. Let us imagine a situation where one party is known to have substantial resources and seeks a re-run of the election, because it is just about the largest party but does not have a majority. There are a variety of such circumstances. In their response to the committee, the Government quite sensibly said that it was impossible to speculate—I am not quoting exactly—about the many different possible situations that could arise, and it is not very fruitful to do so. We merely recognise that there are possibilities.
While so much is said about the failings of the Fixed-term Parliaments Act—I know that it has faults, but the two-thirds majority issue was probably the only significant fault in the legislation—we have to recognise that most democracies in any way comparable to ours have a fixed term for Parliament and that the Joint Committee said:
“The Fixed-term Parliaments Act very clearly fulfilled its immediate political purpose. Not only did the Parliament last the full term, so did the Coalition Government that was formed at the beginning of it.”
I simply say to the other parties that they should be careful what they wish for. The time may come when they seek to form a Government with others and both sides need some guarantee that the Government will not be torpedoed early in its existence.

Lord Lisvane: My Lords, I had added my name to Amendment 2 in the name of noble Lord, Lord Wallace of Saltaire, but unfortunately it has not made it on to the Marshalled List that I have. I hope that is not an expression of editorial disapproval.
I congratulate the noble Lord on his ingenuity in bringing Prorogation within the scope of our discussions. As the Minister will know, I was a little sceptical about the view that Prorogation was outside the scope or relevance of the Bill. That was on two grounds. First, it was said that Section 6 of the 2011 Act excluded Prorogation. Of course, it may have excluded it, but what is excluded can be added by amendment.
The second ground of my scepticism was the intimate relationship between Dissolution and Prorogation. It is by no means unknown for Parliament to be dissolved while prorogued; I have not looked at the figures, but this may be the majority of cases in recent decades. Even if we go back to the relatively short period—the business period, as it were—of Prorogation after wash-up, there will be a period of time when the House of Commons cannot take a decision of the sort envisaged by my noble and learned friend in his Amendment 3. So I suggest that, although this may not be crucial, it is probably a useful procedural mechanism or precaution.
I raise the next point with considerable diffidence because it relates to the drafting of Amendment 3. I see that, in proposed new subsection (1B), Parliament “will” be dissolved—not “shall”. I was going to apologise for my pedantry, but I never have before, so I do not think I am going to start this evening. “Will” is an expression of will but, of course, once the House of Commons has enshrined that in a resolution, it takes on an executive character, so “shall” is probably more appropriate.
It is essential that, if we go down this road, there is a form of words in the statute, if that is the eventual view of Parliament. Whether a particular Motion falls within the statutory requirements cannot be left to the interpretation of the chair. It seems to me that that would put an unbearable strain on Article 9 and would lead us all down a path that we would not wish to traverse.
The noble Baroness, Lady Taylor of Bolton, asked what would happen if there were a tied vote. I immediately agree that conventions and precedents are not as tight a constraint as statutory provision, but I am in no doubt that, if there were a tied vote, the Speaker of the day’s attention would be brought to the decision of Speaker Denison in 1867, when he said that major matters of public policy should be decided by a majority of the House, not “merely”—he used that word—on the casting vote of its presiding officer.

Baroness Noakes: My Lords, I do not often agree with the noble Lord, Lord Wallace of Saltaire, as he knows, but I did agree with his closing remarks on Second Reading:
“We should never take democracy for granted: it needs to be defended.”—[Official Report, 30/11/21; col. 1332.]
I absolutely agree, which is why it is important that the amendments in this group are not passed.
Sometimes, when people talk about democracy, they talk in terms of the role of Parliament or the separation of powers. But we must always remember that democracy is about the people—demos—who have power at the apex of our constitution and whom we have to defend. The most important players in our democracy are not Members of Parliament at Westminster but the voters up and down the land. The possibility of Parliament standing in the way of asking the people for their views on the way forward is fundamentally undemocratic, in my view.
These amendments are capable of depriving the people of their say in the future of the country. Furthermore, they could do harm at the very time that the views of the people, as expressed at the ballot box, are most needed and could have the greatest impact. Of course, if the Government of the day have a whopping majority, whether or not they have to pass a resolution in the other place will make very little difference to the outcome. It might perhaps add a few days of delay to the timing of a general election, but it would otherwise simply be a tiresome detail. But the amendment will make life difficult for minority Governments or Governments with small majorities, if they feel that they need to call an election.
At Second Reading, I spoke about the events of 2019 being one of my key reasons for supporting the Bill. It was plain that Parliament was dysfunctional. The Government could not get their chosen policies through the House due to a combination of the actions of the opposition parties and of some of our own Back-Benchers. A majority in the other place and indeed in your Lordships’ House—although that is not relevant to this amendment—was set upon frustrating the Government’s Brexit policies, but the Government could not call an election to settle that issue because they could not meet the two-thirds threshold of the Fixed-term Parliaments Act.
Of course, the Government eventually got their Early Parliamentary General Election Act through and, by then, the Labour Party had decided to support it. But we will never know whether it would have been possible for the Government to have reached the simple majorities required in these amendments at an earlier stage—but it is entirely possible that they would not have done so. A number of my party’s MPs had lost the Conservative Whip during those unhappy days and would not, therefore, have been able to stand as Conservative candidates if an election had been called. Would the turkeys really have voted for Christmas? I think not.
Many noble Lords in this House might choose to forget the result of the 2019 election because it was not to their taste, but I remind them that it was a resounding thumbs up for the Government’s Brexit policies, which Parliament was seeking to harass and destroy at the time. These amendments could well have prevented that decisive view of the country from being expressed at the time, and we would have been the poorer for it.
Minority Governments with small majorities but fractious Back-Benchers capable of frustrating a vote on a general election are not figments of my imagination; they are a real part of our political system. I say this especially to the Benches opposite because, if they have any hopes of again forming a Government, they  need to reflect on whether a zombie Parliament could affect them as well. They might also reflect on whether the minority Wilson Government in 1974, which the noble Lord, Lord Beith, referred to in the debate on the earlier group of amendments, would also have resulted in an election. Is it absolutely clear that the Wilson minority Government could have called the second election in that year if he had had to cope with what this amendment would have landed him with? These amendments could be a very dangerous part of our constitutional arrangements and should be rejected.

Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood: My Lords, I feel part of an endangered species: a Cross-Bencher who fully supports this government Bill. I would also like to go back to where we were before the ill-starred and ill-judged Fixed-term Parliaments Act.
I am against giving the Commons a veto, as proposed in Amendment 3 by my noble and learned friend Lord Judge, who is normally so sagacious but who is wrong on this occasion. This could lead to the same chaos, stasis and problem of September 2019, which the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, has just outlined, when we subjected our Prime Minister—whatever you thought of him then or think of him now—to the humiliation of having to go cap in hand to Brussels to plead for an extension of time to achieve a policy flatly contrary to the one that he wished to put to the country. He could not get a two-thirds majority, and one seriously doubts whether he would have got a simple majority.
The Joint Committee that examined this legislation and reported in March 2021 made plain that, although a minority supported the view outlined by my noble and learned friend Lord Judge and the noble Lords, Lord Lansley and Lord Beith, the majority recognised the danger, which we should avoid at all costs, I respectfully contend.
As to the prerogative power, one can hardly overstress the difference between Prorogation and Dissolution. Prorogation—let one remind oneself—affects the cessation of Parliament and is anti-democratic in the sense that it thwarts the power of Parliament. Our governing, imperative, fundamental constitutional principle is the sovereignty of Parliament; Prorogation thwarts it and leaves the Executive for the duration in uncontrolled power. Dissolution—at the opposite end of the spectrum—is explicitly designed to give the electorate the opportunity to decide who should control our Executive. My noble and learned friend Lord Judge speaks of Dissolution eradicating the decision of the electorate last time around, ditching the democratic vote. Well, of course, in one sense you are getting rid of an existing Parliament, but you are inviting more up-to-date views on what the public—who, as the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, said, really should be controlling all our processes—want and whether they approve the particular policies in the particular circumstances in which Dissolution is sought.
Of course, if you put the Commons in control, although you run into the sort of difficulties that the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, rightly identified, you get rid of the problems that others seem to suggest arise under Clause 3 here. There is no question then, obviously, of the courts’ supervisory jurisdiction. But—and we will come to this point of debate later—I suggest you  really do not need to introduce the chaos of a Commons vote in support of Dissolution in order to avoid the risk of introducing the courts into the whole business.

Lord Grocott: My Lords, before I comment specifically on the amendment in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, I think that both the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown, have misread what happened in 2019. What happened then would have happened had this amendment been passed, which was that a clear majority in Parliament voted for a general election—fact. On three occasions, they voted for a general election. A general election would have occurred under the terms of this amendment.
If I may say so, the politics of it are fairly obvious. If a Motion comes from a Prime Minister that there should be a general election, which is what this amendment suggests, the Government may not even have a majority, as the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, suggested; there may be people opposed to the Government’s policies generally on their own Benches, and they may not get a majority of their own people, necessarily. But it is almost impossible for an Opposition to vote against a general election. It kills the whole point of being an Opposition. What is an Opposition for if not for saying, “We’ve got a rotten Government, and it is time the people turned them out”? The Labour Opposition at that time sat on its hands, but politically, though I cannot go into all the legal ramifications, it is impossible to imagine a Prime Minister with a majority in Parliament—and he or she would not be the Prime Minister if that were not the case—calling for a simple parliamentary majority, which is all that is required, in order to hold a general election and Parliament throwing it out. That is for the birds; it really is. It would be politics turned upside down.
I think the amendment from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, just nails it. I agree with it absolutely, partly because, when in doubt, you should opt for the simple solution, and there is nothing simpler than a simple majority. We get into all sorts of trouble, as other Members have said, when we require a two-thirds majority or an artificial majority. The public know what a majority is and, let us face it, the real fact of life is that a majority in Parliament—this is as close to Dicey as anyone could be—is power in the land, apart from on the day the general election is held. If Parliament tries to do things that do not have majority support, the majority has all sorts of ways of asserting its support.
A Prime Minister who decided that he or she wanted a general election would be able to get one via this mechanism. This is why I am stunned, frankly, that the Government do not accept it. It meets what the Government want to do, as far as I can see. It restores a situation in which a Prime Minister can get a general election. I am in favour of that; I have said that repeatedly. I support the Government’s objective to enable that to happen so that you do not have the chaos that occurred at the end of the 2017-19 Parliament.
Of course, a simple majority in the Commons has huge additional advantages as well, one of which I have already referred to: it completely removes the  monarch from having to make political decisions, or the most significant political decision anyone could make, which is whether to consult the people. I cannot see how there is any way that a monarch would say to a Prime Minister armed with a majority in Parliament and requesting a general election, “No, you may want one, but you can’t have it. Up theirs to the majority in Parliament.” No monarch is going to say that. It is obvious.
As far as I am concerned, though I do not whether I would carry all the lawyers in the House with me, it has the added advantage of keeping the lawyers out of politics as well, which has been a cause of some concern and been rather problematic on a number of occasions that I could refer to, although that would be out of order. We would not need the dreaded ouster clause we are going to talk about shortly. A majority in Parliament is the jewel in the crown: it can do what it wants, mercifully, in our constitution, and more often than not it is far and away the best way of making decisions.
I recognise what an odd situation we are in and what an odd situation this amendment is proposing: we, the unelected House of Lords, are suggesting to the recently elected House of Commons that they should have this power and not give it away for the monarch to decide. I am in favour of simple arguments and simple solutions. A simple argument is that the history of the British constitution is the slow attrition of power by Parliament—or, more specifically, by the House of Commons—away from the monarch. And this House of Commons, which I respect as I do all elected bodies, has decided to reverse this process: “We think this is too big a decision for us to make, and we need to hand it back to Her Majesty so that she can decide when it is convenient for the British public to exercise their democratic right to vote.”
I find it difficult to find a credible argument against the proposition in this amendment. It keeps the monarch out of trouble; it keeps the judiciary out of trouble; it gives the Prime Minister what the Prime Minister wants and is entitled to have with his or her majority in Parliament; and the Government get what they want. What is not to like about it?

Baroness Stowell of Beeston: My Lords, like everybody else who has spoken in the Committee so far today, I share the objective of returning to the status quo ante and repealing the Fixed-term Parliaments Act. But as some noble Lords who heard me speak on Second Reading may know, I do so for different reasons from that which the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, and most others have set out today. I supported the original legislation, and the reason why I think that it should be repealed is because something that I believed was a relinquishing of power to the electorate turned into a weapon that got used against the electorate, as my noble friend Lady Noakes has described.
That is why I think it is important that we go back to how we were before, rather than, at this point, seek to introduce something that would maintain a power that the House of Commons did not have before. I thought what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, said when he introduced his amendment was interesting as he said this about where power lies. He carefully  made the point that this was not about the current Prime Minister, this was about where power rests in this situation. Should it be with the Executive? Should it be with Parliament? I know that over the last few years the noble and learned Lord has raised many different examples of where there is an imbalance of power between the Executive and Parliament, and that there are some ways in which that needs to be looked at and that imbalance addressed.
I do not think we would be wise to try to introduce a power because of what happened a couple of years ago. The battle for power at that point, in 2019, between the Executive and Parliament was observed, in my view, by people outside Parliament as a battle that should not have taken place. It was power that should not rest in the hands of Parliament. Indeed, it should not rest, in a direct way if you like, in the hands of the Prime Minister. This was about a democratic mandate that was in need of being implemented. I think, for everybody’s interests, trying to introduce the amendment that has been proposed here would be unwise, and the best course of action would be to return to exactly what we had before.

Lord Newby: My Lords, I put my name to this amendment for the reasons given by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, and the noble Lord, Lord Lansley. Like the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, I have been searching for credible arguments against it. I was therefore very grateful that the Minister circulated a letter, setting out the Government’s stance, in which I hoped I might find some credible arguments against it, even if I did not agree with them, but this is what the letter said. It said that it
“will not necessarily achieve the desired outcome”
and:
“Its long-term consequences … are untested.”
I may have got the logic wrong, but until something is implemented how can we know what its long-term consequences are? So I was not too troubled in my belief by that.
Then I read that it was a “novel element”. Anything that is change, by definition, has a degree of novelty to it, so that did not get us very far. It was then said that there could be “(unintended) consequences” without any suggestion of what they might be, so that did not get us much further. It then said it was a “constitutional innovation”. Well, yes—so? That did not get us any further. The letter then said that it had not been “fully considered” and constitutional change needed to be fully considered. Perhaps it had not been, but it has now, so that is not a credible argument. Finally, we had a typically empty threat from the noble Lord, Lord True:
“We are not doing a service to the elected chamber if we ask them to reconsider a question which they have squarely confronted and which they have decisively decided against.”
We might as well go home if we adopted that policy. We certainly would not have been voting against the police Bill at all if we accepted that. That is the sum total of the Government’s response on why we should oppose this amendment.
The further argument—which the Government did not use, incidentally—that I thought had some substance was advanced by the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes.  These are my words, not hers: MPs might refuse a Prime Minister an election because they feared for their own seats and so would act out of personal interest rather than the national interest. Against that theoretical possibility, surely there is the more likely possibility of a Prime Minister calling a premature election primarily to save his or her skin, rather than because they have considerations of the national interest uppermost in their mind.
In any event, surely, the constitutional position is that citizens vote for someone to represent them in Parliament, not for a Prime Minister. In my political lifetime, there have been five occasions on which the Prime Minister has changed during the lifetime of a Parliament without triggering a new election in any case. So voters have ended up with a Prime Minister who was not a prime ministerial candidate at the previous election and who has no personal, direct mandate from the electorate. MPs, by contrast, will be held to account by their electorates if they trigger an early election and so, in my view, the decision on whether to do so should rest with them.
I was going to respond to the noble Baroness in terms of what happened in 2019, but the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, has done that extremely comprehensively. I would just say, going back to 1974, that the same arguments apply. Does anyone believe that in the autumn of 1974, if the House of Commons had been asked whether there should be an election, Harold Wilson would have been denied one? The noble Lord, Lord Grocott, gave the reasons. Oppositions are there to oppose, and they do not vote to keep their opponents in office—it is in the name. The key question which the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, raised is by what authority does a Prime Minister decide, uniquely, when an election should be held, particularly, as I said earlier, if that Prime Minister was not the candidate for Prime Minister at the preceding general election? In my view, authority on when an election should be held should rest with the people who have been elected to run a Parliament. That is why I support this amendment.

Lord Sherbourne of Didsbury: My Lords, I am very puzzled by this debate. There have been words used such as “inappropriate”, “exceptional” and “misuse of power” to suggest that the Prime Minister of the day, when he or she asks the electorate to choose the Government, and where he puts his or her own tenure in No. 10 at risk, is somehow abusing his or her position. I do not understand what those likely positions might be where the Prime Minister of the day can be accused of abusing his or her power to go to the electorate. Nobody has yet produced an example of that. We know when the Prime Minister might want to do that—because they have no majority and want a majority, because they have a very small majority or because they want a mandate for a new policy, possibly—but none of those is an abuse of their power.
If I had read the speech of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, and instead of reading “election” and “Dissolution” had read “Prorogation”, I would completely understand. Of course, it would be an abuse of power to give the Prime Minister of the day the power to extend the life of Parliament, but I do not understand in what situation a Prime Minister  can be accused, in these words, of inappropriate or exceptional misuse, by asking the electorate to choose the Government they want, and to put his or her own tenure at No. 10 at risk. I would be grateful if somebody could provide me with some examples.

Lord Grocott: I am glad to assist, but I would like to ask the noble Lord a question. I have already explained how a Prime Minister who wanted an election could get one, so the power remains with the Prime Minister.

Lord Faulks: The noble Lord is masked.

Lord Grocott: I am sorry. God, I will be glad when we get rid of those for good.
The noble Lord, Lord Sherbourne, said that, somehow or other, there is a suggestion that the argument on this side or around the House is that a Prime Minister calling for a general election is bad, undemocratic or inappropriate. We are not saying that at all. We are saying that a Prime Minister would not be a Prime Minister unless he had a majority in the House of Commons, and the Prime Minister would get what he wanted. I apologise for the length of the intervention, but the question I want to ask the noble Lord is: if he feels this passionately about, as I understood it, the Prime Minister alone being able to make that decision, how could it possibly be the case, in his argument, that a monarch—unelected—could say no to the Prime Minister making a request of that sort?

Lord Sherbourne of Didsbury: I am very pleased that the noble Lord asked that question, because the debates this evening have said that we do not think the monarch could conceivably refuse a request for a Dissolution, as the noble Lord has already said. Other speakers have said that the House of Commons would never refuse a Dissolution; that was the thrust of the noble Lord’s speech and the speeches of other noble Lords. We are being asked to put in a brake on the power of the Prime Minister, but we are told that the brake will never be exercised. What is the point of that? I come back to my question: what are the most inappropriate examples of a Prime Minister abusing their power by calling an election? I can think of only two. First, they might, for party-political reasons, seek the advantage of going early because they think they can get a bigger majority. We know that the electorate are not stupid. There are, throughout the whole country, Brendas from Bristol who will react to that—we found this in February 1974 and in 2017.
The other reason which I thought might be in the minds of noble Lords is if the Prime Minister of the day wanted to go to the country with what they thought would be a sole populist or undemocratic programme, and they were worried that the electorate might vote for it. That poses two problems. First, it is denying the public the right to choose the Government and policy they want. If you really want to exercise an effective brake for that sort of reason, you need a different Bill, because this Bill is designed to end the Fixed-term Parliaments Act and go back to the status quo ante. I believe, as my noble friend the Minister  said, that this clause to give the House of Commons a veto—otherwise there is no point in giving the provision to it—drives a coach and horses through this Bill.

Lord Beith: I shall seek to answer the noble Lord’s question. I go back to February 1974. Imagine that Harold Wilson had said, “I’ve become the Prime Minister. I don’t have a majority. Mine is the largest party. I want to rerun the election straightaway.” Add into that mix—which was not the case at the time—that he is the leader of the party that has the most substantial resources and has been the least damaged financially by the conduct of the election. But that is not what happened. Maybe Harold Wilson was advised that he should not do that, but that is the sort of circumstance that might be thought inappropriate.

Lord Sherbourne of Didsbury: I just think that if you gave the House of Commons the opportunity to veto it, and the Government of the day simply could not get on with their business, which is what would probably happen, then we would have a problem. I come back to the point I made with my noble friend Lord Lansley: if you have a Government with a minority, or without a working majority, that Prime Minister may not be able to get the support of Parliament; but he or she needs it to be able to have an effective working Government.

Lord Butler of Brockwell: My Lords, the noble Lord asked for an example of where a Prime Minister might illegitimately ask for a general election. I will give an example not a million miles away from our present circumstances. Let us suppose that 54 Conservative Members of Parliament expressed no confidence in the present Prime Minister, and there was then an election in the Conservative Party for an alternative leader, and that leader emerged. At that moment, the present Prime Minister decided that, rather than give up power, he would ask the Queen to dissolve Parliament so that there could be a general election. I put it to the noble Lord, Lord Sherbourne, that, in those circumstances, a majority in Parliament, which the Conservatives would have, would reject the proposal for a general election. That might be an imaginable circumstance. I am not in favour of this amendment—I would rather not have it at all—but that is a situation where I would rather that the majority in Parliament rejected the idea of an election than the Queen having to do it.

Lord Mackay of Clashfern: My Lords, I have a very vivid recollection of Harold Wilson’s problem when he was elected with less than a parliamentary majority. As noble Lords will know, he had a second election in that year. At that time, I was the Sheriff Principal of Renfrew and Argyll, and therefore I was a returning officer for the constituencies in Renfrew and in Argyll, so I was rather familiar with what was going on.
Harold Wilson, when he was elected first, had not got a majority. The opinion polls were not quite so prominent in those days as they are now, but there was quite a lot of speculation as to whether, if he took a  second election, he would be better off or worse off. That was a decision that he had to make which would not necessarily have been the same as the balance of people in Parliament, because, if the theory of the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, were right, they would be anxious to be the Government. But I fear that they had the rather suspicious feeling that they might not be the Government, and that in fact what might happen would be that Mr Wilson would get a better majority than he had up to that point. As the Committee knows, it was not quite like that either. To forecast what the vote in Parliament will be in the event of a Prime Minister wanting to call an election is by no means easy. It was very difficult in 1974, and I have no doubt that that sort of circumstance might occur again.
I have tried to look at this from the point of view of the construction of our constitution. We have three parts of the constitution: the Executive, the judiciary and the legislature. The business of the House of Commons—and this House, for that matter—is to legislate primarily and to hold the Government to account. The executive power is not in the House of Commons or in this House, and it should not be; something has gone wrong when that happens. The executive power is in the Executive.
The noble Lord, Lord Newby, asked what the authority of the Prime Minister is if he or she has changed since the Parliament was elected. The authority is that he or she is the Prime Minister, and the Prime Minister’s responsibility, subject to Her Majesty, is to be the head of the Executive. Therefore, the responsibility for taking executive decisions is, and should be, with the Prime Minister.
As I said, the idea that you can forecast the result of a vote in Parliament on this subject is extremely difficult if you take account of all the possible circumstances. I know that if you have an Opposition doing very well and the Government are looking a bit shaky, they will both want the same thing—but there are many other circumstances in which they will not want that.
I submit to your Lordships that we had in existence for many years a system under which there was no vote in the House of Commons at all. As far as I remember, apart from the Wilson year there was really no difficulty about the responsibility of calling an election. You just have to think what a responsibility the person who calls an election has. We had a slight example of that not long ago, when an election was called and the result was that the Prime Minister had a smaller majority—indeed, no majority at all—having started off with a majority. I do not think for a minute that the Prime Minister thought that was going to happen—it would be extraordinary if she did—but it did happen, and that is the responsibility of the Prime Minister.
I find it very difficult to see how that can be properly shared with anybody else. He or she has to take the responsibility to consult the public—the people. It is an executive call to start a general election, and surely the responsibility for doing that should be on the Prime Minister and not on the House of Commons. All Members of the House of Commons will have some kind of interest in what is going to happen. It does not necessarily follow that they want the good of the general population, although it might be disguised  in that way. For example, I could see that as people age—as I certainly am—they may feel that they do not want to continue, whereas others are very anxious to keep their position. One has to have that kind of consideration in mind.
I have great difficulty in disagreeing with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, with whom I have agreed many times in the past, but this is a fundamental point. My principal reason for thinking that this is not an appropriate amendment is that the responsibility of the Houses of Parliament is primarily to legislate and to keep account of the Government, but not to control an executive act except by legislating. This is not in any way a legislation; it is just a decision in the House of Commons that has no effect except as an executive decision.

Baroness Smith of Basildon: My Lords, this has been a long and really interesting discussion, and it sums up the very reason for this amendment. When I spoke on the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Norton, at the beginning, I said that one of the reasons I thought he had brought his amendment forward was to bring some clarity, and it is the same with this amendment in so many ways.
When I looked through the Hansard for the other place, one of the things that struck me—I mentioned this at Second Reading—was how often Ministers asserted as fact something that was really a ministerial opinion or judgment, and not actually a fact. The most crucial one was that the Bill will
“reset the clock back to the pre-2011 position with as much clarity as possible.”—[Official Report, Commons, 13/9/21; col. 721.]
If it was that clear, we would not have the amendments before us tonight. It is not clear, and that lack of clarity has caused concern.
The comments made by the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, about having a practical view of how this works in practice were really important. As the noble Baroness, Lady Taylor, said, one of the problems of the Fixed-term Parliaments Act is that it did not stand the test of time. It was probably flawed at the beginning, and the Minister was kind enough to quote me at the very beginning when I said that the legislation was brought in for a specific purpose, which was to protect the coalition. It outlived its usefulness pretty quickly.
On all this, I start from the basis that a Government must have and retain the confidence of the House of Commons. A Government derive their authority from those elected to the House of Commons. Without that authority, a Prime Minister is unable to govern, unless they can command the support of the House of Commons. In some ways, the 2017 to 2019 Parliament is not a good starting point from which to look at how Parliament operates. We had the Long Parliament and the Rump Parliament; that was the dysfunctional Parliament in so many ways. We need to accept that.
The honourable Lady in the House of Commons kept saying we would “reset” this back to pre-2011. The noble Lord, Lord Lansley, made the point that that is not clear at all. Can you reinstate a royal prerogative by statute? Does the royal prerogative—a point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge—  really work in practice today? It seems there are two options. Either we remove the ouster clause, which would allow the courts to intervene to say whether they think a general election being called by a Prime Minister is appropriate, or we have a separate mechanism of the House of Commons and Members of Parliament voting.
I understand the comments made by the noble Baroness and others that MPs would have a vested interest in whether there is an election. That is 650 vested interests, but a Prime Minister has one vested interest in whether to have an election. I struggle to understand why it can be acceptable for the Prime Minister just to call an election on their judgment, as in the Bill—it is moot whether it restores the position back to pre-2011—but not for Parliament to vote on it. MPs have a vested interest in every single piece of legislation passed and in governing the country. That is what we expect them to do in the interests of their constituents and the nation, so to deny them a vote on the one thing that allows the public to have a vote is difficult.
The noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, said MPs would be denying the people a say in a general election. That is not the case, because there will be a general election within five years. Only if a Prime Minister wishes to have an early election would there have to be endorsement by those elected to Parliament. In this system we do not elect a Government. We elect individual Members of Parliament, who then choose a Prime Minister and the Prime Minister chooses the Government.
I have some sympathy with the comments made by the noble Lord about what would be an inappropriate decision by a Prime Minister to call an election. When a Prime Minister calls an election, it may be to increase their majority. That seems to me a perfectly legitimate reason for a Prime Minister to call an election. Because they are worried the other side might win is also a reason not to call a general election, but at the end of the day that is why we have term limits. No Prime Minister can put off an election for ever, because there is a term of office within which they have to call a general election. We all know that when you do not have fixed terms, Prime Ministers and Parliament will choose an election date to the benefit of their party, and I do not think that an illegitimate way to proceed.
The noble Lord, Lord Beith, in some ways trespassed on the next amendment as well, which I understand because the two go hand in hand, and it is far preferable to have Parliament making the decision than to remove Clause 3 from the Bill.
I would not dare to suggest that the noble Lord, Lord Lisvane, has his “shalls” or “wills” wrong on this, but it highlights a point—the same one made by the noble Lord, Lord Norton. The noble Lord, Lord True, said at the very beginning of our discussions on the Bill that because the House of Commons did not make any amendments your Lordships’ House should not make any amendments. That is not a good justification for not doing so. I read the debates and looked at the discussions they had on whether the House of Commons should have a final say on whether there should be a general election. It did not seem that there was much detailed debate on that, and I wonder whether those Members of the House of Commons who debated  this really understood the power they were giving away or what they were giving away. Our democracy works on a system of checks and balances, and I am far more comfortable with those checks and balances being held by elected Members of the House of Commons than by the courts, or by dragging Her Majesty into political discussions. The Lascelles principles are clearly outlined on paper, but I am not sure they have stood the test of time.
I do not think it is possible just to reset the clock by passing the Bill as it is. We have a duty to ask the House of Commons to have a look at this again. It is a matter for MPs. They should debate and consider it and see whether they think it is appropriate that we hand the power straight back to the Prime Minister so that the decision is vested in one person. Ministers have said previously that this increases democratic legitimacy but handing it to one member of the Executive in the House of Commons does not do that. No one is saying that the Prime Minister—he or she—would not be capable of making a decision, but democracy is served better when decisions are taken in the House of Commons in the normal way.
My noble friend Lord Grocott knocked back the point made about the two-thirds majority by explaining why that is so difficult. I am sorry that the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, did not listen to the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, earlier, because he gave the circumstances in which the House of Commons did vote for an election, but because it was not a simple majority but a two-thirds majority it did not happen then. It did eventually happen, but a simple majority, in the same way as we decide every other piece of legislation, would be the best way forward.
I support Amendment 3 in my name and those of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, and the noble Lords, Lord Newby and Lord Lansley, and I hope the Minister will not just dismiss it out of hand but will be happy to enter into further discussions to see whether it could be a helpful way forward, particularly when we get to the next debate, on Clause 3.

Lord True: My Lords, I thank all those who have spoken in what has rightly been a lengthy debate. Perhaps my concluding marks too will be lengthy; I trust not. I am grateful to all noble Lords who have taken part. Your Lordships will divine that some of those who have spoken I agree with, and some I found less persuasive, but I have welcomed the opportunity to discuss these matters and others with many noble Lords, including the noble Baroness opposite, whose courtesy I always so much appreciate, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, and the noble Lord, Lord Grocott. I very much appreciate that.
I have listened very carefully to all the arguments, not least the compelling concluding remarks of my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay of Clashfern. I was a little puzzled by the position of the noble Baroness opposite because she seemed to say that when the Labour Party told the electorate in 2019 that they would repeal the Fixed-term Parliaments Act, what they actually meant was that they would not repeal it, but they would keep the chance of the very zombie Parliament that the public so overwhelmingly  rejected in the 2019 election. I suggest to your Lordships that, notwithstanding some speeches that have been made, the risk of that occurring if these amendments are supported remains high.
I respectfully suggest to all noble Lords that retaining a revised version of the failed 2011 Act, which this amendment would do, in effect, by keeping the Commons veto in a revised form, is a highly problematic suggestion. It would not achieve what it is intended to do; it certainly would not secure clarity. I was on the Constitution Committee a long time ago when the noble Baroness, Lady Taylor, became chair, and I say to her how much I admired and respected the work that was done by that committee while she was chair; I am sure I speak for the whole House on that. In her compelling speech, she spoke of the need for some degree of clarity and the need to avoid loopholes. We must guard against repeating one of the fundamental errors of the Fixed-term Parliaments Act, which, in the words of our manifesto, led to “paralysis”, or, in the words of the Labour manifesto, has “propped up weak governments”—Governments without the authority to govern effectively.
I submit that the first problem is that this is not the simple solution that some noble Lords have implied. In fact, a vote in the other place on Dissolution would be complicated and challenging to effect. To highlight one area of difficulty, what will be the likely consequences for constitutional conventions, including the conventions on confidence? Some of your Lordships will recall that this was a question that very much exercised this House in the debates on the 2011 Act.
The amendment would undoubtedly repeat the mistakes of the 2011 Act: it would undermine the fundamental conventions on confidence—by virtue of which a Government hold office—by divorcing them from practical effect and, even worse, making the consequences of a loss of a confidence vote ambiguous. The amendment is dangerously silent on the status and practice of the conventions associated with confidence. That silence is unclear and ambiguous, and could undoubtedly lead to fractious debate, uncertainty and delay at a time when timely action might be needed. In particular, in the event that a Prime Minister lost a vote on a Motion designated as a matter of confidence, they would not be able to request a Dissolution without the prior approval of the House.
It is unclear, therefore, how the amendment would interact with conventions on confidence in practice. Does it mean that the Prime Minister would be expected to table the Motion provided for in this amendment straight away, or would they be able to try to regain the confidence of the House? Would some other Member of the House be able to table the Motion? What happens after the loss of a vote on confidence? We saw with the 2011 Act, which tried to codify what would happen after the loss of a vote of no confidence, that efforts to partially prescribe how essentially political processes are played out leads only to ambiguity and uncertainty.
With respect, rather than introducing a process that would arguably preclude the Prime Minister reflecting on the view of the House after a defeat on a designated issue, the amendment does not provide a clear and unambiguous process, yet it also serves to restrict the  ability to flexibly respond. The amendment is silent on these fundamental points of principle and practical implementation and therefore risks us repeating the mistakes of the 2011 Act. I agree with my noble friend Lady Stowell of Beeston: lack of clarity is risky.
Your Lordships have suggested that a simple majority is the silver bullet, preventing deadlock and stasis. However, I submit that, with the benefit of history—from not so long ago; we do not have to have grey hair to have lived through the disastrous Parliament of 2017-19—we can see that the real risk of a vote, even a simple majority one, as I will argue shortly, is a repetition of the deadlock and paralysis of the 2017-19 Parliament.
In my party’s manifesto, when we pledged to repeal this Act we made absolutely clear that its purpose was to prevent
“paralysis at a time the country needed decisive action.”
The Government, in submitting their manifesto to the country, had no doubt that the procedures that led to that paralysis should be done away with.
A vote in the House of Commons, by hindering the ability of the Prime Minister to call and to request an election at the time of his judgment, could mean that a Government are held hostage and lame duck Parliaments limp on. We have seen it. We have heard many fanciful scenarios in this debate, including the one of the noble Lord, Lord Butler of Brockwell—which I thought very fanciful—but this has happened and could happen again.

Lord Grocott: My Lord, if the Minister is going down the path of history, can he please address the specific point? On three occasions, the Prime Minister in—I agree with him—that dreadful Parliament, obtained a majority for a general election. That is not a theoretical speculation—it is fact.

Lord True: My Lords, I am coming on to that, as I just said to the House I would. You can look at those circumstances in different ways, I would submit. Perhaps I will deal with that and then go on to the other point.
The Government had effectively lost the confidence of the Commons on the central purpose of its being, which was to deliver the referendum result on a key European policy. As the noble Lord opposite says, they tried to call an election three times, and three times the Commons refused to grant one. Why did the other place refuse to grant one? I cannot remember which noble Lord it was who said in the debate that it was because the leader of the Opposition sat on his hands and decided to prevent an election taking place. The noble Lord said he would not have done, but he did—three times.
The votes for dissolution were 298 on 4 September, 293 on 9 September, and 299 on 28 October. On every occasion they fell short of a majority. The Labour Party cast its vote to secure what it manifestly wished to do, which was to prevent the Prime Minister going to the country. Three times Mr Corbyn was presented—like Caesar on the Lupercal—with the crown of the election that he could have had the following day, on 4 September, 9 September and 28 October, and he declined.
The noble Lord suggests that of course if they had known there would be an election, the Opposition would never have sought to vote against it. By sitting on their hands, the Opposition defied the people and did not have an election.

Lord Lansley: My noble friend must address the point. The point is that if the requirement were not what the Fixed-term Parliaments Act required but a simple majority on a Motion in the House of Commons, the Prime Minister back in October 2019 would have secured a simple majority and got his election.

Lord True: My Lords, there is a conditional in that: a “would”. I believe that people must be presumed to intend the consequences of their own actions, and the consequence of Mr Corbyn’s actions was to thwart a general election three times. The figures I have given to the House are there in the book.
I want to move on because the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, in the gravamen of the argument—although I think the matters I have covered are a flaw in it—used the argument, which I think was taken up by my noble friend Lady Noakes, that the votes of millions of people should not be overturned by Dissolution. A number of noble Lords have addressed this. By implication, the noble and learned Lord argues, per contra, that the chance to vote for millions of people should be denied by a vote of the House of Commons. It seems to me an extraordinary concept that a House of Commons that does not wish to go should, in his words, prevent or overturn the votes of millions. I respectfully disagree. I think the noble Baroness, Lady Taylor of Bolton, who chaired your Lordships’ Constitution Committee with distinction, put some political practicality into the equation, as did the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood. This is very serious. I simply do not accept the argument that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, put forward.
A simple majority vote, for the reasons I have given, would not necessarily prevent deadlock in certain conditions—my noble friend Lord Sherbourne of Didsbury spoke to this—such as when the Government of the day held only a small majority, no majority at all or depended on a small party with a particular regional or country-specific interest. The procedure that is proposed would, in my submission, fail the test of clarity and the absence of loopholes, as the noble Baroness, Lady Taylor of Bolton, put to us. The Joint Committee itself noted on the matter of a vote in the Commons before Parliament was dissolved, that, “The majority”—there were conflicting views, as the noble Lord, Lord Beith, put to us—
“considers it a change which would only have a practical effect in a gridlocked Parliament, which could mean denying an election to a Government which was unable to function effectively, and which might therefore be counter to the public interest.”
I agree with the submission of the majority that this would be
“counter to the public interest.”
In short, far from making things simple, the very thing that the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, said he wished to achieve, it could still lead to stasis.
The most detrimental aspect of a vote in the other place, and potentially allowing that to be used to frustrate an election, is that general elections are sometimes called when the existing Parliament has proven to be unviable. The statutory requirement for a vote in the other place would only compound that problem, and in such a case, as we have discussed or I have submitted, with part of his own party potentially voting against a Prime Minister—circumstances that the noble Lord, Lord Butler, suggested could happen—even a simple majority would be too high.
Past Governments, and potentially future Governments, have often worked within turbulent political and economic contexts, trying to deliver ambitious and significant agendas and sometimes with small majorities. It is in these circumstances, above all, that the flexibility of the system which the two major parties in this country pledged to revive and which we are seeking to revive through this Bill matters most. In these scenarios, a Prime Minister should be able to be decisive and request a Dissolution to try to resolve a parliamentary stalemate or test their mandate to govern.
My noble friend Lord Lansley asked by what authority a Prime Minister might act. I think my noble friend and learned friend Lord Mackay of Clashfern answered that. The Prime Minister, acting as the Sovereign’s principal adviser, is able to request a Dissolution by virtue of an ability to command the confidence of the other place. In the case of a minority Government or a confused House of Commons, the agreement to a Dissolution might be difficult to secure—as it proved three times in 2019. I submit that not many new MPs—some noble Lords have been slightly disrespectful of what might be the motives of people in another place—would rush to face the electorate in a matter of months if given the chance to have a say.
It is by no means certain, as noble Lords have suggested, that past minority Governments would have secured opposition support for an election had this system operated. I agree with the powerful interventions of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, and my noble friend Lady Noakes on this point. Some noble Lords seem to forget the experience of 2017-19. A vote in the House of Commons might have meant other minority Governments and similar ones having to limp on like that one, unable to deliver their priorities. The revival of the prerogative power to dissolve Parliament is, in our submission, the most effective way for a Government to be permitted to put important questions to the people, resolve stasis and secure the mandate to govern effectively. It is a system of constitutional practice that has worked; I urge noble Lords not to seek to add complexity where previously, before 2011, there was none.
I must address briefly the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Wallace of Saltaire. It would go further in the development of a statutory process by making express provision that, when Parliament stands prorogued, a Dissolution cannot be sought. The amendment seeks to set a condition that a Parliament must be “recalled”—or rather summoned—for the purpose of the passage of a Dissolution approval Motion.
Prior to the Dissolution of Parliament, a short Prorogation may be necessary to allow the swift conclusion of business; of course, it should be as short as possible. This has happened on several occasions, most recently in 1992, 1997, 2005 and 2010. In 2010, Parliament was prorogued from Thursday 8 April until Monday 12 April, whereupon Dissolution was proclaimed. Among other things, this enabled the general election to take place on a Thursday, as has been usual practice. Although the concepts of Prorogation and Dissolution may be superficially similar in that they are both prerogative acts, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, said, they are distinct. Prorogation is the formal ending of a Session; Dissolution provides an opportunity for the electorate to give their verdict.
I have heard the arguments in favour of a Commons vote on this matter in the circumstance of a Prorogation also but, respectfully, the Government believe that this is undesirable and risks repeating some of the worst aspects of the 2011 Act. In our submission, providing for the requirement that a prorogued Parliament must be summoned serves only to build in additional delay and undermine the ability of the Prime Minister to act decisively. The risk that the noble Lord alluded to in seeking to strengthen the role of the Commons raises that fundamental question: who should be the ultimate judge on the Government’s decision to call an election? As many noble Lords have said, the answer is clear: the electorate. As the Joint Committee said, they are
“the ultimate authority in a democratic system”.
Like my noble friend Lord Sherbourne of Didsbury, I simply do not understand the idea of a rogue or outrageous Dissolution because it is the fundamental act of humility by the Executive to place their future in the hands of the electorate, who should be the final arbiter of whether a Prime Minister has called an election legitimately. I acquit the noble Lord, Lord Wallace of Saltaire, of this but I have found it strange to hear noble Lords say that they want to repeal the FTPA but return to some of the worst aspects of it. I think that there is a further complication in what the noble Lord suggested.
I am sure that the House wishes to move on. We will have further opportunities in the debate on the next group to discuss sovereignty and controls on Parliament, but I ought to say in preamble that noble Lords have suggested that a Commons vote increases parliamentary accountability and acts as a check on the Executive. It is not our view that the prerogative system diminishes parliamentary sovereignty and the Executive’s accountability to Parliament. Rather, by reviving the prerogative powers, we are restoring the link between confidence and Dissolution. If a Prime Minister loses the confidence of the elected House, they can either resign, seek a Dissolution or seek to recover the confidence of the House. The other place has the nuclear option of a Motion of no confidence and a plethora of means of holding the Executive to account. It does not require further prescriptive statutory measures to do so effectively.
Notwithstanding the gentle chiding of the noble Lord, Lord Newby—I am grateful to him for taking the time, or wasting it as he seemed to argue, to read the letter that I sent to noble Lords—I ask your Lordships  to consider carefully the potential, unknown, long-term consequences of this amendment, which flow out of some of the problems that we have discussed in this debate. A vote in the Commons would disrupt the equilibrium in finely balanced, historical constitutional arrangements and could have an impact on the role of the sovereign. In reviving the prerogative power to dissolve Parliament, the Government have clearly acknowledged that this power is exercised by the sovereign on the request of the Prime Minister, as we discussed in the first group.
There remains a role for the sovereign in exceptional circumstances to refuse a dissolution request; the noble Lord, Lord Beith, made this point. This is a powerful incentive to ensure that improper requests are not made of the sovereign, irrespective of the Government’s majority in the House of Commons. However, a House of Commons vote in effect removes the role of the sovereign as the constitutional backstop. Some of your Lordships avowedly wish to do that; it is the Government’s strong opinion that that would be unwise.
The Bill as drafted will provide constitutional arrangements that deliver significant benefits to this country and clarity on the way forward—a clarity that has been well known, understood and trusted, and served successive Parliaments and Governments of different parties for generations. The Bill has been through rigorous parliamentary scrutiny. There has been a good deal of scrutiny of the 2011 Act by the Constitution Committee and PACAC. The Joint Committee also undertook outstanding pre-legislative scrutiny of the Bill, which has informed our approach.
The careful scrutiny that your Lordships rightly expect has been provided. To construct this novel constitutional scheme which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, is suggesting, building on the remnants of a piece of legislation that did not stand up in the political turmoil of the previous Parliament, would perhaps be to act with a little haste. That is not the way to ensure that our constitutional arrangements will stand the test of time as the previous arrangements did. This Bill returns our country to its best constitutional traditions, and I urge your Lordships to withdraw the amendment.

Lord Wallace of Saltaire: My Lords, I briefly point out that the definition of “Prorogation” that the Minister has just given does not cover the meaning of what the Prime Minister did in 2019. He might perhaps like to reconsider that definition if he wants to argue that the Prime Minister was behaving within the constitution. A lot of this debate has been about the lack of clarity in constitutional conventions at present and the need for greater clarity. I would be very happy to discuss further with him the revision of the Cabinet Manual to set out clearer definitions of what our conventions are, agreed among the parties and consulting with the committees in both Houses, which is what we need. We lack trust in politics at present and the public has a low opinion of politics and politicians. That is part of the reason why, as the noble Lord, Lord Desai, said, we need to put conventions down on paper. I hope that we will come back to the Cabinet Manual later.
I say rapidly to the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, that we are a parliamentary democracy, and one of the planks on which the 2016 referendum was fought was to restore parliamentary sovereignty. When Parliament began afterwards to divide up into factions within both the major parties—which, after all, was the cause of our difficulties between 2017 and 2019—the Government moved towards an idea of popular sovereignty. If we were to move towards a system of popular sovereignty, as she suggests, we would be moving towards the Swiss model. We would have a much more local democracy, with local as well as national referenda and a Government who were much less able to control anything much from the centre; Switzerland does not have much of a foreign policy as a result. That is a popular democracy. It would be a very different model from our constitutional democracy based on checks and balances between judiciary, Parliament and Executive.
What we risk having is a populist democracy with highly centralised government and a leader with a good deal of financial support behind him—occasionally her, but almost always him—who says that he speaks for the public without actually asking them what they say, who does his best to denigrate any sort of critical or independent media and who thus undermines the whole idea of a constitutional democracy. We have seen that happen in a number of countries in recent years and we do not want it to happen here. That is why we need greater clarity in our constitutional conventions, which is part of what we are concerned with in this Bill. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment 2 withdrawn.

Amendment 3

Lord Judge: Tabled by Lord Judge
3: Clause 2, page 1, line 9, at end insert—“(1A) The powers referred to in subsection (1) must not be exercised unless the House of Commons passes a motion in the form set out in subsection (1B).(1B) The form of motion for the purposes of subsection (1A) is “that this present Parliament will be dissolved.””

Lord Judge: My Lords, it is rather fun to be clothed in the costume of a revolutionary who is about to tear down the constitution. I do not think anyone has ever thought of me in those terms, and my family will be absolutely fascinated by it.
I have found this an interesting debate on all sides. It is perfectly obvious that I shall have to read the debate, which I shall. It is also perfectly clear that there is nothing further that I can say in private meetings, in the Chamber or anywhere else that will enable me to persuade the Minister to change his mind or his position.
I remind noble Lords that we are simply asking that the House of Commons should have a chance to look again at the proposal before us so that it can make up its mind. Its Members had a debate, but when you read it you see that—this sounds discourteous, and I suppose in a way it is—the issue was hardly addressed. All that I am asking in this amendment is that they should be given a chance to think about it. I would be  perfectly happy for them to reject it; that would be their decision. For today’s purposes, I shall withdraw the amendment, but I shall reflect on what should happen at the next stage.
Amendment 3 not moved.
Clause 2 agreed.

  
Clause 3: Non-justiciability of revived prerogative powers

Amendment 4

Lord Norton of Louth: Moved by Lord Norton of Louth
4: Clause 3, page 1, line 17, leave out “or purported exercise”Member’s explanatory statementThis amendment ensures that the ouster provision in clause 3 will not apply to the purported exercise of the powers to dissolve Parliament contained in clause 2.

Lord Norton of Louth: My Lords, I shall also speak to my other two amendments in this group. The amendments would ensure that the ouster provisions in the clause did not apply to the purported exercise of the powers to dissolve Parliament contained in Clause 2. There are two principal arguments that I wish to develop in support of the amendments. The first is that they are necessary to give effect to the Government’s intention that the Bill restore the status quo ante. The second is that including the “purported” exercise of powers within the clause is objectionable in principle.
The purpose of the Bill is to restore the position to what it was before the 2011 Act was enacted. As paragraph 23 of the Explanatory Notes concedes, the purpose of Clause 3(c) is
“to address the distinction drawn by the Supreme Court … as regards the court’s role in reviewing the scope of a prerogative power, as opposed to its exercise.”
As the Law Society of Scotland pointed out in its helpful briefing note, that takes us further than the pre-2011 status quo ante. It considers that extending the clause to the purported exercise of the Clause 2 powers, or a purported decision in relation to those powers, may go beyond the bounds of the previous law as expressed in the 1985 case of Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service. As the note goes on to say:
“We take the view that the inclusion of ‘purported’ appears to be designed to address the decision in R (on the application of Privacy International) v Investigatory Powers Tribunal and others … where the absence of the word ‘purported” was treated as significant by some of the judges.”
Either the Bill restores the status quo ante or it does not. If the Government are to be consistent and achieve the situation as it existed prior to September 2011, the references to the “purported exercise” and “purported decision” of powers under Clause 2 need to be removed from the Bill.
The second and fundamental objection is one of principle. The use of “purported” means that the exercise might be beyond the power vested in Ministers. I am not in favour of Ministers having the capacity  without it being open to challenge in the courts. The Minister in the Commons, Chloe Smith, said that the clause provided
“an opportunity to Parliament to be absolutely clear on whether it thinks that such things should be outside the jurisdiction of the courts.”
She went on to say that
“the check on the exercise of power is for the electorate to decide on rather than the courts.”—[Official Report, Commons, 13/9/21; col. 723.]
“Purported” decisions might conflict with the rule of law. The Minister in the other place was effectively saying that it was not for the courts to determine whether Ministers were acting beyond their powers. I do not think that the letter from my noble friend Lord True really engaged with that point.
It is important to stress that the clause should not be viewed as an attempt to restrict the courts from encroaching on the position of Parliament. That might be how Ministers wish to convey it, but the senior courts have been exercised by the use of powers by Ministers, not by Parliament. Indeed, the most recent high-profile cases that appear to have motivated the Government to use this wording were ones in which the courts sought to protect, not undermine, the position of Parliament in relation to the Executive. In this clause, the Government seek to confer on Ministers wide-ranging powers in a way that I consider dangerous.
The wording of the clause might also be counterproductive. There is no evidence that the courts would want to encroach on the exercise of the prerogative in dissolving Parliament and calling an election.
With these amendments, we are also discussing whether Clause 3 should stand part of the Bill. My contention is that if there is an ouster clause, it needs to be true to the purpose of the Bill, which is to restore the position to what it was before 2011, and that it should omit provisions—in this case reference to “purported exercise” and “purported decision”—that are constitutionally objectionable. If the Government persist in wishing to retain such wording, that serves to reinforce the case for removing the clause. I beg to move.

Lord Hope of Craighead: My Lords, I added my name to the amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Norton of Louth, and to join the noble Lord, Lord Butler of Brockwell, in seeking to remove Clause 3 from the Bill. I agree with what the noble Lord, Lord Norton, said in both respects. He dealt with the point that the provisions he seeks to remove from the Bill are unnecessary and objectionable in principle. I will say a few words in support of what he said.
Like the noble Lord, Lord Norton, I cannot help feeling that references to “purported exercise” and what we see in Clause 3(c) are a reaction against, or motivated by, as the noble Lord said, the decision of the Supreme Court in Miller II, although that case was about Prorogation, not Dissolution. There is a very clear distinction between the two, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, said at an earlier stage in our debates. It is also very important to bear in mind that the court in Miller made it absolutely clear that it saw its function as being to serve the interests of Parliament against the Executive. It sought to ensure that the Government did not use  the power of Prorogation to prevent Parliament carrying out its proper functions, including holding the Executive to account.
We have here a remarkable paradox. On the one hand, the court saw itself as under a duty to preserve parliamentary democracy against actions taken by the Executive. On the other hand, Parliament is being used here by the Executive to deprive the court of that power. I stress that because ouster clauses may seem to be a matter of concern only to lawyers, but that is not so in this context: their use here should be a matter of concern to all of us in this House who value the part that Parliament plays in our democracy.
The word “purported” is worth dwelling on. The noble Lord, Lord Rooker, whose name is also against this amendment but who has unfortunately left his place, raised this issue with the noble Lord, Lord True, at Second Reading. I am sure that noble Lords will remember that exchange quite well. The noble Lord, Lord True, explained exactly what the word meant: he said—I cannot put it better than he did—that it means an “invalid” exercise of the prerogative that is, therefore, not lawful. The question is whether, when you use the word, the power that is being exercised is within its lawful limits. This almost begs the question about whether that is a question of law that this clause is seeking to take away from the courts altogether. Like the noble Lord, Lord Norton of Louth, I think that this provision contravenes the rule of law and for that reason is objectionable in principle.
I make it clear that I take no objection to Clause 3(b) and (c) if the references to “purposed exercise” or “purported decision” are removed. In the interests of clarity, it is quite clear to just say that the court or tribunal may not question the exercise of the powers referred to in Clause 2—that would give clarity. I take no objection to those on the grounds that they are either unnecessary or objectionable in principle. It is Clause 3(c) and the reference to “purported exercise” that concern me.
In principle, my point is that every prerogative power has its limits. Over the centuries, the courts have protected parliamentary sovereignty from threats posed to it by the use of prerogative powers. So the sovereignty of Parliament would be undermined, as a fundamental principle of the constitution, if the Executive could, by using the prerogative, prevent Parliament exercising its legitimate authority for as long as they wish. The same point can be made about the principle that Ministers are accountable to Parliament. We need to be protected against the risk that a responsible Government may be replaced by an unaccountable one. In Miller, the court said that that would be the position if there were no legal limit on the power to prorogue, so the decision to prorogue would be unlawful if it were to have those effects.
I recognise that in this we are not dealing with Prorogation, which brings me to the second part of the point of the noble Lord, Lord Norton of Louth, on whether these provisions are necessary. In paragraph 4 of its judgment in Miller, the Supreme Court noted, in passing, that there are “conventional constraints” on  what the Government can do during the Dissolution period. I take that as a signal that, if the issue of Dissolution were to be raised before the court, it would not entertain any argument about it. In the previous debate, we heard quite a lot about the Dissolution Principles and various constraints that would require any attempt to deprive the electorate of their opportunity to vote following a Dissolution to simply be a non-starter.
Indeed, in his letter to the Constitution Committee in December last year, the Minister developed these points. It was an admirable letter because it answered the Constitution Committee’s points in considerable detail, which is highly commendable and I hope will be followed by other Ministers in similar cases. As the noble Lord said in his letter, there are already checks and incentives for the Executive that have worked for many years, effectively compelling Parliament to be called as soon as possible after a Dissolution. Unduly and unnecessarily delaying the calling of a new Parliament is not in the interest of any Government seeking to make progress on the mandate that they have received through a general election. The Bill itself, in Clause 4, introduces an additional safeguard: an automatic Dissolution provision in the event that a Prime Minister fails to use his prerogative to request a Dissolution at all.
So where is the problem? These are draconian ouster provisions which are without precedent. I am talking about Clause 3(c) because I have not been able to find any precedent for this extreme exclusion at all. Strange things, of course, have been happening since this Prime Minister took office, but even he, I suggest, would find it very difficult to abuse this prerogative power. It seems to me that the possibility of the courts intervening in this context is remote.
Why do I object to these provisions? Parliament and, in its turn, the electorate to which it is answerable, are protected by the rule that questions of law are for the courts. It is very dangerous to undermine that principle in the way that is proposed here because of the example that this clause sets for the future. Clause 3(c), which states that a court may not question “the limits or extent” of the prerogative powers that are revived by the Bill, strikes at the heart of the rule of law. My concern is that, once used, this formula will appear again supported by the reasoning that, just because it was approved by Parliament in this case, it has become an established part of our constitutional lexicon.
I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord True, for a very interesting discussion the other day in which he was good enough to listen to my arguments and explain the position he is taking to resist them. One of the points, which I fully recognise, is why he has been advised that the provisions should be framed in this way. That is because the courts have said that ouster clauses must be construed strictly, and that means that, if it is Parliament’s intention to take this jurisdiction away from the courts, it must do so in clear terms. The noble Lord made it very clear that that was the advice he had received and that is why the clause was drafted in this way. I understand the point, but it does not answer my point, which is whether he should be doing this at all. I assure him that my concerns about this are very real. Prerogative powers can do much damage if  they are abused. To introduce this formula into our lexicon in a different context, as I fear will happen, would be very dangerous.
The Government have nothing to fear by the removal of these provisions if they wish to be free to exercise their prerogative powers in the context of Dissolution. I wonder whether the noble Lord can assure me that, if he insists on keeping these provisions in power, they are not to be a precedent for the future. As the way things are now, that is my principal concern because I do not see the court being involved in this issue about Dissolution being improperly exercised at all.

Lord Faulks: My Lords, the Committee has shown in the debate on this Bill so far that there is common ground that this Bill should provide clarity. The use of “purported” in Clause 3 seems to be a deliberate choice by the Government and the parliamentary draftsmen. It is not a word used much in everyday speech but is found in other Acts of Parliament. It is also used in judgments when an act has taken place or a decision has been taken, but a court has concluded after the event that the decision or act has no legal effect. Any well-informed draftsman in this context would have had well in mind the decision in the Anisminic case.
In Miller II, as it is generally referred to—the prorogation case—the Supreme Court concluded that despite the fact that the Prime Minister had gone through all the appropriate formalities to prorogue Parliament and Parliament had been, as a matter of fact, prorogued, the prorogation, or purported prorogation, was unlawful and was thus deemed not to have happened as a matter of law, with the result that Parliament was reassembled.
The purpose of Clause 3 is plainly to render the exercise of the power to dissolve Parliament non-justiciable. The first question is whether, as a matter of construction, it has that effect, and the second is whether such an ouster clause should be in the Bill at all. That is an issue in the stand part amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Butler. If, for the sake of argument, the House were to conclude that an ouster clause was appropriate, why not include “purported” in the ouster clause? In its absence, a court could conclude that notwithstanding the apparent or purported Dissolution, because of the unlawfulness of the Dissolution—and the courts have shown considerable ingenuity on occasions in finding unlawfulness—the Dissolution never, as a matter of law, occurred. It would follow that Parliament would then be reassembled, campaigning might be halted, the date of an election vacated, with all the attendant chaos that would ensure, and it is even possible that the result of an election could be set aside. That seems to me to be a highly undesirable state of affairs, for two principal reasons: first, the uncertainly; and, secondly, the insertion of the courts into the political process.
I entirely appreciate the distinction between Prorogation and Dissolution, but before Miller 2 most lawyers would have considered that Prorogation was non-justiciable. I dare say that the advice was given by the Attorney-General or the Government Legal Department that when Mrs Miller and others brought their judicial  review it was non-justiciable. That is not such an unreasonable point of view, given the unanimous decision of the Divisional Court, a court consisting of the Lord Chief Justice, the Master of the Rolls and the President of the Queen’s Bench Division. That court concluded that, without in any way expressing approval of the decision of the Prime Minister, it was a matter of politics, not law. In other words, the power was non-justiciable.
Why did the Supreme Court disagree with the reasoning of the Divisional Court? Unfortunately, we do not know, because it made no mention of the decision of the lower court. This departure from the normal engagement with the reasoning of the lower court could certainly be regarded as something of a discourtesy, to put it mildly.
There are differing views as to whether the Supreme Court in Miller 2 came to the right conclusion. The Government’s view may well have been a factor in the setting up of the independent review of administrative law, which I had the privilege of chairing. I do not purport to speak on behalf of the panel today, but I can point out to the House that we concluded that the decision might be regarded as something of a one-off and should not of itself lead to any fundamental changes in the scope of judicial review. The combination of a minority Government, no agreement in government on the right approach to Brexit, and the rigidity of the Fixed-term Parliaments Act, with its requirement of a super-majority, created something of a perfect storm.
On the one hand, the case was a magnificent demonstration of the checks and balances in our constitution working well, even if you do not agree with the conclusion. As it happens, I do not agree with it, but other views are available. I do not favour the decision because of the involvement of judges in a political matter. In conversation with constitutional experts in the United States, I have encountered considerable surprise at the decision. An equivalent challenge in the United States would fall foul of the political questions doctrine, and the claimants would not be able to establish that they had standing to bring such a challenge. In this jurisdiction, points on standing are rarely taken. We pointed this out in the IRAL and suggested that they should be taken more often, even by the court of its own motion, since it is a jurisdictional matter.
In his response to the IRAL report, the then Lord Chancellor, Sir Robert Buckland, as he now is, said that he was anxious to protect judges from politics. I think he had a point. Unlike in the US, our judges have, for the most part, skilfully avoided involvement in political matters. As a result, and in sharp distinction to their counterparts in the United States, our judges are not well known to the general public and their views are not a matter of general public interest, in the non-technical sense, and long may that continue.
This Bill would protect judges from political controversy by reason of the terms of Clause 3. I think a number of judges would be perfectly happy with that outcome, but even if they were not there would be an acceptance that Parliament is entitled to legislate to exclude the courts from considering the legality of the power to dissolve Parliament. The IRAL concluded that it was  constitutionally open to Parliament to pass an ouster clause of this sort, and unless you reject the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, I do not believe that this is in any way controversial.
The other objection I have to the removal or watering down of this ouster clause is the practical effect of a challenge to the power to dissolve. Even an unsuccessful challenge would cause delay and uncertainty. There are those who make no bones about their use of judicial review as a political tool. It is possible, or even likely, that a challenge would be forthcoming if some political advantage was perceived in mounting one. A successful challenge would cause really substantial uncertainty. It is sometimes said that the Miller 2 decision, and even the Miller 1 decision, did not cause that much disruption and did not prevent the Prime Minister calling a general election, but it must be remembered, as is cogently pointed out by Professor Ekins in his Policy Exchange paper on the Bill, that it was only because the SNP and the Liberal Democrats thought that an election would benefit them that he was able to do so. Otherwise, Parliament would have continued in a form of paralysis for a lengthy period as a result of the Supreme Court decision.
This Bill will provide a welcome degree of clarity. It will restore, or rather confirm, the status quo and, with this ouster clause, keep the judges out of politics. I pause to point out that, in a sense, as we said in the IRAL, this is not truly an ouster clause, since the Bill is not creating a new power and then ousting the jurisdiction of the courts. Rather, it is confirming the status quo as acknowledged so long ago by Lord Roskill in the GCHQ case. It is doing this in the interests of legal certainty, a point made by the Constitution Committee, of which I have the privilege of being a member. Our current Prime Minister is perceived by many in your Lordships’ House and outside as having rather little regard for the law. But personal antipathy to this Prime Minister should not result in our making unnecessary and undesirable amendments to this Bill.

Lord Butler of Brockwell: My Lords, I shall disagree with the noble Lord who has just spoken by opposing the inclusion of Clause 3 in the Bill, but first I thank the noble Lords, Lord True and Lord Wolfson, for extending to me the courtesy of a virtual discussion on this. They failed to persuade me, but I appreciated the courtesy.
Last week, the Minister circulated a letter to your Lordships addressing the issues arising from the Bill. In it, he said:
“Clause 3: Restates the long standing position that the exercise of prerogative power”
in relation to the Dissolution and calling of Parliament “is non-justiciable”, and the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, has just said something similar. I have been around a long time, but I am not aware of any such long-standing position. There is the statement of Lord Roskill, but it did not bear directly on this. It is not surprising that this position has not been conclusively established, because no challenge to the use of the prerogative power has ever been made. Nor do I think it likely that  it ever would be. If it was, I find it hard to imagine the circumstances in which a court would uphold such a challenge. So, in practice, I regard this clause as unnecessary, and dangerous.
Let us suppose, for the sake of argument, that a Government misused this prerogative power by asking the sovereign to dissolve Parliament in order to prevent Parliament causing the Government some inconvenience or in an attempt to overturn the result of a recent election. What safeguard would there be against such a misuse of power in the absence of the courts? The noble Baroness the Leader of the Opposition was absolutely right. She said that there were three possibilities. There is Parliament—the House of Commons—which we debated in the last group of amendments, there are the courts or there is the sovereign. Those are the only three possibilities. Again, I quote the Minister’s letter:
“The sovereign retains the power to refuse an improper dissolution and, in doing so, acts as a constitutional backstop in this context.”
Is this a position in which we would wish to place the sovereign? It would do precisely what we are all agreed we should not do: namely, to require the sovereign to intervene in what are likely to be, as the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, said, the most highly charged political circumstances. Therefore, if anyone is to prevent the Government misusing the power, and the Government are determined to oppose the House of Commons being given a vote, I submit that it should be the courts rather than the sovereign.
Of course, if the high court of Parliament—the House of Commons—has authorised the use of the power, that would put it out of the reach of the courts. That is the virtue of the amendment moved by my noble and learned friend Lord Judge and the noble Lord, Lord Wallace of Saltaire, but the Government are opposed to that. There are dangers in leaving it to the House of Commons, which were described at length in the last debate, so it is either the courts or the sovereign. I submit that in those circumstances, it has to be the courts.
There is a more fundamental objection to Clause 3. These are the words of the clause:
“A court or tribunal may not question—
(a) the exercise or purported exercise of the powers referred to in section 2,
(b) any decision or purported decision relating to those powers, or
(c) the limits or extent of those powers.”
I find those words chilling. They amount to saying, “We will take these powers, but we will not allow any interference by the judicial system in the way we exercise them.” That is the language of an authoritarian —some might even say totalitarian—Government.
It is because the present Government have shown signs of seeking to override any challenge to the use of their powers that this ouster clause is such a dangerous precedent, as my noble and learned friend Lord Hope has said. I suggest that this House should stand against that precedent. I shall not seek the opinion of the Committee today on excluding Clause 3 from the Bill, but I reserve the right to move an amendment on Report to remove it.

Lord Beith: My Lords, with a Supreme Court judge, the chairman of the most recent inquiry into the workings of judicial review—he did an extremely good piece of work on that—and a former Cabinet Secretary presenting views that differ in more than nuanced ways, the House will have to resolve this issue. Those of us who are deeply concerned about this clause cannot be accused of wanting to drag the judges into decisions about whether elections are being held. In my case, and in some of the other cases, we have offered two mechanisms that clearly make that very unlikely.
One is that the courts would be very unlikely to question or interfere in any way with the personal prerogative power, which we all agreed earlier is the nature of, if not the wording of the Bill, then of the re-establishment of the status quo ante. The second is that a significant number of us argued that a vote in the House of Commons is a desirable process. Were it there—were it a condition—it would entirely obviate any fear that the courts would become involved, because the courts would recognise the Bill of Rights’ prohibition on questioning the decision made in Parliament. We are not people seeking to drag the judges into this process.
The Government’s belief that they have to build a bulwark of some kind against judges becoming involved, all based on a particular recent experience that was about not Dissolution but Prorogation, has, I think, drawn them into doing something that, if we do it, we will come to regret very much in years to come. The phraseology of the clause should remind us of that: it is the
“purported exercise of the powers”
or the “purported decision”. What does that take us to? It takes us to the point where the Government are trying to ensure that the courts do not question whether the Prime Minister had the power to act in that way, or, if he had the power, that he is acting in ways covered by the legislation. I find it very hard to conceive of a case that could be made, if the processes of this legislation are followed, in which that could reasonably be advanced in front of or taken seriously by any court. What I see is an ouster clause that we will not see the last of and that we will see again in other legislation. Then it will be said that it is a perfectly acceptable ouster clause, as Parliament allowed it in legislation that repealed the Fixed-term Parliaments Act; that it is just a straightforward way of making it clear that this is an area in which we do not want the courts involved.
The power of judicial review, which was carefully analysed by the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, and the team he led, is an essential way in which the citizen is protected from the abuse of power by the Executive. There are many kinds of Executive, not just the national Government we are thinking of today; local authorities and private sector organisations have powers of various kinds. If they act beyond those powers, the courts are the proper place to challenge that misuse of power. Once we give currency to the idea that a Minister can say in relation to a purported action or purported decision that they have decided they have the power to do this and may not be challenged, that is a reversal of the entire system of judicial review.
The process described in Clause 3 will never be engaged in relation to what we are talking about—the calling of a general election. There are so many barriers against it—not least, of course, the desire of the judges not to get into that political process at all—but once we have got this on to the statute book, we will not have seen the last of it. I think we have created a highly dangerous model for ouster clauses. I am disappointed, in a way: I think the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, resisted pressures to come up with foolish decisions in his review, and I would welcome him being on my side on the issue, which is about the longer-term importance of judicial review for the purpose for which it was intended. One can raise questions about some ways in which it has been used in the past. One can raise questions about whether there are some limitations, such as the Cart issues raised by the review by the noble Lord, Lord Faulks. It is vital in the protection of our citizens and I see it threatened by the existence of this clause.

Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood: My Lords, my core concern regarding this group of amendments is for the future generation of judges—not just in the Supreme Court, but judges who, I suggest, must inevitably be troubled at first instance and so forth before things get to the Supreme Court—if there is there is the slightest glimmer of a prospect of anybody legally challenging any decision with regard to Dissolution. I find myself in total agreement with all that my noble friend Lord Faulks said and the legal analysis here. The courts have striven mightily to remove any possibility of ouster clauses having effect. With that, in most contexts, I totally agree, but this is in the context of Dissolution and of trying, with the utmost clarity, to return as whence we were, where there was no possibility of the courts entertaining a challenge.
To my mind, the courts would be grossly embarrassed and, of course, singularly unlikely to intervene. The noble Lord, Lord Beith is absolutely right: it is the last thing they would want to do because it would be so embarrassing and destructive of the current constitutional position of judges to allow themselves to be drawn into this field. However, the temptation for others to try to involve them must be removed. I suggest that this clause, as is, tries to dot every I and cross every T.
The reason for “purported” has been explained; I need not repeat it. The court has the principle that anything that is regarded as legally flawed is a nullity. Therefore, what was thought to be a judicial review of a decision is only the judicial review of a purported decision because X hypothesis has been set aside as a nullity. I see no reason why you cannot have the absolute clarity that this clause provides, which will discourage anybody from trying, as I see it, to embarrass the court.
Finally, my noble friend Lord Butler suggested that you must have Parliament, Her Majesty or the courts supervising in some shape or form so that the Prime Minister does not exceed the legal limits of his power. I suggest that there is a fourth body to ensure that: the public, whom the Dissolution process consults on this question. Brenda of Bristol and her like will make sure that the Prime Minister does not exceed this power.

Baroness Noakes: My Lords, I will speak only on Clause 3 stand part and not on the more detailed amendments, because I am sure that my noble friend the Minister will reply in his careful way about how the wording was arrived at and what it is intended to do, as he did very carefully at Second Reading.
One does not have to be an expert on the constitution, which I am not, to know that judges should not interfere in politics, and decisions on calling elections are about as political as decisions ever get. I believe the Government are right to try to draft this Bill in such a way that the courts cannot interfere in that very political decision, and that is why I support Clause 3 standing part of the Bill.
The fact that the Government feel it necessary to include Clause 3 and draft it in such a complex way speaks volumes about how the judiciary has found many ways of getting involved in areas that would have seemed unthinkable only a few years ago, ones of which we would have assumed the courts would steer clear. The clause is necessary only because of the direction of travel taken by the courts in the way they have interpreted the areas they get involved in. I, for one, believe that we need no more surprises like the Miller judgments.
Clause 3 is confined to the specific and narrow issue of whether the prerogative power to dissolve Parliament is justiciable. I cannot conceive of any circumstances in which the involvement of the courts could ever be justified, and those who oppose Clause 3 have said that they cannot think of any either. Even the noble Lord, Lord Butler of Brockwell, who demonstrated the fertility of his imagination in the debate on an earlier group of amendments, could not come up with an example. We are legislating against shadows, against figments of the imagination.
The issue is about only the steps taken to allow a general election to be called. It is a very political decision. We cannot conceive of the courts ever getting involved in delaying an election, halting an election or even, as my noble friend Lord Faulks suggested, nullifying the result of a general election. It just seems too ludicrous a concept even to contemplate. However, we need it to be clear beyond peradventure in the law, and without this clause it may not be.
We need to get this into perspective. Clause 3 does not diminish the role of the courts in the constitution; it is about this one narrow area that before, when we simply rested on the prerogative, no one thought the courts could ever get involved in, but because of other developments in the law we now feel it necessary to be quite explicit about it.

Lord Butler of Brockwell: The noble Baroness and I agree that the circumstances in which this situation arises are unthinkable, so why should we have the dangerous precedent of this ouster clause in the Bill?

Baroness Noakes: We have it because it is just possible that the courts could find a way in. We have seen them getting involved in areas that we never thought they would get involved in before. That is a fact of the way the judiciary has moved in recent years, and it is why the clause is there.
I do not accept that the clause sets a dangerous precedent. It is about this one very narrow issue. It is not about an ouster clause that would be put in every statute that came before Parliament. Of course, Parliament must decide at the end of the day how it wants to frame its laws. It has the right to do that, and the courts can then interpret those laws, but I do not believe that this will be seen as a precedent for a more general use of ouster clauses. If it is, I am fairly sure that Parliament would not accept them. We should see this clause in the narrow concept in which it is drafted and not try to extend it beyond that.

Lord Wallace of Saltaire: My Lords, if we are talking about our tried and tested constitution, we should remember that in the 17th century it was Chief Justice Coke and his defence of the rule of law against the extent of the royal prerogative which led to the development of some of the ideas of constitutional democracy at least as much as Parliament. The rule of law is an essential part of the way we work.
I say to the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, that we all know that this clause is in the Bill because of the judgment on Prorogation in 2019. I was interested to hear that the Minister’s definition of Prorogation did not in any sense suggest that that use of the power came within an accepted definition. Perhaps he will change his definition next time he comes.
The Minister has said that the importance of the Bill is to restore the status quo, but this ouster clause is not the restoration of the status quo. I agree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, that it opens a window to its use on other occasions, which would be highly undesirable. It is much more radical than Clause 2 in changing our customs and practices. If we want to maintain the status quo while changing it a little—

Lord Faulks: The noble Lord says that the clause does not restore the status quo. Does it follow that, in his view, the power to dissolve would have been justiciable at common law by virtue of the conventions?

Lord Wallace of Saltaire: I find it hard to imagine a situation in which the power of Dissolution would be used in the way that the power of Prorogation was used in 2019, so I do not think it likely that the case would arise. That is my instant opinion.
The radical dimension of this is that it disturbs the balance between the judiciary and the rule of law, and Parliament and the checks that Parliament has on executive power and the Government. The conclusion of The Independent Review of Administrative Law says, as the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, will remember:
“The Panel consider that the independence of our judiciary and the high reputation in which it is held internationally should cause the government to think long and hard before seeking to curtail its powers … It is inevitable that the relationship between the judiciary, the executive and Parliament will from time to time give rise to tensions … a degree of conflict shows that the checks and balances in our constitution are working well.”
I strongly agree with those sentiments. It is part of the proper process of constitutional democracy that each of those elements of our constitution should have a degree of tension with each other and hold each other in balance.
That is why I am in favour of amending this Bill to provide the simpler process of powers of Dissolution that Clause 2 provides—thus making Clause 3 unnecessary —and supplementing the desire for clarity of conventions by revising the Cabinet Manual to have a more fluent definition of Dissolution principles. If we do all three of those, we will substantially improve the constitutional value of this Bill.

Lord Grocott: My Lords, I would like to think that the Minister will find this argument conclusive. If he had accepted the amendment on Clause 2 that so many noble Lords thought was valuable—to have parliamentary resolution for a general election—we would not have needed this debate on the ouster clause and could have got home much earlier. But he has rejected it and that brings us to the debate about the ouster clause itself.
In normal circumstances, when eminent lawyers pronounce on issues of law and legality, those of us who are not lawyers intervene with some trepidation. I am relaxed on this issue, however, because the ghost in the room is the debate on Prorogation, not Dissolution, and that it went to the Supreme Court. We all know the debates surrounding that and those of us who are not lawyers are emboldened by the defence that the Divisional Court thought 100% in one direction and the Supreme Court thought 100% in the other. Whichever argument you pick, you will have a few top lawyers on your side.
In my view, that whole episode relates to that dreadful Parliament I keep referring to between 2017 and 2019. All that debate, which went to the Supreme Court, derived from the background of a dysfunctional Parliament—a bad case, if you like. So much of the debate we are having now is with that and the judgments that were made hanging over us. The list of dysfunctionalities of that Parliament knows no bounds. I mention one obvious point: there was a Speaker who, on the biggest debate of the day—the referendum result and its consequences—was highly partisan on one side of the argument. In those circumstances, all sorts of other undesirable things follow.
I, for one, very much regret that the Supreme Court decided to get involved in politics at the highest level. I know there are all sorts of disclaimers that it was not doing that, but that is precisely what happened. It is difficult to imagine a more dramatic, higher-profile political issue than that of leaving or not leaving the EU, and the Supreme Court came down decisively on one side of the argument, in practical terms. As soon as the courts are involved in these kinds of highly charged political areas, we are in trouble.
I can certainly see the need for this ouster clause, but I regret the need for it because we should have dealt with this in the simple way of a parliamentary majority. We keep hearing about the three pillars of the constitution: the judiciary, the Executive and the legislature. In my book, and perhaps I am biased, one of those is greater than the other two—a first among equals—and that is Parliament, which is answerable to the public in a way the other two are not.
I regret the need for this ouster clause. I think a far simpler solution is a resolution of Parliament that would never be challenged in the courts. The example of all that happened over Prorogation was a very unfortunate set of circumstances, with the courts becoming involved in the issue, and I hope it is never repeated.

Viscount Stansgate: My Lords, I have been listening to this debate and it has been extremely interesting. I will not detain the House because it is late, but what I find interesting—I am talking more generally about Clause 3, although I fully accept some of the points made about the wording and mission creep—is that this Government are claiming that the Bill simply restores the status quo ante. In fact, it is rather more difficult to restore the status quo ante than you might think.
In my view, the reason why Clause 3 is in the Bill is the Miller cases. The noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, and I disagree on what you might call the direction of travel—we can have a conversation about that some other time—but the Government cannot have it both ways. They cannot claim that they are restoring the status quo ante and, at the same time, make the argument for Clause 3. When the Minister replies, it would be helpful if he at least acknowledged that the Bill does more than restore the status quo ante. I will leave it there, in view of the late hour.

Baroness Smith of Basildon: My Lords, in this debate I find myself in the unusual position of agreeing with almost every speaker—agreeing with something they said and disagreeing with something they said.
I start with the point made by my noble friend Lord Stansgate. If the Bill is merely returning to the status quo ante, as was said, I am not quite clear why we need a clause such as Clause 3. I think it was the noble Lord, Lord Butler, who said that it seems inconceivable to him that the courts would insert themselves into a decision about a general election. As the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, said, the practical consequences of doing so are quite disastrous and it is hard to contemplate the impact that would have on a democratic decision to have a general election.
The elephant in the room that has been alluded to is that everybody, whatever side of the argument they are on, is scarred by the unlawful Prorogation. I appreciate that this is about Dissolution, which is very different to Prorogation, but because of the unlawful Prorogation the Government are concerned that the courts may insert themselves into this decision-making. So, even though they are telling us that it returns us to where we were prior to the Fixed-term Parliaments Act, they still feel the need for belt and braces. Yet there is also the view that it is a step too far and would never be needed anyway.
As the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, pointed out, a neater way of avoiding the courts involving themselves in a decision about a general election, and avoiding bringing the monarch into a controversial political decision—the noble Lord, Lord Butler, commented on this—is for the House of Commons to have a vote. If the Government are concerned that, because of the  way the legislation is drafted without Clause 3, there would be a danger of the courts intervening—in my view, there is not a role for the courts to intervene, but the Government are concerned that there may be—they have this clause. That is the chilling effect that people are concerned about.
This highlights the fact that the Government are not confident that their own legislation does reset. I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, which probably surprises her as much as it surprises me, that it is legislation that tries to deal with shadows, because it is something we all hope will not happen. We have to look at this, and we need some more explanation from the Government as to why they feel it is necessary. It is hard to understand how the courts could and would insert themselves into a decision on a general election. I come back to the amendments in group two, particularly Amendment 3, being a better way to deal with this.
Could the noble Lord also address two things when he replies? Although there are the normal checks and balances of conventions, Parliament and parliamentary behaviour, one of our concerns, which comes back, sideways, to the unlawful Prorogation, is that we have a Prime Minister at the moment who does not really stick to the normal conventions of parliamentary behaviour that we expect. The noble Lord and I have had numerous discussions on this across the Dispatch Box—his face shows no emotion at the moment; I do not want to embarrass him. For example, I think that Prime Minister is the first Prime Minister to have ignored findings on the Ministerial Code, and the first to reject the advice of the House of Lords Appointments Commission and do what he wanted to do. In the same way as the 2017-19 Parliament, which my noble friend referred to as the dysfunctional Parliament, and the unlawful Prorogation influenced our decision, we are affected by the Prime Minister’s behaviour when we look at this. It is the same consideration.
Something is still needed to restore checks and balances. I am not convinced that it is this clause, but I would like to hear some more from the Minister, because most of us would be appalled that the courts would be involved in parliamentary sovereignty, for both practical and political reasons.
Could I get the noble Lord to address one final thing when he responds? I am still not clear about the word “purported”. I looked again at the Joint Committee’s report. Various lawyers, such as the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Hale, and Lord Sumption also commented that, basically, if the Government did something that was outwith their powers, we could do anything about it. If that is the intention behind clause, that is quite damaging. I would find it helpful if the noble Lord could explain why the word “purported” is in there and why it needs to be. I genuinely do not understand why it should be. That seems more dangerous than the clause itself.

Lord True: My Lords, I will certainly seek to do so. I do not wish to pre-empt the Committee in any way. We obviously have other groups to come to. I anticipate that the debates on those will not be quite so lengthy but, given the importance of this amendment, I hope noble Lords will be forbearing if I address it in some detail to place these matters on the record,  mindful as we all should be that arguments put at length in Committee should not be repeated at length on Report.
I took it from what the noble Baroness opposite said that the Labour Party agrees with us that the courts should not come anywhere near this. Other people have obviously argued otherwise. She came out with that other elephant in the room, which was glinting quietly in the mists behind the argument from the noble Lord, Lord Butler. She criticises my right honourable friend Minister. The elements are mixed in my right honourable friend the Prime Minister. He has apologised for actions, and things are subject to inquiries. My right honourable friend the Prime Minister is subject to the most unprecedented campaign of personal vilification that I have been aware of in modern politics in my lifetime. Notwithstanding that, I do not think that that justifies ad hominem legislation of any sort. This point was addressed by the noble Lord, Lord Faulks.
The noble Lord, Lord Butler, based his argument on a claim that the Government sought “totalitarian” powers, with an advised plural. This matter concerns one process, as has been pointed out by several people who have spoken, and one process alone: the Dissolution of Parliament and the precipitation of a general election. I find nothing remotely totalitarian in a Government asking the public to be the Government’s judge.
Dissolution remains one of the most fundamental non-justiciable prerogative powers. Nobody has argued that it should be justiciable; some people said, “We do not need to have an ouster clause because it is obviously not”, et cetera. Dissolution is unique for two reasons. First, the constraints on it are democratic; the judgment on a Prime Minister’s decision to call an election is the electorate. There is no vacuum of accountability, as the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, said. What greater judgment and punishment can be meted out if a Prime Minister abuses that power than the loss of power, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown, told us? It is the ultimate political reprimand. Secondly, the security of the process of calling an election, and the election itself, underpins the integrity and health of our democracy. It is critical that exercise of the Dissolution prerogative, including the preliminary steps leading to the exercise of the power, are not made insecure. This prerogative power is inherently political in nature and it is not suitable for review by the courts. There is no legal standard that the courts can usefully apply to review the preliminary steps and the Dissolution decision itself.
This has been the view of the courts, as we have heard. Lord Roskill, in the landmark GCHQ case in 1985, said the courts’ right of challenge must
“depend upon the subject matter of the prerogative power which is exercised”.
He agreed that the Dissolution of Parliament was not
“susceptible to judicial review because”
its
“nature and subject matter is such as not to be amenable to the judicial process.”
Furthermore, as Lord Justice Taylor noted in Everett:
“At the top of the scale of executive functions under the prerogative are matters of high policy, of which examples were given by their Lordships; making treaties, making war, dissolving Parliament, mobilising the Armed Forces. Clearly those matters, and no doubt a number of others, are not justiciable.”
However, despite these clear directions from some of the most esteemed judicial authorities, in our judgment the direction of travel in the case law makes a clear and explicit statement of non-justiciability necessary.
As the Independent Review of Administrative Law noted—and I pay tribute to my noble friend Lord Faulks for his role in that and for his reasoned and intelligent approach in leading that review,
“the past 40 years or so have seen a steady retreat within the law on judicial review away from the view that exercises of certain public powers are by their very nature non-justiciable in favour of the view that the exercises of those powers are either justiciable or reviewable on some grounds but not others.”
It is this reality that makes it necessary to include this clause leaving no room for doubt. The clause has been carefully drafted, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, divined, respecting the message from the courts that only, in the words of Lord Justice Laws, with
“the most clear and explicit words”
can Parliament exclude their jurisdiction. I am afraid, therefore, that when noble Lords suggest that reviving the prerogative power would suffice—this touches on the point raised by the noble Viscount—as the courts would be excluded from reviewing a prerogative power, that does not take into account the direction of travel in the case law and would be to ignore the clear message of the courts themselves. That was the gravamen of the impressive speech of the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, with which, in substance, I agreed, and also the submission of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown.
Noble Lords raised concerns with the specific wording of the clause, in particular the words “purported”, “limit” and “extent”, which I will address in detail. First, I emphasise that this clause says what is necessary and no more. Each of its words is necessary, in our judgment, to preserve the non-justiciability of the prerogative of Dissolution. Drafting this clause has been a technical challenge for counsel, and it has required a response to a range of case law. The purpose of the clause is to be as clear as possible about the “no-go” sign around the Dissolution and calling of Parliament, to preserve the sphere of political decision-making that provides the context for the exercise of the prerogative power of Dissolution and the preliminary steps leading to the exercise of that power. The Independent Review of Administrative Law, which had the benefit of seeing the Government’s clause, did not find it disproportionate but rather agreed that it can be regarded as a “codifying clause” which
“simply restates the position that everyone understood obtained before the Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011 was passed”.
I can tell the noble Viscount that it was the view of the Independent Review of Administrative Law that the clause restates the position.
I turn to the amendments tabled by my noble friend Lord Norton. I shall explain why the references to “purported” are needed. I think it was the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, who questioned “purported” in Committee; as a lay man, I must say that “purported” sounds an interesting word, to put it no finer. We heard an explanation of it earlier from my noble friend Lord Faulks.
As I said, the ordinary standards of administrative law as applied by the courts are simply not a suitable framework against which to judge the exercise of these prerogative powers or decisions relating to them. That applies particularly in the use of “purported” as understood by administrative law. It should not fall to the courts to assess a request to dissolve Parliament by reference to whether relevant considerations have been taken into account or irrelevant ones have been discounted; by reference to whether the request is rational or has been made for a proper purpose; or by reference to whether a fair process has been followed or whether there has been a failure to satisfy a legitimate expectation. That would be to ask the wrong questions in the wrong forum.
The word “purported” has been included in response to two cases in particular. I know that many noble Lords will be very familiar with the cases but perhaps it is useful to consider their particular relevance to the drafting of this clause. In the case of Anisminic Ltd v Foreign Compensation Commission, the Foreign Compensation Act 1950 contained a so-called ouster clause that provided that a “determination” made by the Foreign Compensation Commission shall not be
“called into question in any court of law”.
However, the House of Lords held that the ouster clause did not prevent it inquiring into whether the commission had made an error in law—in that case, by proceeding on a misconstruction of the order. It held that a determination invalidated by an error of law was not a determination at all; rather, it was merely a “purported” determination, or a nullity. The simple reference in the ouster clause to a “determination” of the commission did not cover purported determinations and therefore did not prevent the court looking at whether the commission had made a correct determination in law on the question of eligibility to claim compensation.
In that case, Lord Reid explained that
“it is a well-established principle that a provision ousting the ordinary jurisdiction of the court must be construed strictly—meaning, I think, that if such a provision is reasonably capable of having two meanings, that meaning shall be taken which preserves the ordinary jurisdiction of the court.”
If Parliament had intended the ouster clause to cover purported determinations, Lord Reid said, he would have expected to find something much more specific than a “bald” reference to a determination. That is an important consideration to bear in mind. It is for that reason that we cannot rely in Clause 3 on a bald reference to the exercise of the revived powers and decisions relating to those powers. References to “purported” are required to make plain the intention that it is not for the courts to examine a Dissolution and calling of Parliament against our administrative law framework.
That position is underlined by the recent case of Privacy International v Investigatory Powers Tribunal in 2019, in which the Supreme Court ruled that an ouster clause in the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 did not oust the court’s jurisdiction to review a judgment of the Investigatory Powers Tribunal for error of law. Here, Lord Lloyd-Jones remarked that it was a striking feature that the ouster in the 2000 Act did not mention purported decisions, given that the drafter must have been aware of Anisminic. He expressed  an expectation that those drafting legislation would have regard to the case law and make it clear if “purported decisions” are intended to be outside the jurisdiction of the courts. We submit that in this context, and based on the clear views expressed by the courts, it is reasonable that the Government should seek to draft Clause 3 in this clear and unequivocal way.
In short, we have included “purported” in Clause 3 to give effect to the principle that matters concerning the Dissolution and calling of Parliament are best judged by the electorate, not by the courts. This wording is essential to achieve that point.

Baroness Smith of Basildon: I am sorry to interrupt the Minister, and I am grateful for the detail that he is going into. I am not a lawyer, but I am not the only person in your Lordships’ House tonight who is not. Can the Minister say, in lay man’s language, what he understands a “purported decision” to be? Can he give an example?

Lord True: My Lords, as noble Lords know, I am a lay man. I have read out the legal advice that I have been given that it should not fall to the courts to assess by reference to whether relevant considerations have been taken into account or irrelevant ones have been discounted. I said that earlier in my speech. I will write to the noble Baroness if the words that I have put before Parliament are not sufficient, but they are the words that I have on advice.

Baroness Smith of Basildon: My Lords, I suspect that those words are sufficient for lawyers, but I think the Minister’s understanding of this might be as great as mine at the moment, so I will perhaps take advice between now and Report so that I fully understand the implications of what he saying—because I do not think he is able to give me further detail either.

Lord True: My Lords, I seek to put into the record the points put to me by those who argue and maintain that this is necessary.
I will further address the specific question of bad faith that was raised. This touches on another area around “purported”. Bad faith was mentioned by Lord Reid in Anisminic as one of the ways in which a decision may be treated as a nullity. Case law suggests that, if an exercise of power by a public body is taken in bad faith, it is unlawful and will be quashed by the court. A decision is taken in bad faith if it is taken dishonestly or maliciously, although the courts have also equated bad faith with any deliberate improper purpose. Therein lies the challenge. Again, there is no suitable standard by which a court can judge what an “improper purpose” is. By what standards can the courts assess the legitimate or illegitimate purpose—

Lord Beith: I want to clarify something. Clearly, one reason to include the word “purported” is to deal with the annulling of decisions that have begun to be put into effect. But the Minister referred earlier to the importance of protecting the political space for the particular decision involved in this legislation: the calling of an election. Is it his understanding that this is quite unlike any other exercise of executive power?  If it is not, I shall be even more worried because it would bring about situations in which it is generally publicly accepted that the courts were right to annul, for example, a bad faith decision or a decision that has taken none of the processes that should go with it.

Lord True: I heard what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, and the noble Lord, Lord Beith, said and I was going to, and will, come on to this point. I am trying to put a considered position on the record for the benefit of the House between Committee and Report.
By what standards would a court assess the legitimate or illegitimate purpose, or for that matter the impropriety or propriety, of a Dissolution decision by a Prime Minister? Is a Government calling a snap election because that may be to their advantage in some way an improper purpose? Where is the line to be drawn? Ultimately, these are matters that political actors and the electorate, not, I respectfully suggest, judges and lawyers, are best placed to opine on.
Therefore, although bad faith is suitable in the context of behaviour seen as, for example, commercially unacceptable or a deliberate improper exercise of an ordinary discretion by a public authority, it is not a term that is apt in the context of the Dissolution and calling of Parliament. This is something that is inherently political or, in the words of Lord Justice Taylor, a matter of “high policy”. Dissolution is simply not amenable to these legal tests.
I turn to the second part—a further amendment to delete “limits or extent” from the clause. Again, I am grateful to my noble friend and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, for meeting me prior to Committee to explain their thinking. I hope that what I am about to say reassures your Lordships’ Committee of the necessity and proportionality of Clause 3(c).
As with the inclusion of “purported”, the words “limits” and “extent” are also a necessary response to case law. Clause 3 is drafted in response to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Miller II; that is clear. By reference to certain constitutional principles, the Supreme Court established a legal limit on the power to prorogue Parliament and concluded that it had been exceeded. The point we want to make is that by framing the issue in Miller II as being about the limits of the power to prorogue Parliament, the court was able to put the arguments about non-justiciability to one side.
In analysing the importance of Miller II, the Independent Review of Administrative Law observed that
“it creates the potential for the courts to circumvent the ‘no-go’ signs currently mounted around the exercise of prerogative powers in relation to ‘matters of high policy ... [such as] … dissolving Parliament”.
Therefore, Clause 3(c) seeks to make it clear that in the context of the Dissolution and calling of Parliament, the “no-go” signs should not be circumvented in this way.
My second point is about what standards or limits a court may seek to impose. In Miller II, the Supreme Court considered that two principles of constitutional law were relevant in establishing the relevant limit on the power to prorogue; namely, parliamentary sovereignty and parliamentary accountability. The Prorogation of  Parliament is of course different from the Dissolution and calling of Parliament, as we have heard more than once tonight. In particular, the latter enables the electorate to deliver their verdict on the incumbent Government.
However, one might conclude that a court could look to impose a limit on the revived prerogative powers to dissolve and call Parliament, analogous to the limit imposed on the power to prorogue Parliament in Miller II, and in effect require in law a Government, of whatever persuasion and under whatever lead, to have a reasonable justification for calling an election in certain circumstances.
To paraphrase the independent review, in the case of Dissolution, deleting the words “limits” and “extent” would allow the courts to impose
“various conditions on when such a power can be said to have been validly exercised”,
and then declare
“that the power has not been exercised at all if those conditions are not observed.”
The Government consider that this would be an entirely inappropriate limit on the revived prerogative powers.
As I have argued, the Dissolution and calling of Parliament are inherently political decisions that are entirely unsuitable for review by the courts. More specifically, with relevance to Clause 3(c), we do not believe that it is appropriate for the courts to impose legal limits of this sort on when a Parliament may be dissolved and a general election called.
In reply to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, we contend that this clause is not contrary to the rule of law. The Government agree with the independent review, which said:
“It is … for Parliament to decide what the law … should be, and it is for the courts to interpret what Parliament has said.”
The majority of the Joint Committee also concluded that it is
“not inherently incompatible with the rule of law”
for Parliament
“to designate certain matters as ones which”
should
“be resolved in the political … sphere”.
I come now to the point of precedent raised by the noble Lord, Lord Beith, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, for whose conversations I was very grateful. They asked a specific question and voiced their concerns that this clause sets a precedent. It is not so. As I have explained, Clause 3 is a very specific clause drafted with a particular purpose in mind; namely, to confirm a widely shared view of the nature of the prerogative powers to dissolve and call Parliament. For this reason, it is more accurately described, to use the phraseology of the independent review, as a “codifying clause”—a clause that in effect seeks to prevent the courts in future declaring something to be justiciable that is already currently understood to be non-justiciable.
In this case, it is seeking to ensure the non-justiciability of the prerogative powers for the Dissolution and calling of Parliament, which traditionally the courts have had no role in reviewing—nothing more. This is a bespoke exclusion to address this precise task.

Lord Faulks: This may be an observation intended to help the Minister. Since the Bill was drafted, the Judicial Review and Courts Bill has been introduced. It contains an ouster clause, but one that is qualified as opposed to absolute, so the argument that this is being used as some form of basis for future ouster clauses seems to be defied by recent legislative practice.

Lord True: I will come to that particular piece of legislation—definitely—since it has been raised. To complete what I was saying, the prerogative power to dissolve Parliament is the ultimate expression of humility on the part of the Executive, placing its future and power into the hands of the people. We therefore believe that Clause 3 is appropriate and necessary, as judgment on the Government’s actions in such matters should be left solely to the electorate at the polling booth. I stress that we are asking Parliament to consider these arguments and endorse this clause in this Bill—nothing more. The Judicial Review and Courts Bill, by way of contrast, contains an ouster clause to prevent the judicial review of decisions of the Upper Tribunal to refuse permission to appeal decisions of the First-Tier Tribunal.
I turn to the potential consequences of the amendments proposed. Deleting the wording or the clause would undoubtedly make the dissolution prerogative more susceptible to potential litigation. In effect, the decisions in Anisminic, Privacy International and Miller II potentially offer a route for a court, or more precisely a mischievous litigator, to derail an election process by taking the Government to court for calling an election for political imperatives with which they may disagree. The suggestion by noble Lords to delete “purported decisions” is equally disagreeable, for it would arguably provide litigators with a route to try to delay an election through a court case that could examine why an election has been called on one date rather than another. This, I think, we can all agree would be entirely undesirable.
The clause prevents political litigation about the timing of elections; litigation that I am sure your Lordships dread as much as I do and—I agree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood—I am sure much of the judiciary would dread. Let me emphasise what it is that we are trying to protect: it is nothing less than the legal certainty of our elections, which underpins our democracy. If the courts can vitiate a Dissolution decision, the principle of the legal certainty of our elections is violated and the courts are inescapably drawn, as the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, said, into making decisions and weighing political imperatives that they are not equipped to do.
If there is an intervention, is the election timetable then suspended? Are the people to be informed that a court might deny them the right to have their democratic say? If the court process moves slowly, could the situation arise where a court then dismisses or questions an election result? Asking the courts to review a Dissolution decision is to ask them to weigh the political merits and imperatives of the decision; it is inherent in the nature of the question. If the courts can vitiate a Dissolution decision, the principle of the legal certainty of our elections is violated and the courts are inescapably drawn into making decisions and weighing political imperatives.
More practically, we must consider the risk that we might send a signal to mischievous and politically motivated litigators that they can disrupt the process with vexatious and frivolous claims against Dissolution. Even the threat of such a court case would be disruptive to the process, drag our judges into the political fray and cause huge expense and delay and a frustration of the democratic process. There is no surer way of risking the reputation of the judicial system among many sections of the British people, no surer way for the courts to be seen as a political institution, and no surer way to drag the sovereign into politics. These are not scenarios for which your Lordships can possibly wish. It is wise to take all the necessary steps to be absolutely certain, without a shadow of doubt, to ensure that these scenarios do not occur.
Finally, let me directly confront the case put by the noble Lord, Lord Butler of Brockwell, that, by removing a judicial oversight, this clause allows a licence for the Executive—far from it. The exercise of the prerogative power is a question for the political, not the judicial, sphere, and the remedies and constraints are in that political sphere.
Our constitution has for centuries proved well able to avoid extremities and has provided for accountable checks on the Executive, and these checks are both pre and post hoc. In terms of pre-hoc checks, a Prime Minister requests a Dissolution of the sovereign which, in exceptional circumstances, can be refused. In parallel, the core constitutional principle that the sovereign must not be drawn into party politics acts as an important deterrent to improper requests being made. That is an immense latent force in our constitutional arrangements. Furthermore, the Government, in response to the Joint Committee, amended the Bill prior to its introduction to Parliament so that the statutory election period will be triggered automatically by the Dissolution of Parliament. This will ensure that the theoretical possibility of a Dissolution without an ensuing election period is eliminated.
There are also post-hoc checks and incentives on the Executive that have worked for many years, effectively compelling Parliament to be called as soon as feasible after an election. The Government of the day must be able to command the confidence of the elected House. Unduly and unnecessarily delaying the calling or meeting of a new Parliament is not in the interest of any Government seeking to make progress on the mandate it has received at a general election. Most importantly, the Dissolution and calling of Parliament are powers that pave the way to a general election and a new Parliament. Again, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown, reminded us, the actions of the Prime Minister and the Government are subject to the judgment of the electorate and, in due course, to that of a new Parliament.
If a Prime Minister acts—as we alleged one might—nefariously, even if a Prime Minister acts contrary to prior expectations and past practice, that will be judged by the electorate. It is also available to that new Parliament to undertake the nuclear option of passing a Motion of no confidence on the new Government, almost immediately, if it wishes, on an amendment to the Queen’s Speech. These practical constraints on the  Executive have served us well for many generations. As we see, the checks on Dissolution are practical and political; they should not be legal.
I apologise for speaking at such length, but I hope noble Lords will understand the importance of putting these points on the record for your Lordships to consider between now and Report. If any other points have been raised in the debate, I will, of course, write. I sincerely hope that noble Lords will reconsider their amendments and urge them to join the view of the other place to not permit the entry of the courts and support this clause

Lord Norton of Louth: My Lords, I very much agree with the noble Lord, Lord Beith, that it has been a very good debate in light of the quality of the contributions that we have heard. I think it demonstrates the value of this House in being able to hear and rehearse these arguments.
I noticed yesterday when the noble Baroness, Lady Fookes, was presiding over our proceedings and the Minister was at the Dispatch Box that the Minister resigned. When I saw that the noble Baroness, Lady Fookes, was in the Chair this evening and the Minister was at the Dispatch Box I wondered for a moment whether something might happen.
My noble friend Lord True will not be surprised to hear that I do not agree with the argument that he has advanced. I retain my points in opening that this clause, particularly the use of the word purported, does not restore the status quo ante and is objectionable on principle. I have previously quoted the late Lord Simon of Glaisdale, who once opposed an amendment being brought forward for the avoidance of doubt on the grounds that there was no doubt to be avoided. I think we may be in a similar situation here. It is quite clear that the courts would not get involved in this, despite what has been claimed about the direction of case law recently. I do not think the issue really arises, in part for the reasons given by my noble friend Lord True. The problems he adumbrated a few moments ago would be reasons why the courts would stay completely clear of entertaining any case relating to this.
My objection is really on the grounds of principle. I do not think it appropriate to try to limit the power of the courts because one disagrees with particular decisions of theirs. It is objectionable on principle. The argument has been advanced that it sets a precedent; my noble friend Lord True said, “No, this does not set a precedent; it is a bespoke solution.” The problem, I fear, is that on future occasions, Governments will find a bespoke solution based on what is included in this Bill.
I maintain my position. I hear what the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, said about the purpose being to keep the courts out of politics, but my fear is that putting “purported” in is designed to keep the courts out of the law. So I am not persuaded by what my noble friend Lord True said. I am sure that we will come back to this on Report but, for the moment, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment 4 withdrawn.
Amendments 5 and 6 not moved.
Clause 3 agreed.

  
Clause 4: Automatic dissolution of Parliament after five years

Amendment 7

Lord Wallace of Saltaire: Moved by Lord Wallace of Saltaire
7: Clause 4, page 2, line 2, leave out “If it has not been dissolved earlier,”Member’s explanatory statementThis is a probing amendment aimed at debating the expectation of how long a Parliament should be in normal circumstances.

Lord Wallace of Saltaire: My Lords, before I speak to Amendments 7 and 9, I want to say one or two things about the conditions for Report. Here we are, late at night. We have just listened to the Minister make what I think is the longest speech I have ever heard to sum up in Committee, at 30 minutes, and there are still some important issues to debate. I appreciate that the length of his speech reflected the complexity and importance of the issues in a constitutional Bill; that being the case, we will need the time on Report, with a full House and without the enforcement of unusually short speeches, to discuss them further.
The House of Commons went through the Committee, Report and Third Reading stages of this Bill in less than two hours—not good for a constitutional Bill. This House is going through its Committee stage in a few hours, stretching late into the night. I very much hope that, when we come to Report, the usual channels will ensure that we start in prime time and address the very important issues, particularly in Clauses 2 and 3, at length and with the House listening.
Amendments 7 and 9 are probing amendments on the balance between frequent elections and regular elections and, secondly, about what time of the year they should be held if possible. I speak as someone with experience of having fought two elections in one year, the first in February and the second in late October. Yesterday, I talked to a former Conservative MP who said that he remembered having the impression of being damp for an entire month during a winter election. It is good for democracy if we have elections on a regular basis and in good weather in the summer; that is why I suggest that, where possible, we should have elections in June.
It is also good because regular elections allow for a longer period to know when controlled expenditure should be imposed and when the Opposition are entitled to talk to the Civil Service to prepare for a potential change of government. The prime ministerial prerogative to jump elections when they think is most to their advantage—we have not yet talked about incumbency advantage—deprives the Opposition of the advantage to prepare properly for governance afterwards. Good governance matters to an effective constitutional democracy.
I am also concerned about the effective monitoring and administration of campaigns. I go and talk to my local electoral registration team from time to time; my ear has been bent on the difficulties of running election campaigns at short notice. I heard anger in Bradford some months ago about Conservative MPs saying, “There is no problem—all it requires is for staff to work harder if it comes to it”.
I tabled the amendments to test the question: how often do we want to have elections, and do we wish to leave it entirely open as to whether they are in December, January or June? In my opinion, the default should be June, not coinciding with the May elections or devolved national elections. The exceptions should be at times of the year not including winter. That is the purpose of my amendments.

Lord Rooker: My Lords, I have found the debate fascinating today. I thank the Minister for the detailed responses he has given. I have not changed my mind on any of the issues, and I very much support the noble Lords, Lord Norton and Lord Butler, and my noble friend Lord Grocott on the issues they have raised.
I looked around the House and realised I was probably the only person present who fought and won both the elections in 1974. I have been sitting here thinking what the weather was like. I know what it was like. On 28 February, it was snowing as I was still knocking up at 9.30 pm out in the constituency; it was a very important period in my life. My noble friend Lady Taylor asked me during one of the debates whether I would have supported a quick election a month after I had won in 1974. I was physically whacked at that point. Therefore, I was quite content, because the message came through after we all assembled that there would have to be another election later in the year. But that is not really what I want to raise.
I am going to devalue the debate; I am sorry about that. In respect of the length of a Parliament, I accept that the Bill restores the status quo; that is probably the least important part of the Bill. But in my view that is no excuse not to put the issue on the record for the future. I am going to repeat much of what I said on Second Reading. Five years is not the norm for general elections in the UK, to start with. I am no academic and no expert, but I know in the past that there was a legal maximum of three years, and there was a period where there was a legal maximum of seven years. I think the maximum has been five years since the Parliament Act 1911, but five-year Parliaments are rare.
Going early is a clear advantage to the sitting Government. That is why, during the 1970s, 1980s and probably 1990s, I became convinced that I was in favour of a fixed-term Parliament, because I could see the manipulation that was going on and the temptation for Governments to manipulate the economy, basically. In some ways, I regret that the Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011 failed. It was designed to fail, almost. I accept it is going, and I am not trying to bring it back, but there are some difficulties with going back to the status quo ante.
There have been 20 general elections since 1945. Thirteen have been early, and the sitting Prime Minister won 10 out of those 13. Those 20, between 1945 and the last general election, were within 74 years, so we are talking about an election just under every four years. My experience in the other place was of seven general elections, and I sat for 27 years, so we averaged just under four years.
It was worse, in a way, not knowing when elections were going to be. My party was not a rich party. We had no offices in the city. Each time, I had to find somewhere for a headquarters, not knowing when the  election was, and get phones in. It was difficult in those days, but nevertheless it was a joy to be in the other place for so long.
Giving the Prime Minister the choice of date is an advantage in the electoral system, and that is what I am against. I realise that building the checks and balances is not easy, because for every check there are disadvantages either way. But I do not think that it should be built into the system. As I said, I accept that we are abandoning the fixed term that we brought in in 2011. What I object to is the maximum length, which should be more like what we are actually used to, which is four years rather than five. There is some support for this view. People think that Governments run out of steam after four years, and there is some evidence for that but my point is not about it. My objection is quite different. Governments that seek to rig the electoral system, as this one is attempting to do, should be more limited as to how long it is before they meet the electorate. I want to shorten the time. I almost put an amendment down for three years to strengthen the point that I wanted to make—which I made at Second Reading, but when you have a good story to tell it is worth repeating.
This is nothing personal to any of the Ministers either here or in the other place, but there is a pattern whereby the Government are attempting overall to rig the electoral system. There is a succession of Bills and regulations before Parliament or due to come before Parliament, and I have a little list, which is not exhaustive, of their intentions: voter suppression, straight out of the Trump playbook, which we are about to get; action against the courts, shrinking their ability to hold the ruling party to account—that is the reality— curbing citizens’ right to protest; restricting the freedom of the press by removing the public interest defence; moves against election monitors and the referee in a concerted attack on the Electoral Commission, whose powers have never been as strong as I thought they should have been; widening the scope of the Official Secrets Act; and open attempts before our eyes to control the media via Ofcom.
There is a pattern here. We deal with each little bit as it comes along and have debates like we have had today, of a very high quality and forensic in looking at what is a very small Bill with massive implications—but the debate is in the context of this Bill. We have arguments already flattened by the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, who said, “No, the ouster clause won’t be used as a precedent, because there’s another Bill that hasn’t got the same ouster clause in.” This can make the point, as the noble Lord, Lord Norton, did, that the draftsman will find a way. I am very disappointed that the draftsmen have co-operated with all this, because they have operated under instructions. There are all these issues and others, which I will not go over. I quoted Lord Puttnam at Second Reading, who gave a couple of further examples.
It all makes it harder for a Government to lose power. That is what the pattern actually creates. Would a four-year limit stop this? No. I am just trying to shorten it from five. Would it limit the damage? Well, maybe. Is it worth raising? Oh yes, because I intend to raise it at every possible opportunity; not just on  this Bill, but on all the others as they come. I am not alone. There are the Select Committees that were mentioned earlier, the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee and the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee. We have had two incredibly powerful reports published just before Christmas from this House—the unelected House—about the threats to our democratic process, which is really important.
This is where the tragedy is in some ways. I would love to be able to switch off from what I have now and pop back to the other place for a couple of years and say, “By the way, it’s not quite like we think it is. Things have got bad—it’s a little bit back in time.” That is not possible, however, because I came to this place ignorant of its powers, even though I had been down there and was a Minister as I swapped over. There is massive ignorance among the Members of both places about our roles and what we are doing.
I do not have a solution to this because the argument is always, “You’re unelected, you don’t count.” But because we are unelected and we do not have a vote in a general election, we are disinterested in some ways. I see no problem in this place saying to the other place to think again, because we are only a sub-committee of the other place. All our powers are to ask it to think again. At every opportunity, the House of Commons rightly has the last word. It does not matter what happens—it has the last word in every case.
I know that in extremes the Parliament Act can be used, but it been used only twice in my time. It is still the case, however, that the Commons has the final word. That is the case I always put across when doing the Peers in Schools programme. Our powers are incredibly limited, but they mean we can say, “Think again”. Sometimes we say, “And again”. I think there are a couple of examples where it was three times, then this place—obviously, as it is unelected—said, “You’ve had a good think about it, we’ll leave it alone.” That is our function. The fact is that they did not change that in the Bill.
There is an interchange sometimes when Ministers talk about Parliament but are actually talking about the Government. Government and Parliament are interchangeable—well, to Ministers they might be, but to the rest of the population they are not. Ministers say that Parliament has decided, but they mean that the majority controlled by the Government in the other place has decided. It is the Government who have decided. The whipping system and the timetable system have decided. In some ways I greatly regret the timetabling system used down there, but we had good reasons. I have lived through guillotines and I know what the rules were. What was it—100 hours to get a guillotine for wasting time upstairs in Committee? That is why timetabling was brought in.
The fact is that we receive Bills in this place that have not been thoroughly examined in the elected Chamber and that is a tragedy. There was a time when I tried, as a Minister, to suggest that we ought to have Bills with the bits that had not been discussed highlighted, but it is incredibly complicated to say which sections were not debated or looked at; you just cannot do it. We have to use our common sense and gumption.
The fact is that they are not doing their job in the Commons. That is the reality. Their job is to keep an eye on the Government and to question what the Executive are doing—and they are simply not doing it. They are distracted by other things, such as trying to do the job of local councillors for a start. It is easy for me to say that because it was not like that. I do not want to say that those were the good old days and throw back, but the House of Commons is not doing its job of scrutinising the Executive and we are receiving legislation that has not been properly scrutinised. Then, unfortunately, the Government say, “Oh, it’s the House of Lords, always defeating the Government.” We are not; we are simply saying that we want the Commons to do its job. That is what we are asking them to do.
In this case, I would be astonished if Clause 3 is still in the Bill when it leaves this place. There is the amendment supported by the Cross Benches and the noble Lord, Lord Butler, about letting Parliament decide on Dissolution; if you have one, you do not need the other. It is simple. Keep the judges away—I absolutely agree with that—but there is an easy way to do it: let the elected House do it.
I have made my point, but I shall keep coming back. For each Bill and regulation that comes along, I will recite the same list, because there is a pattern and the penny has to drop at some point.

Viscount Stansgate: My Lords, I very much enjoyed the speech of my noble friend, for whom—I hope he will allow me to say—I have a great deal of affection. I am very interested in the list that he has and will use again; there is great merit in much of it.
I remember the weather on 28 February 1974, and it was shocking—appalling. I think my noble friend said that there was snow where he was; in the constituency where I was working it was solid rain, but I will say that the turnout improved compared to the previous election because it was an election that people thought mattered. The other thing about the weather, referred to by a noble Lord when he talked about the time of year that he would like elections to be held, is that I remember the weather in June 1970—it was gorgeous where I was. As I am about to tell the House on Friday, I cast my first vote in the election of June 1970. It was wonderful weather and it was an election called early by the then Prime Minister—and he lost. That was my first recollection of general elections: you can be very disappointed.
I hope my noble friend will not press his Amendment 8 to a vote, but I would find it difficult to join him if he did, because there is an element of flexibility in this. For more than 100 years, five years has been the standard length of a Parliament, and there is no reason to go beyond that. As he says, in his own experience—he has had a great deal of experience in another place in here—the period between elections averaged about four years. Therefore, without legislating, I think you will find that if you keep the period of five years, in practice events will unfold in such a way as to make it an average of about four years over a period of many Parliaments.

Baroness Smith of Basildon: My Lords, I rise briefly, if only to remind your Lordships’ House that the Labour Chief Whip, the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, and I were not able to vote in 1974, but that is probably not a good reason for rising to the Dispatch Box at this time of night.
I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Rooker for raising a number of issues that have concerned this House as a whole. I think it was my noble friend Lord Coaker who, during the debate on the police Bill last Monday, reminded the House that we were discussing measures to curtail protests that even Margaret Thatcher would not have contemplated during the worst times—as she would have seen it—of the miners’ strikes. We have moved a long way in what we think of as acceptable.
I point out that in 1838 the Chartists had six demands. All have been met, and we have gone beyond on some, such as the universal male suffrage that they wanted—we have improved on that—except for the one demand of theirs that has never been met, which is for annual elections. I am not making that case.

Baroness Scott of Bybrook: I thank noble Lords; I am very grateful to the noble Lords, Lord Wallace of Saltaire and Lord Rooker, for tabling these amendments, which have initiated what has been an interesting short debate, if not necessarily always on the amendments. In 1974, I remember pushing a pushchair and delivering literature, though not necessarily for the Labour Party of the noble Lord, Lord Rooker.
If noble Lords do not mind, I will stick to the amendments and not answer any further questions. The Bill makes express provision for Parliament to automatically dissolve five years after it has first met. This is the most straightforward way to calculate the five-year term. It also remains the case that your Lordships’ House has an absolute veto on legislation to extend the life of any Parliament.
I first turn to the question of the length of parliamentary terms. I have heard the argument for a four-year term, and I heard from the noble Viscount, Lord Stansgate, that he does not necessarily agree with the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, on this. However, the Government remain of the very strong view that five years is the right maximum length for any Parliament.
A maximum five-year term allows the Government time to undertake and implement their programme without having to start any electioneering. This is an important issue that I do not think the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, took into account as he did not mention it. Any Government have to deliver on the programme that is in their manifesto. Five years is a maximum period which I and the Government believe balances sensible, long-term government with ensuring that a Government and Parliament are accountable to the electorate in a timely manner.
In fact, we can that see parliamentary terms have developed their own effective and flexible rhythm. A strong Government seeking a fresh mandate might seek a Dissolution after four years. Anything less than four years is usually a sign of some political crisis or emergency. Often, Parliaments are dissolved for political necessity rather than choice, to put a policy or political question to the electorate or to resolve a  political crisis. Moreover, shorter maximum terms invariably mean earlier speculation about whether a Parliament will see out its full term. This speculation does not serve Parliament, the public or businesses well. The former Cabinet Secretary noted in evidence at PACAC that longer-term Parliaments and longer-term tenures for both senior civil servants and Ministers would all be very good for Governments, who are increasingly having to face up to very long-term issues, as we have seen recently.
Finally, this question was reviewed by the Joint Committee, which did not question the starting premise that five years is the appropriate duration for parliamentary terms and the life cycle of a Parliament.
I will now address the amendment proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Wallace of Saltaire, on the timing of elections. The noble Lord has reflected on the experience of the electorate in December 2019 and observed that winter elections are not desirable. I hope your Lordships will allow me to relate Stanley Baldwin’s comments on the impossibility of finding a time for an election that suits everyone. On 23 October 1935, when seeking a Dissolution, Mr Baldwin observed on the timing of elections:
“Therefore I have long come to the conclusion that you must rule out the spring and summer months because of financial business. You must rule out August and September because of the holidays. You are left with the autumn, but in no circumstances must you run into any interference with the Christmas trade.”—[Official Report, Commons, 23/10/1935; col. 154.]
Those light-hearted remarks contain an important kernel of truth.
Certainly, outside times of political tumult when exceptional elections are necessary, it may well be the case that a Prime Minister would prefer not to call on the public to venture out to cast their vote in the depths of winter. I share the noble Lord’s sentiment that winter elections do not provide the most ideal conditions for queuing at a polling station or canvassing from door to door. The election in 2019 was, of course, exceptional and was called to bring an end to a period of extended parliamentary deadlock.
Nevertheless, the purpose of the Bill is to provide for a system that will serve successive Governments. As the 2011 Act has taught us, we should not draft our constitutional arrangements in response to one event. There is no guarantee that, in the future, an election will not again be required in December—or February, as in 1974, which we have heard about. So it would not be wise to legislate in the long term for an event that was an exception to the rule. Our arrangements need to be adaptable. That is the important point.
The challenge of the approach set out in the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Wallace, is that it prevents the flexibility necessary for a Government to respond to particular circumstances. As such, I suggest to the noble Lord that to subject the timing of elections to this particular constraint—even if Parliaments do not normally run their full term—would run counter to that objective.
The purpose of the Bill is to revive arrangements that have stood, and will continue to stand, the test of time. I am grateful to the noble Lords, Lord Wallace and Lord Rooker, for stimulating this fascinating  discussion but I hope that your Lordships’ Committee will agree with me that Clause 4, unamended, is the most suitable approach to achieve that aim. I therefore urge the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

Lord Wallace of Saltaire: I beg leave to withdraw the amendment, noting that we may return on at least one of these amendments on Report. That remains to be discussed.
Amendment 7 withdrawn.
Amendments 8 and 9 not moved.
Clause 4 agreed.
Clause 5 agreed.

  
Clause 6: Extent, commencement and short title

Amendment 10

Lord Wallace of Saltaire: Moved by Lord Wallace of Saltaire
10: Clause 6, page 2, line 13, leave out subsection (3) and insert—“(3) This Act comes into force when a revised Dissolution Principles document has been laid before Parliament and—(a) the revised Dissolution Principles document has been approved by a resolution of the House of Commons; and(b) the House of Lords has debated a motion to take note of the revised Dissolution Principles document. (3A) The Dissolution Principles document under subsection (3) must be revised to refer to a “request” from the Prime Minister to the Sovereign to dissolve Parliament.”Member’s explanatory statementThis amendment seeks to implement a recommendation from the Joint Committee on the Fixed-term Parliaments Act to revise the Dissolution Principles document.

Lord Wallace of Saltaire: My Lords, the purpose of the two amendments in this group is to draw attention to recommendations made in the Joint Committee report and in a number of other parliamentary reports to which the Government have responded weakly and inadequately.
Paragraph 15 of the Joint Committee report states:
“The move to reduce executive dominance in key parts of the UK constitutional arrangements … was accompanied by a desire to clarify and make public the understanding of constitutional conventions.”
It then references the White Paper, The Governance of Britain, of 2007, and the drafting of the Cabinet Manual. The Constitution Committee’s report, Revision of the Cabinet Manual, published last July, stated at paragraph 35:
“We recommend that a draft update of the Cabinet Manual should be produced as soon as possible, and not later than 12 months from the date of this report.”
Paragraph 44 states:
“We note the open and constructive engagement which took place between the then Government and parliamentary committees on the first draft of the Cabinet Manual in 2010–11.”
Paragraph 45 goes on:
“We recommend that future drafts, including draft individual chapters, should be shared with our Committee and the relevant committee in the House of Commons for comment. This can help to achieve consensus”—
a word the Government do not seem fully to understand—
“on the text.”
It added that the next draft should commit to regular revision at the beginning of each Parliament—a summary of conventions, so that there is clarity and these things are understood.
On Dissolution principles, the Joint Committee at paragraphs 227 and 228 says that
“legislation—by definition—does not create or restore conventions … there needs to be a political process to identify, and to articulate, what those conventions are … The overwhelming consensus of those who gave evidence to the Committee is that the Dissolution Principles document falls short.”
Given that the Dissolution document as produced by the Government has received fairly universal criticism and very little approbation, it is quite remarkable that the Government have not yet provided a draft. I hope that the Minister will be able to say that a draft is now well under way and will shortly be provided. I say this with particular emphasis because we may well come out of the next election without a single-party majority. It is quite likely that there will be at least four parties which have two dozen MPs and another two parties which have perhaps a dozen, so there could be a very complicated outcome. At that point, we will need some clear guidance, understood by all those likely to be involved, about how government will be formed in a difficult situation.
The Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee in July 2021 pressed the Minister to issue a revised Dissolution principles document, which has not yet been provided, and the Minister in the other place, Chloe Smith, told the Commons on 13 September that there was
“ongoing dialogue to be had”—[Official Report, Commons, 13/9/21; col. 751.]
on Dissolution conventions. I hope the Minister will be able to tell us how that dialogue is going on, when it might conclude and whether he thinks it is appropriate for this Bill to become an Act before those necessary documents to mark and clarify our conventions, which should accompany it, have been published and agreed with Parliament. I beg to move.

Lord Norton of Louth: My Lords, I very much agree with the noble Lord about the need for a revision of the Cabinet Manual. It is long overdue. I see the point of his amendment is to try to spur that, so I put on record the importance of bringing it up to date and incorporating quite a lot of material that needs putting in.
I am a bit wary of the noble Lord’s amendments, particularly Amendment 10, because he is trying to get Parliament to approve something which is really in the gift of government. The Dissolution Principles are those which would govern the Prime Minister in requesting a Dissolution, and that really is a matter for government and the principles that will govern that. It might be laid before Parliament, but there really should not be a requirement for it to be approved by a resolution of the House of Commons.
There should be an update of the Cabinet Manual, but it is important to remember that the Cabinet Manual is not something that needs to be endorsed by Parliament. It is distinct from Parliament and draws together the  provisions, as we understand them, and the conventions, but it is a manual for government to which we can have recourse. Yes, there should be dialogue with committees and consultations so that we can feed into that, but at the end of the day it is within the remit of the government. It is a government document, not one to be endorsed by Parliament.

Viscount Stansgate: My Lords, I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Norton, that it does not have to be agreed by Parliament, but the Cabinet Manual is a really interesting document. I remember when it came out; other noble Lords might remember it as well. I believe it was triggered and inspired by the then Government and the then Cabinet Secretary, who is a Member of this House. It is a pity that he is not here because he could play a big part in the short debate that we are having on this question.
For those who have never seen it, it was a fascinating document because it encapsulated the conventions that had existed for many years but had never been codified in any way. It was very useful. I feel very sorry, incidentally, that, for a debate such as this, the noble Lord, Lord Hennessy of Nympsfield, is not here to take part. Our debates would be hugely enriched by having him here; of course, he coined one of the phrases of recent times, the “good chaps theory of government”. Many of the things that we have been discussing have illustrated ways in which people feel that we are departing from that theory and we are discovering that our constitution is capable of being abused. I do not want to go back over history, but we would not have had the discussion that we had about Clause 3 and references to the Miller case without that being an obvious example, and there are others.
Of course, this will not be pressed to a Division tonight, but a great deal more attention should be paid to the Cabinet Manual. I am rather unclear as to how it could be revised and who would be involved in doing it. A noble Lord said earlier that we were talking about where power lies in our constitution. When I visited a school recently, I recommended that the students read the Cabinet Manual, or at least have it to hand, because if they wanted to understand our constitution, that was an essential part of it. The sixth-formers looked at me rather blankly and I do not blame them in the slightest. That does not mean to say that I was wrong, because it still is very important. I am not sure how it could be updated, but it would be a very good thing. It is rather like when Gandhi was asked what he thought of civilisation in Britain and he replied, “Well, I think it would be a very good thing.”
Nevertheless, I support the spirit of the amendment and I would be interested to know whether we are going to come back to this on Report. If so, I hope to play a modest part in the debate at that stage.

Lord Kennedy of Southwark: I just want to say how much I enjoyed my noble friend’s speech. I very much agree with his points and those of the noble Lord, Lord Norton of Louth. The Cabinet Manual is an important document. It is a government document, not a parliamentary one, but we need to ensure that it is used properly and respected. That is a very important point to make.

Baroness Smith of Basildon: My Lords, I think that we have had a slightly longer and more interesting discussion on this than we anticipated at the start. The noble Lord, Lord Wallace, made a very valid point, not least because we have spoken a lot tonight about the normal conventions and practices of parliamentary politics. It remains to be seen whether the actions of this Government and this Prime Minister, in ignoring so many of them, will become the norm or whether, once he has gone, whenever that might be—it might be sooner than he anticipates—we will return to the normal way of abiding by the conventions.
I wonder whether the Cabinet Manual will be amended to say what happens or what should happen. I was amused earlier today when I read the section on the principles of collective Cabinet government. Paragraph 4.2 says:
“The Cabinet system of government is based on the principle of collective responsibility. All government ministers are bound by the collective decisions of Cabinet”,
which seems a remote concept at the moment, but perhaps we will return to those days as well.
Even though it is not within the power of Parliament to say that these documents should be updated, as with the Ministerial Code—the introduction to which now seems so dated and irrelevant in many ways because what is referred to in it has largely passed—there should be this regular updating. If we are to have a dynamic Parliament and a dynamic constitution, we need to update as appropriate.

Lord True: My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Wallace, has frequently looked forward to that fabled day when the Liberal Democrats will again have, as he sees it, a balance of power in government. Perhaps a manual could be published on what would be the likely behaviour of the Liberal Democrats in the event they had such constitutional authority.
Jokes apart, I am grateful to the noble Lord for raising these points. They are two fundamentally important documents, which, as my noble friend Lord Norton of Louth and the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, pointed out, are government documents. We published a Dissolution Principles document because we are aware that principles can operate effectively only when they are commonly understood and, yes, when there is tacit agreement that they should be respected, irrespective of the particular political challenges and circumstances of the day. There has been substantial discussion and scrutiny of the principles, including by the Joint Committee chaired by my noble friend Lord McLoughlin, by PACAC in the other place, and in dialogue back and forth.
As others have said, Amendment 10 proposes that there should be a process for Parliament to scrutinise a restatement of the principles in the form of a vote in both Houses, which has the difficulties that my noble friend Lord Norton of Louth and others referred to. The Government have reservations that this would be a step towards a codification of principles and conventions, just as we saw that the 2011 Act, which we have discussed, was not necessarily helpful because of the  need for flexibility. In fact, Lord Sumption recognised in principle the challenges of codification when he gave evidence to the Joint Committee. He argued:
“One should be careful not to start codifying conventions, because their practical value is that they represent experience and practice … what is required to make Parliament work is not necessarily the same today as it was half a century ago.”
That will be so in the future. The Government believe that a careful balance needs to be struck between ensuring that there is a tacit agreement that these principles should be upheld—I acknowledge the duty to be mindful of the views of people inside and outside politics—and leaving space for these conventions to move in line with the political context.
In practical terms, on this and the next amendment, the Government would be concerned that this amendment means that the provisions of the Bill would only come into effect once both Houses had considered and voted on a Dissolutions principle. That risks creating uncertainty around the coming into force of the Act and, therefore, the arrangements for calling any election, which we have all agreed today should be avoided.
The same applies to Amendment 11. As noble Lords have emphasised throughout the debates today, constitutional conventions have a vital role to play in our parliamentary democracy. I am conscious that the separate tradition of the Liberal Democrats, which I respect, is that they wish more and more to be written down. The Cabinet Manual, alongside other authoritative texts such as Erskine May, is an important point of reference and reflection for how conventions are understood—but iterations enable evolution.
The noble Lord, Lord Wallace, is quite right to say that it will be necessary to revisit these sections of the Cabinet Manual once the 2011 Act is repealed. The Cabinet Manual recognises that conventions continue to evolve, and the Government will in due course respond to the report of the Constitution Committee and set out their intentions with regard to updating the Cabinet Manual. We are grateful to the committee for its considered review of the manual and its thoughtful identification of the key issues that ought to be considered in terms of any update. I am acutely aware that the Government’s response is long overdue, and I have humbly apologised for this to the noble Baroness, Lady Taylor. We are carefully considering those recommendations and will respond in due course.
To continue on the amendment, the Government agree that the Cabinet Manual should be an accurate reflection of our constitutional arrangements, but we are of the view that this amendment for a parliamentary vote is unnecessarily restrictive, for the reasons given by my noble friend Lord Norton of Louth and others. But the Government are particularly concerned that the provisions of the Bill would only come into force once a revised version of the Cabinet Manual has been published. Such an undertaking would necessarily require a considerable amount of work. Tying the provisions of the Bill to such a project risks creating uncertainty, which, again, we wish to avoid.
Both these amendments would run the risk of fixing our understanding of these conventions at a point in time—that is point one—undermining the flexibility that is essential to our constitutional arrangements.  On the matter of the Cabinet Manual, I urge the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment, which would add complications because of the Catch-22 situation: the Cabinet Manual draws its authority from its ability to accurately reflect our arrangements, but we have not yet determined in Parliament what the successor arrangements to FTPA should be.
While obviously accepting the importance of both the principles and the manual as well as their relevance across party, beyond party and beyond this Parliament, I hope that the noble Lord will be content to withdraw his amendment.

Lord Wallace of Saltaire: My Lords, the question really is: where are these documents and when are they going to be published? There were some very critical comments from various committees of both Houses, including the Joint Committee, about the lack of quality in what is currently provided in the Dissolution Principles and about the outdatedness of the Cabinet Manual, particularly the part of it that deals with Government formation.
There may be an overall majority for one party at the next election, which would be easier, but we need to future-proof the Bill as we take it through and to prepare for other eventualities. The Joint Committee marks that we are more likely to have non-majoritarian outcomes from elections in the coming years than we have had in the last 50. Perhaps the Minister will be prepared to talk between now and Report about being able to provide some statement on Report about a rather more definite timespan than “in due course”, which, as we know, means “kicked into the long grass for the next year or two”.
We need to have, as far as we can, some shared assumptions, some cross-party agreement, about these crucial conventions in our constitution. That requires trust. Trust is currently in very short supply; trust in this Government and this Prime Minister, if the opinion polls are correct, is currently going through the floor. Where trust is lacking, one needs written rules. Where written rules are challenged, we end up requiring statute. Yes, we would perhaps prefer the flexibility of shared assumptions, but in that case we need to talk about what they are and make sure that we all share similar assumptions, before we slide into a situation that could be another critical outcome or contested set of procedures around the next election.
I look forward to talking further with the Minister, and I may or may not wish to bring these amendments back in some form on Report. For the moment, I am happy to beg leave to withdraw the amendment, and I wish all your Lordships a very pleasant evening.
Amendment 10 withdrawn.
Amendment 11 not moved.
Clause 6 agreed.
Schedule agreed.
House resumed.
Bill reported without amendment.
House adjourned at 10.47 pm.